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Executive Summary 
 
Wealth is a crucial parameter for economic well-being and fulfils several functions. 
It generates direct financial income such as capital gains, constitutes a source of 
consumption as well as a buffer during spells of economic stress and thus provides 
economic security, for instance. Wealth is of high importance with regard to 
intergenerational transfers and bequests which have a share in maintaining existing 
inequalities. Furthermore, the importance of wealth holdings accumulated for 
retirement purposes has increased in recent years. Despite of the particular 
importance of wealth as a measure of economic well-being and the various functions 
of wealth, its distribution on the individual level as well as the reasons for inequality 
in wealth holdings in Germany have not been fully explored. 
 
Amongst other things, current wealth holdings are determined by previous wealth, 
(permanent) income and consumption, and hence by saving. Shocks with regard to 
these determinants, e.g. unemployment or sickness, can affect wealth holdings. 
Marital splits constitute another potential shock in relation to wealth. Divorce is 
likely to reduce wealth holdings directly, as court and lawyer fees are incurred by 
divorces. Additionally, divorce is related to wealth indirectly, since family status 
correlates with the determinants of wealth. Marital splits can reduce (permanent) 
income in consequence of ceasing eligibility for fiscal privileges or the loss of 
specialisation gains. Consumption needs may be relatively lower for a couple than 
for a single individual due to economies of scale. Assuming that married couples 
derive higher income, saving for retirement is likely to be higher for couples in 
comparison to divorced individuals pursuant to the life-cycle approach. 
Precautionary saving incentives, however, may be higher for divorced individuals, as 
the institution of marriage reduces future risks.  
 
The incidence of divorce has become more and more prevalent. In Germany, divorce 
rates have increased over the last 50 years – while the ratio between divorces and 
new marriages was one to ten in 1960, it has risen to one divorce opposed to only 
two new marriages in 2008. Wealth is assumed to be negatively interrelated with 
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divorce and more and more marriages split up. Thus, divorce is likely to be an 
increasingly important determinant of the distribution of wealth on the individual 
level. Considering the increasing importance of wealth with regard to private 
retirement provision and other advantageous attributes of wealth like the generation 
of income or its transferability, the analysis of the relation between divorce and 
wealth can be conducive to explain differences in wealth holdings. An analysis of the 
relation between changes in marital status and wealth requires a careful consideration 
of the causal directions between the two parameters. On the one hand, marriage 
benefits the accumulation of wealth, e.g. as a result of economies of scale or the 
marriage wage premium. These advantages fall away in case of divorce. On the other 
hand, wealthier individuals are more likely to marry in the first place and less prone 
to divorce.   
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the relation between divorce and wealth and 
to provide evidence whether the effects of marital splits on wealth are actually causal 
– i.e. whether divorce leads to a reduction of individual wealth holdings and hence to 
a reduction in economic well-being. 
 
To analyse the relation between marital dissolution and wealth in Germany, data 
provided by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is employed. Individual 
wealth holdings were surveyed in 2002 and 2007. The measure of net-wealth 
comprises owner-occupied and other property, financial assets, private pensions as 
well as business and tangible assets and consumer credits. Data are multiply imputed 
to account for item and partial unit non-response which prevalently arise surveying 
wealth. Furthermore, the SOEP collects (retrospective) information on martial 
histories. If marital status affects the accumulation of wealth, it would not be 
appropriate to analyse wealth holdings using only the current marital status. Using 
marital histories, it is taken into consideration whether an individual who is currently 
married has been continuously married or whether he or she underwent a divorce and 
remarried. 
 
The skewness of the wealth distribution requires a transformation of the dependent 
variable. The inverse hyperbolic sine-transformation provides the opportunity to 
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include negative values and zero wealth holdings. To allow for the endogeneity of 
marital status with regard to wealth, the study applies propensity score matching 
methods. The bias caused by reverse causality could be completely eliminated by 
means of matching methods, if no unobserved variables had an impact on the 
outcome and the treatment status. With regard to divorce, however, unobserved 
heterogeneity is likely to occur. Prudence or the extent of caring for the partner 
constitute potential unobservable factors. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, 
conditional difference-in-differences matching is employed. 
 
Empirical results indicate that wealth and divorce are negatively related. Divorced 
individuals hold less wealth than continuously married individuals. This finding 
persists controlling for the individuals’ socio-economic background. Further analyses 
show that individuals who got divorced between 2002 and 2007 incurred losses in 
wealth, whereas individuals who remained married accumulated wealth, on average. 
Although female wealth decreases by a higher share of initial wealth in consequence 
of divorce, wealth holdings of men seem to be affected to a higher extent by divorce 
in relative terms: the relative difference in wealth between divorced and continuously 
married men increases to a higher extent than between women in the respective 
groups. In addition, the analysis provides some evidence that the effects observed are 
not actually causal – that divorce itself may not be considered to lead to a reduction 
of individual wealth holdings and hence to a reduction in economic well-being. 
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 Introduction 1   
 
Economic well-being constitutes a major component of overall well-being. In this 
context, the question arises how to measure economic well-being. The Canberra 
Group (2001, p. 3) states that “a household’s economic well-being can be expressed 
in terms of its access to goods and services”. According to Osberg and Sharpe 
(2002), economic well-being comprises four dimensions, namely consumption flows, 
income equality, economic security and wealth stocks.  
 
Some studies use consumption as a measure of well-being (e.g. Meyer and Sullivan 
2010). Smeeding and Thompson (2010, p. 7 et seq.) argue that this measure may be 
insufficient as consumption can be debt-financed and may therefore constitute a 
measure of hardship rather than well-being. An index for economic security can 
focus on several economic risks such as unemployment, sickness or old age (Osberg 
2009). It is a moot question, however, how to weight these risks to achieve a single 
measure. The primarily applied benchmark of economic well-being is income. Even 
if income constitutes a major determinant of well-being, wealth is a decisive 
supplementary factor of the command over economic resources (cp. Burkhauser, 
Frick and Schwarze 1997).  
 
Amongst other things, current wealth holdings are determined by previous wealth, 
(permanent) income and consumption, and hence by saving. Wealth can therefore be 
assumed to be a more permanent measure of economic well-being than current 
income. Furthermore, wealth is less volatile than income and can thus provide higher 
economic security (Frick and Grabka 2009b, p.579). While wealth and income are 
positively related, wealth is more unequally distributed than income (Grabka and 
Frick 2007). The correlation between income and wealth is far from perfect (cp. 
Wolff 2006a, p. 108, Smith 2001, p. 89 et seq., or Venti and Wise 1998), but their 
high interdependence is likely to exacerbate overall inequality (Davies 2009, p. 127). 
Moreover, the distribution of wealth is found to differ significantly by social groups 
such as gender (Sierminska, Frick and Grabka 2010) or immigrant and non-
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immigrant families (Bauer, Cobb-Clark and Sinning 2011). These wealth gaps in 
addition to income gaps are likely to make the overall distribution of well-being 
more unequal in comparison to considering only the distribution of income.   
 
Wealth fulfils several functions. Besides generating direct financial income such as 
capital gains, wealth constitutes a source of consumption as well as a buffer during 
spells of economic stress and thus provides economic security (e.g. Wolff 1998, p. 
131). Wealth is of high importance with regard to intergenerational transfers and 
bequests which have a share in maintaining existing inequalities (Szydlik and Schupp 
2004). Additionally, owning and using particular wealth components – such as 
tangible assets or housing wealth – can directly increase utility. A supplemental 
advantage of wealth is that it can promote power and prestige and therefore increase 
an individual’s public influence (cp. Claupein 1990, p. 32 et seqq., or Davies 2009, p. 
128). Furthermore, higher wealth holdings may facilitate obtaining a consumer credit 
(Canberra Group 2001, p. 3). Individual wealth also constitutes a relevant factor for 
retirement provisions. The importance of wealth holdings accumulated for retirement 
purposes has increased in in recent years (Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 663). In 
2002, the so called “Riester Rente” was introduced in Germany which is targeted to 
extend private retirement provisions by means of tax incentives, for example. The 
consumption-smoothing and self-insurance functions of wealth are emphasised by 
Davies (2009, p. 147 et seq.) as well. He states that accumulating a wealth stock has 
become more important as individuals face rising levels of risk and a higher life 
expectation.  
 
Despite of the particular importance of wealth as a measure of economic well-being 
and the various functions of wealth, its distribution on the individual level as well as 
the reasons for inequality in wealth holdings in Germany have not been fully 
explored. Amongst other things, shocks with regard to the determinants of wealth, 
e.g. unemployment or sickness, can affect wealth holdings. Marital splits constitute 
another potential shock in relation to wealth. 
 
Wealth holdings are related to marriage and divorce directly and indirectly. Divorce 
has an immediate effect on the wealth stock as it causes direct costs which are 
12 
 
incurred primarily in the form of court and legal fees. Other direct costs of marital 
splits can arise, if expenditures for goods previously shared have to be financed. 
Furthermore, the credit line may be relatively lower for a single individual than for a 
married couple (cp. Fethke 1989, p. 122). 
 
Besides the direct effects of divorce, marital status can indirectly affect wealth, as its 
determinants are also related to family status. Hence, different marital histories can 
constitute one reason for variations in wealth holdings. Becker (1974b) was one of 
the first to link marital patterns to economic behaviour like labour force participation 
or the allocation of resources. Subsequently, bargaining processes over labour supply 
or consumption within the household were addressed in game theoretic approaches 
(Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, Chiappori 1992). According 
to economic theory, marriage involves benefits which arise from joint production and 
consumption as well as from risk pooling. These advantages cease to exist in case of 
divorce. In the following, the relation between determinants of wealth and marital 
status are outlined to specify their links. 
 
Family arrangements can have an impact on labour supply (Becker 1974b) and hence 
on current and future income (Heckman 1976). Marital gains resulting from 
specialisation corresponding to the spouses’ comparative advantages are assumed to 
increase a couple’s outcome. Legal regulations like taxation of the total income on 
the basis of equal halves (“Ehegattensplitting”) additionally favour the income of 
married couples in Germany. Furthermore, couples benefit from economies of scale 
in consumption (e.g. Lazear and Michael 1980, p. 92 et seq.). In case a couple splits 
up, these benefits with regard to income and consumption fall away. Income 
subsequent to divorce will amongst other things depend on previous human capital 
accumulation, which hinges on previous labour supply and is thus related to the 
degree of specialisation during marriage. However, theory suggests that labour 
supply decisions and marital stability are determined simultaneously. If the spouse 
specialised in non-market work decides to increase their labour supply, the gains 
from marriage are assumed to decrease and thus the probability of divorce increases 
ceteris paribus. In turn, facing a higher propensity to divorce, the spouse not 
specialised in market work is likely to increase their labour supply (Becker 1985, p. 
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S34). In a bargaining approach, labour supply decisions are of additional concern as 
the bargaining position within marriage may be affected by unequal human capital 
accumulation of the spouses.  
 
Assuming that married couples derive higher income and benefit from joint 
consumption, saving is higher for couples in comparison to divorced individuals as 
well. Furthermore, saving motives can differ by marital status. Pursuant to the life-
cycle approach (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954), higher permanent income involves 
saving at a higher rate. As couples are assumed to derive higher permanent income 
than single individuals, they are likely to save more. Precautionary saving incentives, 
however, may be higher for divorced individuals as the institution of marriage 
reduces future risks (e.g. Lillard and Panis 1996 or Waite 1995, p. 486 et seqq.). 
 
Children are assumed to be an important marriage-specific investment (Becker 
1974b, p. 304). The presence of children can have an impact on consumption, labour 
supply decisions or saving and saving motives – and therefore on wealth 
accumulation. The presence of infants will most likely reduce the mother’s labour 
supply, for instance (e.g. Smith and Ward 1980, p. 244, or Drobnič, Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1999, p. 142). The consumption of the parents may change in consequence 
of the modified time allocation (Smith and Ward 1980, p. 244), the needs of children 
have to be met and the demand for goods complementary with children is likely to 
rise. Children can have an effect on income and consumption and consequently their 
presence can affect saving. Saving for intergenerational transfers is likely to be 
positively related to the presence of children. Saving for retirement, however, may be 
reduced in families with children since they can support their parents in case these 
outlive their income or asset base (Fethke 1989, p. 125). The precautionary saving 
motive could be weakened as elder children may assist their parents in times of 
unexpected changes in income or sickness.  
 
The determinants of wealth accumulation can differ between sexes in some respects 
(e.g. Bajtelsmit 2006, p. 125 et seqq.). Economic theory suggests that specialisation 
in market and home work increases the gains of marriage. Although female labour 
supply has increased over the last decades, a gendered division of household chores 
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is still observable (Klaus and Steinbach 2002). The gender wage gap is attributed to 
more discontinuous employment histories of women, their choice of occupations or 
labour market discrimination (e.g. Blau and Kahn 2000, p. 80 et seq.). The difference 
in (permanent) income between men and women is one of the main reasons for the 
gender wealth disparity (e.g. Warren, Rowlingson and Whyley 2001 or Sierminska, 
Frick and Grabka 2010). The partner who takes care of children during marriage and 
custody after divorce is mostly the woman (e.g. Burkhauser et al. 1991, p. 322, or 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2010, p. 14 et seq.). Living with children may have an effect 
on her labour supply and the consumption and saving behaviour of the household – 
and therefore on wealth.  
 
Considering these links between marital status and the determinants of wealth 
accumulation, divorce can be assumed to decrease wealth holdings directly and 
indirectly: court and lawyer fees are incurred by divorces. Marital splits can reduce 
(permanent) income in consequence of ceasing eligibility for fiscal privileges or the 
loss of specialisation gains. Consumption needs may be relatively lower for a couple 
than for a single individual. Saving for retirement is presumably higher for married 
couples than for divorced individuals – in contrast to the incentive to save for 
precautionary reasons, however. Marital decisions are made simultaneously to labour 
supply, saving and fertility decisions. The causal direction between marital status, 
income, consumption or saving, and fertility is hence ambiguous and may differ 
between sexes. The effect of divorce on wealth can therefore be assumed to differ 
substantially depending on several decisions made before, during and after marriage. 
Even if divorce is likely to be negatively related to wealth, the correlation between 
marital status and wealth cannot arrive at completely unambiguous conclusions 
theoretically. 
 
As in other countries, the number of marriages has decreased in Germany over the 
past decades. At the same time, the incidence of divorce has become more and more 
prevalent. Figure 1 exhibits that divorce rates have increased considerably over the 
last 50 years – while the ratio between divorces and new marriages was one to ten in 
1960, it has risen to one divorce opposed to only two new marriages in 2008. 
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Figure 1: Number of divorces and marriages in Germany 1960-2008 
 
 
Divorces: Until 30.6.1977 according to “Ehegesetz” (“Gesetz Nr. 16 des Kontrollrates”, legislated 20.2.1946), 
since 1.7.1977 according to “Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts” (legislated 14.6.1976). Until 
1990: West-Germany only. Marriages: Until 1992: West-Germany only. 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2009). 
 
Wealth is assumed to be negatively interrelated with divorce and more and more 
marriages split up. Thus, divorce is likely to be an increasingly important 
determinant of the distribution of wealth on the individual level. Considering the 
increasing importance of wealth with regard to private retirement provision and other 
advantageous attributes of wealth like the generation of income or its transferability, 
the analysis of the relation between divorce and wealth can be conducive to explain 
differences in wealth holdings. The purpose of this study is to identify the relation 
between divorce and wealth and to provide evidence whether the effects of marital 
splits on wealth are actually causal – i.e. whether divorce leads to a reduction of 
individual wealth holdings and hence to a reduction in economic well-being.     
 
Becker’s (1974b) theory implies that wealth accumulation before marriage (or 
remarriage as regards divorced individuals) improves an individual’s chances on the 
marriage market. As positive assortative mating is assumed to be optimal with 
respect to wealth, wealthier individuals are more prone to (re)marry and are more 
likely to mate a wealthier individual at the same time. Higher marital gains resulting 
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from higher wealth additionally involve higher martial stability and reduce the 
probability of divorce. Analysing the relation between divorce and wealth holdings, 
this endogeneity in the form of reverse causality or simultaneity must be accounted 
for. Moreover, potential unobserved heterogeneity can bias the results. 
 
Some former studies examine the relation between marital status (or marital 
histories) and wealth holdings (e.g. Wilmoth and Koso 2002, Bolin and Pålsson 2001 
or Yamokoski and Keister 2006). Most of the analyses do not account for 
endogenous parameters, though. Furthermore, the studies mostly apply measures of 
household wealth. Davies (2009, p. 129), however, states that concerning wealth the 
interest in ownership and thus in individual wealth holdings is essential. Analysing 
the relation between family status changes and wealth, it is reasonable to employ 
data on the individual level as this allows to gain insight into gender differences and 
the intra-household distribution of wealth (cp. Schmidt and Sevak 2006, p. 145 et 
seq.). Another shortcoming of some analyses is that they use the current marital 
status instead of accounting for marital histories. O’Rand (1996) argues that life-
course trajectories can be held responsible for intra-cohort inequalities and that 
institutional benefits cumulate over time. If marital status affects the accumulation of 
wealth, it would not be appropriate to analyse wealth holdings using only the current 
marital status. Applying marital histories, it is taken into consideration whether an 
individual who is currently married has been continuously married or whether he or 
she underwent a divorce and remarried. Assuming that divorces are indirectly and 
directly related to wealth holdings, this differentiation is beneficial for the study.  
 
To examine the relation between marital dissolution and wealth in Germany, data 
provided by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is employed. Individual 
wealth holdings were surveyed in 2002 and 2007. Furthermore, the SOEP collects 
information on marital histories. To allow for the endogeneity of marital status with 
regard to wealth, this study applies propensity score matching methods. Conditional 
difference-in-differences matching is employed to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
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Empirical results indicate that divorced individuals hold less wealth than 
continuously married individuals. This finding persists controlling for the 
individuals’ socio-economic background. Further analyses show that wealth holdings 
of individuals who got divorced between 2002 and 2007 decreased, whereas wealth 
of individuals who remained married increased, on average. Multivariate analyses 
support this finding. In general, women hold less wealth than men. For both sexes, 
divorce is found to be negatively related to wealth. While the difference in wealth 
between continuously married women and women who got divorced between 2002 
and 2007 is higher initially, the relative difference in wealth holdings of continuously 
married and divorced men increases to a higher extent in consequence divorce. 
Finally, results of conditional difference-in-differences matching suggest that the 
negative relation between divorce and wealth may rather be driven by the different 
distributions of background characteristics of ever married and divorced individuals 
and that the reduction in wealth of divorced individuals may not actually be involved 
by divorce.  
 
In the following, the economic theory of marriage and divorce as well as the concept 
of wealth underlying this study are outlined. Subsequently, an overview of the 
relation between wealth accumulation and marital status is provided. Chapter 3 
discusses the data and methods applied. Empirical evidence on the relation between 
divorce and wealth is summarised in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the 
results and provides an outlook for future work.  
  
18 
 
 
 Theoretical Background 2   
 
This chapter gives an overview of the economic theory and the legal regulation of 
marriage and divorce, the concept of wealth underlying the empirical analysis, the 
channels of wealth accumulation and the interrelation of wealth and marital status. 
Subsequently, analyses concerning the distribution of wealth and the economic 
consequences of marital splits are reviewed.    
 
2.1 Economic Theory of Marriage 
 
In general, two possibilities of intra-family allocation can be distinguished: unitary or 
common preference models, and collective or bargaining approaches, respectively. 
The first assume an aggregated family utility function which is maximised by a 
single decision-maker and hypothesise income pooling. The latter allow for distinct 
preferences and thus for more than one decider.  
 
Unitary models 
In 1956, Samuelson introduced his consensus model. In this attempt, the utility 
functions of household members are maximised as if they constituted one single 
consensus social welfare function. However, the modalities of decision-making are 
not specified.       
 
One of the first economic theories of marriage and marital dissolution was developed 
by Becker (1973, 1974a, 1991). His neoclassical altruist or caring model assumes an 
unselfish head of the family1 considering the inputs and preferences of all household 
members when maximising an aggregated utility function 
 
                                                 
1The marginal rate of substitution of the altruistic household head between his or her own 
consumption and the consumption of the other household members equals one (cp. Althammer 2000, 
p. 63).  
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(1)   ∑	
 with 
  		, … , ; 	, … , ; 	, 
 
where  stands for services and market goods,  for time inputs of the  household 
members and  for “environmental” variables. The utility function is maximised 
subject to a time and budget constraint 
 
(2)                            in combination with 
(3) ∑   ∑  !  "# ⇒ 
(4) ∑   ∑ !  ∑ !  "  %  
 
with & as the price of the respective market good, ' as the wage rate and ( as the 
time a household member spends for market work. ) constitutes the total time and * 
the maximum income achievable assuming constant wage rates ', + stands for 
property income. 
 
Labour supply decisions of the household members not only depend on their own 
wage rate but are also determined by the wage rate of the partner. Household non-
labour income and the price of consumption goods constitute other determinants. 
Besides the substitution and income effects, a cross-substitution effect exists which is 
assumed to be equal for both spouses. All household members are affected by a 
change in prices or wages to the same extent. If the wage rate of one household 
member increases, the labour supply of the other individual will decrease ceteris 
paribus. This assumption is also referred to as the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix 
(cp. Mincer 1962 or Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974). Household members can 
specialise in non-market or market work, respectively, corresponding to their 
comparative advantages. Individual f will spend more time in the household than 
individual m, for instance, if ', - '. and if  /0/12 - /0/13, given that .  ,. A 
complete specialisation of individual f in non-market investments ()  .) would 
take place, if the quotient of the wage rates ', and '. was sufficiently large or if the 
marginal product of non-market investments was sufficiently higher for individual f 
than for individual m, respectively (Becker, 1973, p. 816 et seq.). In case an 
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individual does not take part in the labour market, their work in the household is 
assessed by means of a “shadow” price which equals the marginal product of the 
individual’s time. It is assumed to be lower than the wage for market work so that 
there is an incentive to confine to non-market work. It is thus comparable to a 
reservation wage. The “shadow” price is positively related to the sum of nonhuman 
capital (Becker 1974b, p. 315). 
 
As regards the decision to marry, Becker’s choice-theoretic model assumes that the 
expected utility from marriage must exceed (or at least equal) the utility remaining 
single. An individual searches for a partner as long as the search costs are lower than 
the value of an expected improvement in the potential partner (Becker 1974, p. 22). 
In other words, the costs of continuing to search for a better match are composed of 
the income foregone in consequence of postponing marriage and the costs of 
searching (Becker, Landes and Michael 1977, p. 1148). 
 
(5)    ≡ 
 5 
6  
6,  with    >
6  and >
6, 
 
where 7,. and 8,. stand for the respective maximum obtainable outcome being 
married and 9,: and 9:. describe the output in the case of two separate households 
(Becker 1973, p. 818). Accordingly, marriage is continued as long as the gain of 
remaining married is higher than the expected loss sustained in consequence of 
separation, taking into account renewed search costs or legal fees.  
 
Becker (1973, p. 818) argues that the main reason to get married is to rear own 
children. Furthermore, marriage can generate benefits if , and . (or (, and (., 
accordingly) are imperfect substitutes and if specialisation within the household 
takes place (cp. Becker 1973, p. 819 et seq.). However, a sufficient extent of “caring” 
could involve that positive instead of negative assortative mating as regards 
productive capacities is optimal (Becker 1974a, p. 17). Additionally, the more 
partners care for each other the higher the gains from marriage since caring 
constitutes a (non-marketable) household commodity and reduces policing costs 
(Becker 1974a, p. 12 et seqq.). 
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The optimal output of a married household can be written as 
 
(6) 
  	;<=>∅	<=@	=	A=B<=; ≡ %C !,!,# ≡
%D%
C  
 
when returns to scale are constant. By means of equation (6) it can be shown that an 
exogenous increase in property income for both individuals by the same percentage 
(+, *,⁄  +. *.⁄ ) rises full income – and thus the respective gains from marriage –  
by the same percentage. If the individuals’ allocation of time does not change, the 
costs of production remain unaffected by the rise in property income. Hence, an 
increase in property income would increase the propensity to get married or lower 
the probability of divorce, respectively. The effect of a rise in both wage rates 
(subsequent changes in the allocation in time to be ignored) on the incentive to enter 
into or to dissolve a marriage is ambiguous, though, as the costs of production rise 
simultaneously to the rise in income. Thus, whether the gains from marriage increase 
or decrease in consequence of the rise of both wage rates is equivocal. The 
(additional) output rather depends on the relation of the wage rates and the 
individuals’ respective relative changes (Becker 1974b, p. 306 et seq.).   
 
Becker’s economic theory also provides indication for the quality of matches (1973, 
p. 823 et seqq., 1974a, p. 12 et seqq., 1974b, p. 308 et seqq., or Becker, Landes and 
Michael 1977). It is assumed that a market in marriages exists as individuals 
competitively search for a mate. Finding the optimal mate is therefore restricted by 
marriage market conditions: the sum of household output over all marriages is 
maximised instead of the output of every single marriage. In other words, the average 
gain from marriage compared to being single over all marriages is maximised (cp. 
Becker 1974b, p. 310). 
 
Optimal sorting may depend on the differences in characteristics of mates.  
Becker (1973, p. 825 et seqq.) shows that positive or negative assortative mating is 
optimal if  
 
(7) 
FG
 H,H#
FHFH ≷ 6. 
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In the case of positive assortative mating increasing the value of both individuals’ 
traits (J , 	K  8,7) adds more to the output than the sum of the additions when 
each is increased separately. Negative assortative mating is optimal, if the sum of 
separate additions is higher than the addition when increasing both. In other words, if 
traits are complements, positive assortative mating is optimal, whereas negative 
assortative mating is optimal if characteristics constitute substitutes. 
 
In the following, the optimal sorting with respect to some characteristics is outlined 
whereby individuals are assumed to differ only in the respective characteristic. 
As regards wage rates, negative assortative mating is generally optimal. 
 
(8) FG
 F!F!L ≡ 
 ≡ 
 ≷ 6, 
 
where 9.,  MNOPN,(.  NOQ R(. R',⁄ . The output is maximised if '. and ', 
are perfectly negatively correlated while . and , do not constitute gross 
complements2 as the gain from the division of labour is maximised. However, if 
some individuals are not in the labour force (R9 R',⁄  0 or R9 R'.⁄  0 and thus 
9.,  0) or wages are sufficiently low, a sorting could also maximise the output 
although the correlation between wage rates is less negative or even positive. In this 
case, wage rates would not be a decisive factor of optimal sorting as several sortings 
may be ranked equally (cp. Becker 1974b, p. 313 et seq.). Assumed that every 
individual is in the labour force (and thus market wage rates constitute the value of 
time) and they only hold different stocks of nonhuman capital K with r as the rate of 
return3, then 
 
(9) 
F

FT  F
FT  ACO - 6 and F
G

FTT  BABTCO - 6, 
 
while   
/U
/V2  /U/V3  0.  
                                                 
2 The term “gross complements” allows for the income as well as the substitution effect. 
3 Becker (1974b, p. 314) argues that r would be positively related to K, if r depended positively on the 
expenditure of time for portfolio management. Furthermore, he shows that W  R* RX⁄ . 
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Hence, perfectly positive assortative mating as regards property income would be 
optimal (Becker 1974b, p. 314 et seq.). However, comparable to the modification 
with respect to wage rates, if some individuals do not participate in the labour force a 
perfectly positive correlation of nonhuman capital may not be optimal.   
 
Differences in non-market productivity determine the part of differences in the 
output of commodities not explained by different wage rates or property. Becker 
(1973, p. 829 et seqq.) shows that positive assortative mating is optimal with respect 
to personal traits. However, he concedes that there are some psychological traits such 
as dominance or hostility for which negative assortative mating may be preferable 
(Becker 1974b, p. 318). As regards inheritable traits positive assortative mating may 
decrease the uncertainty about the “quality” of the child (Becker 1974b, p. 318 et 
seqq.).  
 
Unitary models like Becker’s can be criticised insofar as they do not account for 
intra-household allocation and as the aggregation of preferences to a household 
utility function does not allow for the neoclassical concept of individualism (cp. 
Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992, p. 356). Additionally, the aggregation may fail 
according to Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Furthermore, the income pooling 
hypothesis – and thus the assumption that the allocation of time remains unaffected 
by an exogenous change in total income – have been rejected empirically by several 
studies as well as the assumption that all household members are affected by a 
change in prices or wages to the same extent (i.e. the assumption of cross substitution 
effects or the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix) (cp. Vermeulen 2002, p. 534 et seqq.).  
A shortcoming of the theory of optimal sorting is that only one trait is considered 
while other traits are held constant.  
 
Bargaining approaches 
Becker’s common preference or unitary model was enhanced by Manser and Brown 
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) who account for bargaining within marriage 
and therefore allow for distinct preferences and for more than one decider 
accordingly. For this purpose, they apply an axiomatic bargaining framework 
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whereupon a particular cooperative equilibrium model (for instance Nash-
bargaining) is employed. These cooperative game theory approaches distinguish 
between family resources and resources controlled by each household member 
individually and provide the possibility of individual utility functions (cp. Lundberg 
and Pollak 1993, p. 992). Thus, in contrast to the unitary models which focus on the 
inter-household distribution of resources, the inequality within the household can be 
illuminated by means of collective models. The assumption that a change in prices 
affects all household members to the same extent does not have to be satisfied. 
 
Manser and Brown (1980) consider two persons (Y  7, 8) who pool their incomes. 
Individual m maximises the utility Z, Q, P,, (,, [.# subject to a household 
income and time constraint (cp. equation (4)) and the utility function of the partner 
(Z. Q, P. , (. , [,#) and vice versa. Marriage generates gains if there exists at least 
one market good that cannot be shared by single individuals but by a married couple. 
On the one hand, there are “family” or “collective” goods (Q  	QQ, … , Q\) which 
every individual can consume. The consumption of these public goods by one 
individual does not reduce the amount available to other individuals. Other goods 
(P  	PQ, … , P\) constitute “private” goods that cannot be shared. The aspect 
of caring is introduced by means of an efficiency parameter [ that is dependent on 
the marital state and affects the utility level received accounting for personal 
characteristics of the partner. Each individual will accede to form a household or to 
continue a marriage only if the utility level achieved in this state is higher relative to 
(or at least not lower than) their threat points – the utility arrived in case of staying 
alone or getting divorced. To assess their respective gains obtainable from living 
together, both individuals have to agree on a bargaining rule. Gains are allocated 
Pareto-efficiently within the household subject to the bargaining power of the 
household members (cp. Vermeulen 2002, p. 536). Manser and Brown (1980, p. 37 
et seqq.) describe the dictatorial model and the symmetric Nash and Kalai-
Smorodinsky models in more detail. The model of McElroy and Horney (1981) is 
comparable to the above approach and concentrates on a Nash-bargaining concept.   
 
A drawback of these “divorce threat” models is that in order to assess the threat 
point, preferences have either assumed to be independent of the marital status or the 
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utility arrived in case of staying alone or getting divorced and in case of marriage 
have to be estimated simultaneously (cp. Chiappori 1988). Like in Becker’s model it 
is assumed that household members pool their incomes. Additionally, predisposing a 
bargaining model raises problems when it comes to empirical testing as no 
distinction can be made between the rejection of the bargaining setting and the 
rejection of a particular allocation of gains, for instance (Vermeulen 2002, p. 536).  
 
Therefore, Chiappori (1992) only assumes that decision making within the household 
is Pareto-efficient (“efficiency approach”). Individuals are allowed to have egoistic 
preferences as well as to be altruistic in terms of caring (Chiappori 1992, p. 462 et 
seq.). The income pooling hypothesis does not have to be corroborated. Instead, the 
existence of a “sharing rule” is assumed which is not explicitly determined by the 
model and is a function of individual incomes. Other factors possibly influencing the 
rule are the weight of tradition, the cultural environment or the state of the marriage 
market (Chiappori 1992, p. 443). Household members allocate their share of private 
expenditures subsequent to the division of household income disposable for private 
and public goods. 
 
However, Lundberg and Pollak (1996, p. 150) argue that the assumption of efficient 
bargaining outcomes may be implausible as binding agreements cannot be made in 
case of the occurrence of asymmetric or incomplete information and as contracts 
with regard to intra-marital allocation or labour supply are not externally enforced. 
Another difficulty arises from assessing the sharing rule correctly.   
 
Besides the unitary and cooperative approaches, non-cooperative household models 
exist. Here, the decision process is described as a game between the household 
members. Those models assume that individuals maximise their utility subject to an 
individual budget constraint. The behaviour of the remaining household member is 
taken as given. However, non-cooperative models prevalently do not result in Pareto-
efficient allocations within the household (cp. Vermeulen 2002, p. 557 et seq., or 
Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992, p. 359). One example introduced by Lundberg and 
Pollak (1993) is the “separate spheres” bargaining model. The threat point in their 
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approach is a non-cooperative equilibrium which is determined by traditional gender 
roles. 
 
Even if the modalities to assess the achieved utility levels differ between economic 
theories of marriage and divorce, one consistent assumption is that marriage is 
continued as long as the utility in the married state is higher than the utility in case of 
a divorce. Another inference important with regard to the relation between wealth 
and marital dissolution is that higher wealth holdings involve higher gains from 
marriage and therefore reduce the propensity to split up. Furthermore, the assumption 
that positive assortative mating is optimal concerning wealth implies that selection 
into marriage depends on wealth. 
 
2.2 Legal Regulation of Marriage and Divorce 
 
Marriage laws can affect wealth holdings directly and indirectly as they regulate the 
division of marital property and have an impact on consumption and saving 
behaviour during and after marriage (cp. Wilmoth and Koso 2002, p. 255). In the 
following, a short overview of the legal regulation of marriage and divorce in 
Germany focusing on the accumulation and division of wealth is given.4 
 
The BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) constitutes the legal foundation of German 
marriage and divorce law to a large extent. In 1977, a unilateral no-fault divorce law, 
namely the 1st EheRG (Ehereformgesetz), was enacted.5 The most important change 
was the replacement of fault divorce by the principle of irretrievable breakdown 
(“Zerrüttungsprinzip”). Thus, the failure of marriage constituted a sufficient reason 
for divorce from then on. Since 1977, one year of separation (i.e. spouses may not 
share and must be willing not to re-establish a common household) suffices as a 
                                                 
4For a broader overview of legal regulations see BMJ (2009), Andreß and Lohmann (2000, p. 37 et 
seqq.) or Voegeli and Willenbacher (1992). Engelhardt, Trappe and Dronkers (2002) provide a 
comparison of divorce regulation in former East and West Germany. 
5 The 1stEheRG was passed on 14th June 1976 and came into force 1st July 1977. 
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precondition, if both spouses consent to divorce (§ 1565 BGB). In the case of 
unilateral divorce claims, a triannual separation is required (e.g. Gude 2008, p. 292).6 
 
On the basis of the 1st EheRG the concept of sole breadwinner ceased to apply and 
marriage was established as a cooperative union of two individuals having equal 
rights and responsibilities. In this regard, the adjustment of pension rights 
(“Versorgungsausgleich”) was implemented.7 Entitlements to social security 
pensions accrued during marriage are shared equally between spouses in case of a 
divorce. The adjustment is made ex officio and thus independent of the needs of the 
spouses in order to allocate the social security pension rights acquired equitably (§ 
1587 BGB). The adjustment of pension rights was reformed in 2009. Until then, all 
pension rights were summed up separately for each individual and the sum was 
equalised subsequently. Making the entitlements comparable was error-prone. The 
equalisation of private and occupational pensions was often inadequate. Accordingly, 
each pension right acquired during marriage is equalised separately since 1st 
September 2009. Furthermore, if the marriage lasted only up to three years, the 
adjustment is not made ex officio (cp. BJM 2009, p. 52). 
 
Until 1977, only the spouse considered the guilty party of divorce was liable for 
alimony payments. The 1st EheRG detached the claim to maintenance from the fault. 
An individual is entitled to payments from the partner only on the basis of needs in 
consequence of the marriage. In principle, each (ex-)spouse has to care for 
themselves. However, (temporary) maintenance claims can be enforced in case of 
unemployment, on the basis of age or medical conditions or time for (further) 
education as well as for equity reasons. Furthermore, child support and subsistence 
allowance in the event of insufficient own income can be claimed. Claims to 
                                                 
6 González and Viitanen (2009) show that introducing no-fault divorce legislation increased divorce 
rates in several European countries. The study by Kneip and Bauer (2009) reveals that the change to 
unilateral divorce involved a rise of divorce rates in Western Europe. Stevenson (2007) finds that the 
adoption of unilateral divorce laws lowers the incentives to invest in marriage-specific capital in the 
early years of marriage independent of the property division law. However, home ownership seems to 
be affected by prevailing property division laws. 
7Weitzman (1992, p. 86) argues that career assets are “often the major assets acquired during 
marriage”.  According to her this “new property” should be divided at marital splits. The German law 
attempts to comply with that by means of pension right adjustment and alimony payments. However, 
Ott (1993, p. 134) argues that no equal distribution of earnings is stipulated and that alimony 
payments are often only temporary. 
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maintenance are regulated by §§ 1570-1576 BGB. In January 2008, some aspects 
concerning maintenance were reformed. The main focus was shifted to the best 
interest of the child and thus the child support. Furthermore, the principle of post-
marital individual responsibility was consolidated (cp. BMJ 2009, p. 36 et seqq.).  
 
In consequence of the law of equal rights (“Gleichberechtigungsgesetz”) coming into 
effect in 1958, marriage constituted a community of acquisitions 
(“Zugewinngemeinschaft”) in Germany (§§ 1363-1390 BGB). Wealth components 
accrued during marriage are owned jointly by the spouses. In consequence of 
divorce, gains accumulated in the course of marriage are equalised 
(“Zugewinnausgleich”), whereas wealth acquired before marriage 
(“Anfangsvermögen”) as well as inheritances and gifts received while being married 
are added to the wealth accrued before marriage. However, the increase of the value 
of these inheritances and gifts constitutes a gain and has to be offset in case of a 
divorce. The gain acquired during marriage (“Zugewinn”) is the value by which the 
wealth of one spouse after marriage (“Endvermögen”) exceeds their wealth holdings 
before marriage (§ 1373 BGB). Before 2009, if net-wealth accumulated before 
marriage was negative, the value was set to zero for the calculation (cp. Table 1). 
After assessing the gain of each spouse, the difference between them is calculated 
and divided by two. The spouse who gained less during marriage has a claim for 
compensation in the amount of the resulting value. 
 
According to the definition of the courts, objectively assessable wealth as well as 
legally protected positions (like an entitlement to severance payments) are described 
by the term property if they are vested. § 1376 BGB regulates the valuation of wealth 
holdings before and after marriage. Wealth is valued by means of respective current 
market prices. However, a particular method to assess the value of appreciation is not 
statutory. Conjugal homes or household effects are divided in consideration of a 
constricted compensatory principal in favour of the spouse that is worse off 
economically. Regulations in this regard are less explicit and provide higher latitude 
of judgement (cp. Andreß and Lohmann 2000, p. 50). Since September 2009, not 
only property but also debts incurred before marriage are accounted for. 
Furthermore, wealth holdings at the time of filing for divorce are considered instead 
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of wealth at the actual divorce to restrain spouses from diverting wealth during the 
separation period. 
 
 
Table 1: Numeric example “Zugewinnausgleich” 
 
 wife husband 
amount in € before 2009/since 2009 before 2009/since 2009 
wealth acquired before 
marriage 
(“Anfangsvermögen”) 
10,000 -5,000 
wealth at divorce 
(“Endvermögen”) 
30,000 45,000 
gain acquired during 
marriage (“Zugewinn”) 
20,000 45,000 / 50,000 
equalised gains 
(“Zugewinnausgleich”) 
+12,500 / +15,000 -12,500 / -15,000 
 
Table 1 provides a calculation example for the equalisation of the gains accumulated 
in the course of marriage. Here, the wife accrued 20,000 € during marriage, the 
husband 45,000 € applying the regulation in force until 2009. Since then, also debts 
incurred before marriage are included in the calculation of the “Zugewinn”. Thus, the 
gains of the husband amount to 50,000 €. The gains accrued during marriage are 
summed up and divided by two subsequently. The amount of the 
“Zugewinnausgleich” is the result from the difference between these average gains 
and the respective gain accrued by either spouse. In the example, the wife would be 
entitled to a compensation amounting to 12,500 € until 2009. Since then, the husband 
would have to pay 15,000 € to his wife in case of a divorce.   
 
By means of notarised marriage settlement (§§ 1408-1413 BGB) spouses can 
stipulate separation of property (“Gütertrennung”, § 1414 BGB). If so, gains 
acquired during marriage are not equalised in case of divorce. On the other hand, 
marriage contracts can covenant community of property (“Gütergemeinschaft”, § 
1415 BGB) which implies that (parts of) wealth holdings brought into marriage of 
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either spouse are consolidated to joint property. An adjustment of pension rights and 
alimony payments can be stipulated as well. If, however, the notarised marriage 
settlement violates the interest of a child or if one spouse is unilaterally 
disadvantaged the contract may be voided (cp. BMJ 2009, p. 17 et seqq.). 
 
As regards taxes, married couples can profit from the taxation of their total income 
on the basis of equal halves (“Ehegattensplitting”, §§ 26b, 32a Abs. 5 EStG). 
Incomes of either spouse are added and the couple’s taxable income is assessed 
jointly. Subsequently, the income subject to income tax is divided by two and 
afterwards the accrued taxes on this amount are doubled. Tax advantages arise for 
sole earner households, in particular, whereas no benefits accrue if both spouses 
contribute to the household income to the same degree. A married couple’s saver’s 
tax-free allowance is twice as high as for singles and losses can be offset between 
positive and negative income components of the spouses (cp. Vollmer 2006, p. 74 et 
seq.).  
 
2.3 The Concept of Wealth 
 
Before looking at the reasons for wealth accumulation and the distribution of wealth, 
the underlying concept is specified.  
 
Almost every definition of wealth requires at least three conditions to be fulfilled: 
wealth is supposed to be a stock variable, it has to be disposable (inclusive of 
property rights), and the economic value of wealth should be assessable (cp. 
Claupein 1990, p. 20 et seqq., or Ring 2000, p. 40 et seqq.). The Royal Commission 
on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (1975, p. 9) states that the concept of 
personal wealth requires wealth to be owned and valuable. Jenkins (1990, p. 333 et 
seq.) defines an individual’s wealth as “a monetary valuation at some point in time of 
the total stock of his or her current and future claims over resources”. Moreover, he 
states that in order to specify the concept of wealth the resources considered, the 
valuation method and the concept of ownership have to be determined. As regards 
the assessment of the value of wealth holdings, one can distinguish between different 
concepts: the initial, the current, and the replacement value, for instance. For the 
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analysis of private households’ wealth, the current value is of particular relevance 
(Claupein, 1990, p. 50 et seqq., or Royal Commission 1975, p. 71 et seq.).8 The 
Royal Commission (1975, p. 9 et seq.) argues that the requirements of ownership and 
marketability are associated to the valuation method. To provide the opportunity to 
assess its value at a particular point in time, wealth is required to be a stock variable. 
Flows like income and saving contribute to changes in the wealth stock over a certain 
period. Hence, wealth holdings can reveal long-term differences in households’ or 
individuals’ saving behaviour (Stein 2004, p. 17). The requirement of disposability 
comprises several functions of wealth: it generates gains, provides economic 
security, wealth can be transferred (and bequeathed, respectively) or consumed and it 
is a source of power and prestige (Claupein 1990, p. 32). This implies that wealth 
should be marketable and acceptable as collateral, too. 
 
A general concept of personal wealth implies human and non-human capital. The 
measure of non-human capital comprises financial and tangible assets. Financial 
assets can include bank money or market investments, bonds, building savings 
contracts or shares, for instance. Tangible property can be sub-classified into 
property which is used for consumption and property for production purposes. Cars, 
TVs or household appliances, for instance, are referred to as consumption property. 
Buildings or estate constitute immovable property and are also described by this 
term. Business assets represent productive property. All these components of non-
human capital are disposable and they constitute a wealth stock. However, with 
regard to the assessment of the value of consumption property some problems can 
arise, whereas, in general, the value of productive property and financial assets is 
well ascertainable (cp. Ring 2000, p. 46 et seqq.). 
  
                                                 
8A general problem that arises when analysing the effect of divorce on income is the retrospective 
nature of income data which are surveyed for the year before the interview (cp. Schwarze and Härpfer 
2000, p. 29 et seq.). This is not the case for wealth data as property is valuated at the time of the 
survey.  
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Figure2: The formation of personal wealth 
 
Personal Wealth 
 
 
 Non-Human Capital     Human Capital 
- financial assets 
- tangible assets 
- social security wealth 
 
Source: cp. Andreß and Lohmann (2000), p. 23. 
 
Social security wealth (or social property) constitutes a supplemental component of 
non-human capital. Public pension rights are mostly referred to as social security 
wealth. A broader definition also comprises other social security benefits and access 
to health care or education, for instance (Atkinson and Harrison 1978, p. 4). Social 
security wealth is likely to constitute a considerable factor for the distribution of 
wealth. Not accounting for this additional wealth component presumably causes 
biased results as contributing to social pension schemes substitutes for other 
investments (Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 629, or Wolff 1996, p. 435).9 In 
Germany, the defined benefit pension scheme is likely to incentivise some 
population subgroups differently with regard to old-age provision. While the pension 
                                                 
9 Frick and Grabka (2010) use information on retirement pension expectancies provided by the 
Forschungsdatenzentrum der Deutschen Rentenversicherung (FDZ-RV) to extend the analysis of 
wealth holdings on the basis of 2007 SOEP data. They find that including pension wealth decreases 
the inequality of wealth. Applying the augmented measure increases wealth holdings in the lower 
quantiles of the distribution to a disproportional extent. However, the high concentration of wealth on 
the top of the distribution persists. In an earlier study, Dunn and Hoffman (1983, p. 252 et seqq.) show 
that including occupational and state pension rights in the measure of wealth decreases the share of 
total wealth for the upper percentiles of the distribution in the UK but increases differences among age 
groups. Disparities between men and women become smaller (Dunn and Hoffman 1983, p. 267). They 
argue that if other non-marketable components such as supplementary benefits or accommodation 
allowance were accounted for, the distribution would be even more equalised (Dunn and Hoffman 
1983, p. 255). Gustman et al. (1999) analyse the distribution of wealth in the USA including social 
security wealth. They also find that social security tends to smooth the disparity. However, the general 
pattern of inequality by marital status persists. For a supplemental overview of studies that were 
capable of examining the effect of social security wealth on the distribution of wealth see Mazzaferro 
and Toso (2009, p. 780 et seqq.), for instance. 
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scheme is statutory for the major part of the population it is optional for self-
employed or professionals (“Freiberufler”). A separate tax financed system without 
explicit contributions exists for civil servants, who are exempt from paying 
contributions to the statutory pension system. Wealth holdings of the different groups 
are likely to differ due to distinct incentives for retirement saving. The omission of 
social security pensions presumably leads to an underestimation of wealth holdings 
of employed people.10 However, the exclusion of public pension rights from the 
measure of wealth is general practice (Davies 2009, p. 129) due to a lack of 
appropriate data. Davies and Shorrocks (2000, p. 607) argue that assessing the 
monetary value of entitlements to social security pensions raises difficulties like the 
determination of discount rates or the question of risk adjustment. Furthermore, the 
requirement of ownership and marketability and thus the transferability and 
disposability of this component are not fulfilled (cp. Royal Commission 1975, p. 9, 
Atkinson 1971, p. 253, or Claupein 1990, p. 88 et seqq.). 
 
In addition to material assets, a more comprehensive concept of personal wealth, 
“total” wealth, comprises intangible property like human capital (e.g. Davies and 
Shorrocks 2000, p. 606). The capitalised value of the potential of income realisation 
and consequential wealth accumulation is sought to be included in this augmented 
measure of wealth. However, it is difficult to assess the monetary value of human 
capital. The human capital model of Heckman (1976) implies that the calculation of 
human capital requires information concerning factors like the extent of investment 
in, the depreciation rate of or the respective rate of return of human capital. The 
determination of all these parameters causes severe difficulties. Moreover, human 
capital cannot be considered disposable since it cannot (or at least can only at a 
fraction as in the case of notations or intellectual property rights) be transferred or 
merchandised (cp. Davies 2009, p. 127 et seq., or Ring 2000, p. 50 et seq.). 
 
The observation unit when analysing the personal distribution of wealth may be the 
individual or the household. It is important to discuss the choice of observation unit 
as the pattern of the distribution can change depending on whether the household or 
                                                 
10An overview of the advantages and disadvantages of embracing social security wealth by the term of 
wealth is given by Stein (2004, p. 81 et seqq.). 
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the individual wealth is analysed (Dunn and Hoffman 1983, p. 274 or Canberra 
Group 2001, p. 108 et seq.). Wealth is likely to be less unequally distributed on the 
household level in consequence of redistribution within the household (Frick, Grabka 
and Sierminska 2007, p. 11 et seqq.). Davies (2009, p. 129) states that the ownership 
of wealth is essential and that individual wealth holdings should be analysed 
preferably. In case of analysing household wealth, the choice of a sharing rule is of 
vital importance. Even if one spouse was in possession of the whole amount of 
household wealth, other household members would be likely to partake in this wealth 
(cp. Atkinson and Harrison 1978, p. 241 et seqq.). Jenkins (1990, p. 337) argues that 
the degree of sharing may depend on the respective type of wealth component. 
According to him, real property is more equally shared than financial assets, for 
instance. In the context of family status changes, it is reasonable to analyse wealth 
holdings on an individual level as gender differences can be examined more 
precisely and the intra-household distribution of wealth can be accounted for, for 
instance. Schmidt and Sevak (2006, p. 145 et seq.) argue that by means of a measure 
of wealth on the household level, ownership structures within marriage and hence 
intra-household inequality cannot be taken into consideration. Changes in individual 
wealth due to changes in family status can provide a deeper insight into the 
distribution since only considering household wealth can distort the results (e.g. 
Atkinson and Harrison 1978, p. 241 et seqq.). 
 
Imagine two married households with spouses disposing of 2,000 € in total. In 
household one, both individuals hold 1,000 € and in the other household one 
individual possesses the entire amount of 2,000 €, whereas the partner holds no 
wealth. Applying a per capita household measure of wealth, all these individuals 
would be equally wealthy and possess 1,000 €. In case of a divorce (assuming here 
that it involves no costs), both individuals of household one would still possess 1,000 
€. However, the distribution would change in case of the second household where 
one individual would now hold 2,000 € and seem to have gained 1,000 €, whereas 
the other would seem to have lost 1,000 €. In contrast, employing an individual 
measure of wealth the distribution would not have changed in consequence of the 
separation. 
 
35 
 
The study at hand focuses on the current value of individual nonhuman capital 
(minus debts) which can be merchandised and transferred, i.e. individual net 
marketable wealth. Net-wealth can take negative values if debts exceed the positive 
wealth holdings. The analysis is restricted to a narrower concept of wealth. The 
exclusion of human capital and social security pension rights in the applied measure 
of wealth results from the non-availability of appropriate data. However, both 
components are of special importance in the context of family formation and 
dissolution, mainly due to the simultaneous causality of labour supply (and thus the 
accumulation of human capital and the acquisition of pension entitlements) and 
marital status (e.g. Johnson and Skinner 1986, van der Klaauw 1996, Lundberg 
2005a or Bardasi and Taylor 2008). 
 
2.4 Wealth Accumulation 
 
In general, one can distinguish two possibilities to increase wealth holdings: via 
saving and via exceptional increases like inheritances or gifts. Moreover, as a result 
of revaluation the current value of the existent wealth holdings can change (e.g. 
Claupein 1990, p. 21 et seq., or Thiele 1998, p. 106 et seqq.). 
A simple equation to express wealth accumulation is 
 
(10) ]  	  A]O  ^ M C  _  	  A]O  %  _. 
 
Wealth in period  ( 1`) comprises wealth in the previous period (Wt-1) plus returns of 
investments (W1 ∗ 1`OQ), as well as income (b1), consumption expenditures (N1) and 
received inheritances (c1) in period  (Meade 1964, 1976). Thus, changes of these 
factors influence the wealth formation – the higher the income, inheritances, the 
initial wealth stock and the preference for risk (hence the higher W1), and the lower 
the consumption (or the higher the saving, respectively) in period , the higher 
becomes future wealth.  
 
A distinction is drawn between active and passive saving. The amount of income not 
spent for the purpose of consumption constitutes active saving (*1  b1 M N1). In 
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addition, the wealth stock can undergo a rise or decrease in value that is 
automatically reinvested. These capital gains are also referred to as passive saving 
and can be written as (W1 1`OQ) (e.g. Juster, Smith and Stafford 1999).11 Keister and 
Moller (2000, p. 70) argue that the concentration of wealth tends to be connected to 
stock market trends as wealthier individuals are more likely to hold stocks. A change 
in the value of real estate, however, assumable benefits a larger part of the population 
as this wealth component is more equally distributed.  
 
In the following, some saving inducements will be briefly outlined. Theoretically, 
there are several motives for saving12: e.g. wealth holdings can provide a buffer stock 
to protect against several risks such as earnings’ fluctuation or illness (precautionary 
motive), people save to smooth consumption over the life-cycle (saving for 
retirement), or they intend to leave bequests (intergenerational transfers). Browning 
and Lusardi (1996, p. 1797) list additional saving motives. 
. 
Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis assumes that people determine their 
consumption based on long-term income expectations instead of their current income 
and that transitory shocks do only marginally affect consumption behaviour. 
Accordingly, saving also depends on expected future income. The life-cycle 
hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954) links wealth holdings to the position of 
individuals in their life-cycles directly. Thus, the wealth accumulated is assumed to 
be a consequence of saving or dissaving in different stages of life. People save to 
smooth consumption over the life-cycle and hence a motive to save for retirement is 
implied. In consequence of this approach, wealth holdings are expected to exhibit a 
hump-shaped distribution over an individual’s life-cycle.13 Dynan, Skinner and 
Zeldes (2004), for instance, find evidence for a positive relationship between life-
time earnings and saving rates. However, like Atkinson (1971) or Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1981) they show that life-cycle factors alone do not account for the 
                                                 
11 Using PSID and SCF data Juster, Smith and Stafford (1999) find that capital gains accounted for 
about one fifth of wealth accumulation between 1984 and 1994.According to Wolff and Zacharias 
(2009) the omission of capital gains leads to a decrease in income from wealth and its share in 
inequality between 1982 and 2000. Accounting for capital gains reverses the results. A study by 
Cannari, D’Alessio and Gambacorta (2008) shows that wealth varies about 40% due to unrealised 
capital gains in Italy.  
12 For a comprehensive survey on saving see Kotlikoff (1989) or Browning and Lusardi (1996). 
13 For a more detailed overview of the life-cycle approach see Ring (2000, p. 93 et seqq.), for instance. 
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observed inequality of wealth. Life-cycle theory is least suitable to explain the upper 
part of the wealth distribution (Royal Commission 1975, p. 116). 
 
The simple life-cycle model can be extended by means of accounting for a 
precautionary and a bequest motive. People accumulate wealth for precautionary 
reasons to protect against unexpected future risks. Unanticipated changes in income 
due to spells of unemployment or in consequence of a household separation, for 
instance, constitute a major financial risk. Moreover, precautionary savings are 
sought to provide a buffer in case of impairment of health, which, besides direct 
financial liabilities for health care, can also affect the individual’s earnings capacity. 
Obviating financial straits in the case of longevity is another precautionary saving 
motive (cp. Banks, Blundell, Smith 2003, p. 267 et seqq.). If the bequest motive is 
not explicitly incorporated into the life-cycle model, inheritances only occur in case 
of unexpected deaths and therefore are involuntary. However, assuming that 
individuals can increase their utility via investment in the human capital of, or 
inheritances and gifts inter vivos they have an incentive to save for bequest reasons 
(Cagetti 2003, p. 341). Thus, if the marginal utility of bequeathing is higher than the 
marginal utility of own consumption, saving takes place with intent to bequest. 
Transfers can be made based on altruistic as well as on strategic motives like 
receiving attention (for a discussion of the bequest motive see Kotlikoff 1989, p. 68 
et seqq., Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 621 et seqq., Thiele 1998, p. 119 et seqq., 
Banks, Blundell, Smith 2003, p. 271 et seqq., or Stein 2004, p. 91 et seqq.). Lupton 
and Smith (2003, p. 132) argue that “significant asset accumulation for bequests may 
be operative only at high incomes”. 
 
Wealth holdings can increase as a result of revaluation of the current value in 
addition to a rise via saving. Reasons for changes in value are inflation or a change in 
scarcity. Furthermore, wealth policies like fiscal interventions14 can have an impact 
on the value of the wealth stock as well as on the saving rate (e.g. Claupein 1990, p. 
21, Stein 2004, p. 98 et seqq., Thiele 1998, p. 112, or Kotlikoff 1989, p. 167 et 
                                                 
14 Ring (2000, p. 61 et seqq.) and Stein (2004, p. 101 et seqq.) give an overview of potential wealth 
policies and their history in Germany. Stein (2004, p. 131 et seqq.) describes how public policy can 
affect saving behaviour. Ring (2000, p. 297 et seqq.) analyses the effectiveness and efficiency of 
wealth policies. 
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seqq.). Another reason for a rise in wealth is the incidence of exceptional increases. 
Primarily, this includes intergenerational transfers like inheritances. Ring (2000, p. 
101) argues that the amount inherited may inter alia depend on previous investments 
in the offspring’s human capital. Kohli et al. (2006, p. 66 et seqq.) show that 
inheritances tend to reduce the relative inequality of the distribution of wealth. They 
argue that the relative increase of wealth is higher for households at the bottom of the 
distribution. The absolute disparity, however, rises in consequence of inheritances. 
Received inheritances are assumed to constitute a transitory income component in 
the context of the life-cycle model, involving a propensity to save that is higher than 
out of permanent income (cp. Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 618). In accordance 
with that, Westerheide (2005) finds that the main part of transfers received flows into 
saving. This is particularly true for household with lower initial wealth holdings, 
most probably resulting in a smoothing effect of inheritances on the distribution of 
wealth. Kohli et al. (2006, p. 63 et seqq.), however, show that inheritances do not 
affect saving behaviour substantially in the long run. Besides inheritances, gifts of 
private persons or capital-forming payments are referred to as exceptional rises (e.g. 
Claupein 1990, p. 21, Stein 2004, p. 121 et seqq., or Ring 2000, p. 98 et seqq.).  
 
2.5 Wealth and Marital Status 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the relation between marital status and 
wealth. Theoretically, there are reasons why marriage could be positively related to 
wealth.15 Incentives to accumulate wealth can be higher for singles than for married 
individuals, though. Moreover, the inducements can differ between sexes. In the 
following, the interrelation between marital status and factors which may have an 
impact on the accumulation of wealth are outlined.  
 
Marital transitions can affect wealth directly and indirectly. Economic theory 
suggests that wealth and marital status are related. Wealth accumulation before 
marriage improves an individual’s chances on the marriage market. It is assumed that 
                                                 
15 A general overview on the benefits of marriage is given by Waite and Gallagher (2000), for 
instance. 
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positive assortative mating is optimal with regard to wealth. Thus, higher wealth not 
only increases the probability of getting married but also the chance to mate with a 
wealthier individual. Higher marital gains resulting from higher wealth additionally 
involve higher martial stability. In case of marriage failure, the wealth stock may be 
beneficial for covering the costs of divorce. 
 
Divorce causes direct costs and thus has an immediate effect on the wealth stock. 
Transaction costs of a divorce are incurred primarily in the form of court and legal 
fees. Expenditures for goods previously shared have to be financed. Furthermore, the 
credit line may be relatively lower for a single individual than for a married couple 
(cp. Fethke 1989, p. 122). 
 
Income and labour supply 
Besides the direct costs, marital transitions can indirectly affect wealth. In reference 
to equation (10), one of the main factors that have an impact on wealth is income. 
Wealth accumulation or saving, in particular, is significantly determined by 
(permanent) income. Moreover, income is linked to marital status. On the one hand, 
regulations benefit the income of married couples in Germany. On the other hand, 
family arrangements can have an impact on the labour supply and hence on current 
and future income. 
 
In Germany, family policy privileges married couples fiscally by means of taxation 
of the total income on the basis of equal halves (“Ehegattensplitting”). Additionally, 
spouses that do not work in the market sector as well as children are co-insured in the 
health insurance of the wage earner during marriage. Within three month after 
divorce, however, ex-spouses have to insure themselves. With regard to other 
insurances like liability insurance, spouses are also co-insured. Thus, tax savings and 
reduction of insurance costs are higher for married couples than for divorced persons. 
This applies to sole wage earner couples, in particular (for an overview of family 
policy instruments in Germany see Althammer 2000, p. 30 et seqq.). 
 
Pursuant to the traditional micro-economic approach, households maximize their 
utility as their members specialise in home- or market work, respectively, 
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corresponding to their comparative advantages and therewith increase the total 
output compared to one person households (Becker 1991). Specialisation provides 
one possible explanation for the marriage wage premium. The partner who 
specialises in market work is enabled to invest more time in human capital 
accumulation leading to higher efficiency. In other words, specialisation increases 
the productivity and thus involves higher wages (e.g. Loh 1996, Daniel 1995 or 
Bardasi and Taylor 2008). Another explanation for the marriage wage premium is the 
selection of more productive individuals into marriage (e.g. Nakosteen and Zimmer 
1987 or Korenman and Neumark 1991). Thus, married individuals are assumed to 
derive higher income than divorced individuals.  
 
Working in the labour force is an important determinant of human capital 
accumulation. Human capital expresses future earnings potential and therefore has an 
impact on wealth accumulation as it affects permanent income. Human capital 
accumulation before marriage has an ambiguous effect on the gains from marriage. It 
can be assumed, depending on the age at marriage however, that human capital is 
primarily accumulated in the form of schooling before marriage. For highly educated 
individuals, positive assortative mating may be optimal as they have high levels of 
market and non-market skills and thus the gains of marriage are high. The gains may 
be offset, however, as specialisation between highly educated spouses is less likely 
(cp. Becker Landes and Michael 1977, p. 1146 et seq.).16 
 
According to economic theory, intra-family labour supply decisions are made subject 
to comparative advantages. Specialisation implies higher gains of marriage. If the 
spouse that is specialised in non-market work decides to join the labour force, the 
gains from marriage decrease and the probability of divorce increases ceteris paribus. 
In turn, if divorce rates increase, the spouse not specialised in market work is likely 
to increase their labour supply (Becker 1985, p. S34). Labour supply decisions are of 
additional concern in a bargaining approach. The accumulation of human capital by 
the spouse working in the market sector is independent of the household context to a 
                                                 
16 Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009) show that the incentives to invest in schooling increases for 
women relative to men, if the return from schooling on the labour market rises. They argue that in 
consequence of weakened intra-household labour division norms and facilitation of domestic tasks 
owing to technological progress the return from schooling within marriage has increased for women.  
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large extent, whereas the non-market human capital mostly does not express income 
capacity. The bargaining position within marriage may be affected by the unequal 
human capital accumulation. The spouse who is (primarily) in the labour force 
improves his or her options outside of marriage as a result of higher earnings 
potential, whereas the other spouse’s options become worse in consequence of lost 
seniority and human capital depreciation (cp. Ott 1993, p. 122 et seqq.). Hence, a 
trade-off between the gains realised on the basis of specialisation and a higher 
divorce propensity in consequence of specialisation can arise. In other words, theory 
suggests that labour supply decisions and marital stability are determined 
simultaneously.   
 
Labour supply during marriage affects employment opportunities and wages after 
marital disruption. In case of a divorce, the partner who was specialised in non-
market work possibly faces difficulties to re-enter the labour market. Depending on 
the degree of specialisation during marriage and the length of the absence from the 
labour force, human capital accumulation is impaired. Formerly acquired human 
capital is depreciated in consequence of non-working times or part-time employment. 
The partner who was specialised in market work may be disposed to modify their 
labour supply in anticipation of or after divorce to reduce alimony claims (Zagorsky 
2005, p. 410, or Schwarze and Härpfer 2000, p. 20). Another explanation for the 
potential labour supply adjustment of the partner specialised in market work during 
marriage is that financial needs may be lower as a result of decreased household size. 
 
Consumption 
A second determinant of wealth accumulation is consumption. This factor is also 
likely to be related to marital status and stability. The concept of economies of scale 
implies that needs are lower for a two-person household than for two single 
households. Lazear and Michael (1980, p. 92 et seq.) suggest that economies of scale 
in consumption can arise from family or collective goods, which every individual can 
consume without reducing the amount available to other individuals. They take 
electric light or a piece of art as examples. Economies of scale apply particularly on 
housing. However, sharing a flat is also possible without being married. Becker 
(1973, p. 819) argues that “the explanation of why men and women live together 
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must go beyond economies of scale”. In a bargaining framework, consumption of the 
spouses and the sharing rule, respectively, depend on their bargaining power which is 
assumed to correspond to their incomes to a great extent (Chiappori 1992). In 
divorce-prone marriages, the incentive to consume while married is higher for an 
individual with higher decision power since the sharing during marriage will be in 
their favour, whereas savings are likely to be shared equally in consequence of 
divorce (cp. Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi 2007, p. 3). Their current and future 
utility rises with higher consumption during marriage, if they expect to be obliged to 
compensate their partner after divorce. Browning (1995, p. 280) argues that “if 
[joint] assets are split equally [upon divorce] then saving has something of a 
character of a public good since foregone consumption now may only be partially 
compensated for by later consumption if the two partners do split up”.  
 
Saving 
It is assumed that the part of income not consumed is saved. In the following, the 
interrelation of saving and marital status will be outlined. For this purpose the impact 
of marital status on precautionary saving, saving for retirement and intergenerational 
transfers is discussed. According to Becker’s theory of marriage, single individuals 
have an incentive to save as higher wealth improves their chances to marry. 
Moreover, based on the assumption that positive assortative mating is optimal with 
regard to property, wealthy individuals are likely to marry other wealthy individuals.  
As a result of family policy and specialisation gains, permanent income of married 
couples is assumed to be relatively higher than permanent income of single 
individuals. Assuming a positive correlation between higher permanent income and 
saving, married individuals are expected to save more than singles. The wealth 
holdings of couples are likely to increase relative to wealth of singles the longer 
couples can take advantage of the marital benefits. Accordingly, prospective wealth 
accumulation is higher for married households as well. Additionally, the incentive 
for married individuals to save for retirement may be higher than for singles as 
marriage benefits health and hence increases the life expectancy (e.g. Lillard and 
Panis 1996 or Waite 1995, p. 486 et seqq.). Precautionary saving incentives are 
higher for single households than for married couples as the institution of marriage 
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reduces the future risk (e.g. Waite 1995).17 As regards the risk of loss in income or 
periods of unemployment, this applies in particular for dual-earner marriages. A 
divorce-prone couple may save for precautionary reasons to cope with the income 
uncertainty after the marital split and the expected costs of a divorce. Finke and 
Pierce (2006) argue that the extent of precautionary saving of divorce-prone couples 
depends on the ratio of the spouses’ incomes. Couples where spouses contribute 
similarly to the household income are likely to increase precautionary saving to 
absorb the expected wealth shock caused by divorce. In marriages with more 
specialised division of labour or different spouses’ incomes, respectively, the returns 
of saving for the spouse with the higher income are lower during than after marriage 
because they have to compensate the other spouse upon divorce. The lower- or non-
earning spouse faces a higher income uncertainty, which results in a higher 
precautionary saving motive. Their expected income uncertainty decreases, however, 
due to the anticipated alimony payments which may in turn decrease the incentive to 
save for precautionary reasons. Besides saving for retirement and precautionary 
saving, intergenerational transfers in the form of inheritance or investment in human 
capital constitute a motive to save. According to Becker (1973, p. 818), the main 
reason to get married is to bear and rear own children. However, the incidence of 
extramarital births has increased in Germany and more married couples remain 
childless (e.g. BiB 2004, p. 27 et seqq.). Thus, an unambiguous conclusion whether 
marriage is conducive to savings for bequest reasons cannot be drawn. 
 
Children 
Children are assumed to be an important marriage-specific investment and to be 
positively related to marital stability. It may be, however, that children are rather 
born into stable marriages (e.g. Lillard and Waite 1993). Besides the impact on 
saving for the purpose of bequest, the presence of children can have an effect on 
wealth accumulation via adjustments in labour supply, consumption and saving for 
retirement or precautionary reasons. The presence of infants will most likely reduce 
the mother’s labour supply (e.g. Smith and Ward 1980, p. 244, or Drobnič, Blossfeld 
and Rohwer 1999, p. 142). The reduction of working hours or the absence from the 
                                                 
17 Using the example of Ireland, González and Özcan (2008) show that precautionary saving within 
marriage rises due to an increasing divorce risk. 
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labour market may not involve major losses in current income due to child-raising 
allowance. The extent will depend on the previous level of earnings, though. The 
relative reduction of income is likely to hinge on whether a woman is married or 
single as a married woman can rely on her husband’s income in case of a maternity 
leave. If a partner exists who enhances his labour supply, potential gains from 
specialisation could at least partially offset the loss. Browning (1992, p. 1458) argues 
that mothers tend to increase their labour supply with increasing age of the children 
as the costs of child care decrease. This applies in particular when children reach 
school starting age. With increasing age of children they become more goods 
intensive and less time intensive. To meet these additional needs single mothers of 
school-aged children, in particular, are found to increase their labour supply 
(Drobnič, Blossfeld and Rohwer 1999, p. 142). However, future earnings capacities 
are impaired by gaps in the employment history due to child-rearing because of lost 
seniority and human capital depreciation (Mincer 1974). The presence of children in 
a household may also be relevant as regards consumption. The needs of children 
have to be met and the demand for goods complementary with children will rise. The 
consumption of the parents may change in consequence of the modified time 
allocation (Smith and Ward 1980, p. 244). Lupton and Smith (2003, p. 133) state that 
“[w]hether the family as a whole consumes more or less depends, however, on 
whether market-purchased goods are net substitutes for or complements of children 
and household time”. Children can have an effect on income and consumption and 
consequently their presence can affect saving. The amount saved or dissaved will 
depend on the relation between income and consumption changes and thus may vary 
with the age of children. Additionally, there are reasons why the presence of children 
is likely to affect saving motives. Children are likely to have a positive impact on 
saving for intergenerational transfers. These transfers comprise human capital 
investments and financial bequests. In a large part, saving for monetary bequests will 
presumably occur when rates of return to human capital investments decline. Lupton 
and Smith (2003, p. 132) state that therefore wealth accumulation for the purpose of 
bequest is feasible particularly for high income families. Saving for retirement may 
be reduced in families with children. Fethke (1989, p. 125) argues that “[c]hildren 
are a way to insure against the probability of outliving one’s income or asset base, if 
they support their parents in old age, they can substitute for retirement savings”. In 
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line with that, the precautionary saving motive could be weakened as elder children 
may assist their parents in times of unexpected changes in income or sickness. In 
anticipation of childbirth, however, people are assumed to save for precautionary 
reasons in order to protect from income losses in consequence of childcare and 
changes in household size. The causality between wealth accumulation and fertility 
is ambiguous. Labour supply and fertility decisions are likely to be made 
simultaneously. Saving (or consumption) and the presence of children are 
interrelated as well. Thus, the presence of children can be assumed to be related to 
wealth accumulation.  
 
Gender differences 
The determinants of wealth accumulation can differ between sexes in some respects 
(e.g. Bajtelsmit 2006, p. 125 et seqq.). Economic theory suggests that specialisation 
in market and home work increases the gains of marriage. Although female labour 
supply has increased over the last decades, a gendered division of household chores 
is still observable (Klaus and Steinbach 2002). The causal direction between gender 
specific labour supply and divorce is ambiguous. Empirical studies provide evidence 
for both hypotheses: that increased labour force participation of women leads to a 
higher divorce risk (e.g. Greenstein 1990 or South 2001) as well as that women 
increase their labour supply in anticipation of divorce (e.g. Johnson and Skinner 
1986 or Sen 2000). Poortman (2005) shows that the direction of causality between 
female labour supply and divorce is uncertain. Montalto and Gerner (1998) find a 
decrease in men’s probability of labour force participation if they expect to be 
divorced. Inconsistent with that result, they show that men increase their hours 
worked in anticipation of divorce. The gender gap in wages has been analysed by 
numerous studies (for a review of literature on the gender wage gap see 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005 or Kunze 2008, for instance). Potential 
reasons for the pay gap are more discontinuous employment histories of women than 
of men, the choice of occupations or labour market discrimination (e.g. Blau and 
Kahn 2000, p. 80 et seq.). The difference in (permanent) income between men and 
women is likely to constitute one of the main reasons for the gender wealth disparity 
(e.g. Warren, Rowlingson and Whyley 2001 or Sierminska, Frick and Grabka 2010).  
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The partner that takes care of children during marriage and custody after divorce is 
mostly the woman (e.g. Burkhauser et al. 1991, p. 322, or Statistisches Bundesamt 
2010, p. 14 et seq.). Living with children may have an effect on her labour supply 
and the consumption of the household. However, the presence of children has an 
ambiguous effect on wealth accumulation. Some studies find gender differences in 
financial literacy. Women seem to be less financially educated than men (e.g. Chen 
and Volpe 2002 or Lusardi and Mitchell 2008). Furthermore, according to Ladd 
(1998), women face discrimination in mortgage lending markets. Muravyev, 
Talavera and Schäfer (2009) show that women have a lower probability of receiving 
a loan and that they pay higher interest rates. Several studies find that women are 
more risk averse than men, which may involve lower wealth holdings even if saving 
rates are held constant (for a review of gender differences in risk preferences see 
Croson and Gneezy 2009, p. 449 et seqq., for instance). However, some analyses 
challenge this finding (e.g. Schubert et al. 1999).  If women are more risk averse than 
men, they presumably are disposed to save more for precautionary reasons. A higher 
incentive for women to save for retirement results from their higher life expectancies 
compared to men. Whether women are actually able to save corresponding to their 
motives may, however, depend on their income or bargaining power if they are 
married (Browning 2000).  
 
Altogether, divorce is likely to decrease wealth holdings directly and indirectly: court 
and lawyer fees are incurred by divorces. Marital splits can reduce (permanent) 
income in consequence of ceasing eligibility for fiscal privileges or the loss of 
specialisation gains. Consumption needs may be relatively lower for a couple than 
for a single individual. Saving for retirement is likely to be higher for married 
couples than for divorced persons as a result of higher permanent income and 
benefits arising by reason of joint consumption. The precautionary saving motive, 
however, is stronger for single individuals. Even if divorce is likely to have negative 
effects on wealth, the correlation between marital status and wealth cannot arrive at 
completely unambiguous conclusions theoretically. As outlined in this chapter, the 
causal direction between marital status, income, consumption or saving and fertility 
is ambiguous and may differ between sexes. Marital decisions are made 
simultaneously to labour supply, saving and fertility decisions. Furthermore, reverse 
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causality between these determinants of wealth accumulation occurs. The effect of 
divorce on wealth can therefore be assumed to differ substantially depending on 
several decisions made before, during and after marriage. 
 
Current marital status or marital histories 
O’Rand (1996) argues that life-course trajectories can be hold responsible for intra-
cohort inequalities and that institutional benefits cumulate over time. If marital status 
affects the accumulation of wealth, it would not be appropriate to analyse wealth 
holdings using only the current marital status. Using marital histories, it is taken into 
consideration whether an individual that is currently married has been continuously 
married or whether he or she underwent a divorce and remarried. Assuming that 
divorces cause indirect and direct costs and therefore are related to wealth holdings, 
this differentiation is beneficial for the study. Besides former changes in family 
status, the duration of the particular periods can be included in the analysis. 
 
2.6 Literature Review 
 
After presenting some empirical findings concerning the distribution of wealth, 
literature dealing with the economic consequences of marital splits is outlined. 
 
2.6.1 The Distribution of Wealth 
During the last decades, the shortage of appropriate wealth data on the micro-level 
has been resolved. The distribution of wealth could therefore be analysed empirically 
(cp. Juster, Smith and Stafford 1999, p. 253 et seq.).  In general, wealth is more 
unequally distributed than income and the distribution is highly skewed to the right 
(see e.g. Grabka and Frick 2007 or Juster, Smith and Stafford 1999, p. 265 et seqq.). 
Furthermore, the hump-shaped wealth-age profile is proved empirically (see e.g. 
Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding 2006 or Burkhauser, Frick and Schwarze 
1997). 
 
A review of empirical evidence of wealth inequality in several countries is provided 
by Davies and Shorrocks (2000, p. 628 et seqq.), the collection of essays by Wolff 
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(2006b) gives an overview of the allocation of household wealth as well. Sierminska, 
Brandolini and Smeeding (2006) use the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) to 
analyse the wealth distributions of ten rich OECD countries. In comparison to the 
other countries, Germany turns out to be in the middle as regards wealth holdings 
and inequality.  
 
Ring (2000, p. 204 et seqq. and p. 254 et seqq.) gives an overview of former studies 
dealing with the distribution of wealth in Germany. Combining the results of several 
analyses, he shows that the distribution of wealth holdings in Germany has been 
relatively constant in the long term. In the following, more recent analyses are 
outlined. The distribution of wealth in Germany is examined by Stein (2004) using 
the EVS (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe), for instance. According to him, 
wealth holdings have risen substantially between 1983 and 1998 in West-Germany. 
Furthermore, he reveals a large intra-German wealth gap: net-wealth in East-
Germany was about 3/5 lower than in West-Germany in 1998. Stein states that 
during the period under consideration wealth inequality in Germany increased. Frick 
and Grabka (2009a) who compare net-wealth in 2002 and 2007 applying SOEP data 
arrive at similar conclusions. They show that wealth inequality has risen in Germany 
and that the disparity of wealth holdings in West- and East-Germany increased. 
Ochmann and Steiner (2009) analyse the wealth distribution in Germany employing 
EVS data and support these findings. 
Another study by Frick and Grabka (2009b) points out that the concentration of 
wealth on the top of the distribution increased between 2002 and 2007. The 10% 
wealthiest individuals were most likely to remain within the top decile of the 
distribution although the median change in wealth between the two years was higher 
and negative for this quantile in comparison to the lower deciles where people gained 
in wealth, on average, but on a lower level. A multivariate analysis suggests that 
educational attainment, labour market integration and income constitute the main 
determinants of changes in net-wealth. Besides, Krause and Schäfer (2005) show that 
women (single mothers, in particular) are less wealthy than men and that wealth 
holdings increase with age.  
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2.6.2 Marital Splits and Wealth 
Most of the existing literature dealing with economic consequences of marital splits 
focuses on changes in income. This is most probably due to the long-time lack of 
appropriate longitudinal wealth data in household surveys (cp. Browning and Lusardi 
1996, p. 1825). The impact of breakups on income is examined by Becker, Landes 
and Michael (1977), Duncan and Hoffman (1985), Smock (1993), McManus and 
DiPrete 2001 or Andreß et al. (2006), for instance. Some studies also deal with the 
question in what way the composition of income changes as a result of marital 
separation (e.g. Burkhauser et al. 1991, Jarvis and Jenkins 1999, Schwarze and 
Härpfer 2000, Jenkins 2008). Poverty as a consequence of breakups is analysed by 
Mc Lanahan, Sørensen and Watson (1989), Andreß and Güllner (2001), and 
Smeeding and Sandstrom (2004), for example. The correlation of female labour 
supply and divorce is examined in some studies as well. Altogether, the rising 
probability of marital breakups seems to increase labour force participation of 
women (Johnson and Skinner 1986, Seitz 1999, van der Klaauw 1996 or McKeever 
and Wolfinger 2001). In summary, the different studies show some similar results: 
the income of women drops in the course of marital dissolution (particularly if they 
take custody of the children), whereas almost every analysis states an increase of 
male income.18 Additionally, women seem to recover partially by and by but they are 
not able to compensate completely for their loss. As regards the composition of 
household income, it is shown that labour income of women rises in consequence of 
divorce. However, the other income components do not change substantially. 
Moreover, marital dissolution turns out to increase the poverty risk. This is true for 
women in particular. 
 
Holden and Smock (1991, p. 72), for instance, state that one should include measures 
of wealth to assess the economic well-being following marital dissolution. A major 
part of the literature dealing with wealth and marital breakups employing survey data 
                                                 
18 It should be mentioned here that McManus and DiPrete (2001), for instance, provide evidence for a 
decrease in economic status of men in consequence of partnership dissolution. According to them, 
men are not able to compensate the loss of former partner’s income. Additionally, paying alimony 
impairs men’s economic situation. Furthermore, Andreß and Bröckel (2007) show that men are more 
negatively affected by separation as regards life satisfaction. According to Aassve et al. (2009) women 
suffer disproportionally more financially from divorce. However, as regards non-monetary deprivation 
indices a significant impairment of well-being can be found for men.   
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focuses on the current marital status of individuals. Only some studies account for 
marital histories. Mostly, the consideration of different family structures is due to a 
lack of wealth data on the individual level.   
 
The study of Haider, Jacknowitz and Schoeni (2003) analyses the economic status of 
elderly women applying the HRS and the Current Population Survey (CPS). They 
find that older female divorcees hold considerably less wealth than women who are 
married or remarried. Zagorsky (2005) compares wealth holdings of young baby 
boomers depending on marital status using the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY79). By means of median wealth, he shows that continuously married 
respondents are wealthier than singles and that wealth begins to decrease in 
anticipation of divorce. However, wealth seems to increase again after divorce. 
While there are only marginal gender differences in median wealth for married 
individuals, men are found to be better off than women after divorce. Additionally, 
regression results show that divorce not only involves lower wealth levels but also 
less growth of wealth. Schmidt and Sevak (2006) arrive at similar conclusions 
applying PSID data on household wealth. Using OLS and quantile regression they 
find that single-female headed households are considerably less wealthy than married 
couples. However, this gap partly closes when controlling for observable 
characteristics that are correlated with gender and marital status. The wealth holdings 
of single women are lower than that of single men. The gender wealth gap cannot be 
verified for younger households controlling for observable characteristics. 
  
The impact of marital status on savings is analysed by Lupton and Smith (2003) 
applying HRS and PSID data. They find that married people are considerably 
wealthier than divorced or never-married individuals. This pattern persists when 
including social security and pension wealth in the analysis. Furthermore, they show 
that couples that remain married between 1984 and 1989 or 1989 and 1994, 
respectively, are wealthier than individuals who are continuously divorced or never 
married. The transition from marriage to divorce seems to decrease wealth, whereas 
remarriage increases wealth. Married couples who are about to divorce are initially 
less wealthy. However, according to Lupton and Smith, an interpretation of the 
changes in wealth holdings of families that undergo marital transitions as savings is 
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hindered, as these changes largely depend on the additional (or fewer) number of 
household members. By means of a regression analysis, Lupton and Smith show that 
marriage and the duration of the married status positively affect wealth and that the 
wealth gap between married and single households increases. On the other hand, 
duration effects of the changes in wealth (i.e. saving) for married couples and 
unmarried individuals seem to decrease over time. Applying pooled cross-section 
NLSY79 data for eleven years between 1985 and 2000, Yamokoski and Keister 
(2006) show that married households are wealthier than single male or female 
households. By means of descriptive statistics as well as general linear regression, 
they find that for the younger baby boomer generation the wealth gap does not exist 
between sexes primarily. Main differences occur depending on parenthood in 
combination with being single. Divorced mothers, however, are disadvantaged in 
particular. 
 
A study by Bolin and Pålsson (2001) employs wealth data on an individual level 
provided by the Swedish Household Income Survey (HINK). It shows that being 
married involves higher wealth than being unmarried. This difference appears also 
when looking at men and women separately. Furthermore, men hold more wealth 
than women. According to Bolin and Pålsson, the gender wealth gap decreased 
between 1978 and 1992. These descriptive results are confirmed applying OLS 
regression. The negative effect of divorce on wealth seems to be higher for men. 
Sierminska, Frick and Grabka (2010) analyse the gender wealth gap in Germany 
applying individual wealth data provided by the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) for 2002. Employing semi-parametric decomposition methods, they find a 
significant gender wealth gap which seems to be driven by gender-specific 
characteristics. In particular, individual income and labour market experience have 
an influence on wealth accumulation according to Sierminska, Frick and Grabka 
(2010). They also show that currently divorced individuals hold less wealth than 
those who are married at present.  
 
Applying propensity score matching in combination with a difference-in-differences 
estimator to account for endogeneity, Aassve et al. (2009) as well as Ongaro, 
Mazzuco and Meggiolaro (2009) find that women suffer more from separation than 
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men in monetary terms. However, as regards non-monetary deprivation indices, 
Aassve et al. (2009) show that the well-being of men is significantly impaired. In 
Italy, the standard of living of non-custodial fathers who live alone decreases in 
consequence of marital break-ups according to Ongaro, Mazzuco and Meggiolaro 
(2009). 
 
Some analyses also account for the influence of complete marital biographies on 
wealth accumulation. Wilmoth and Koso (2002) apply the HRS to study wealth in 
1992 of households where at least one person is aged between 51 and 61 depending 
on marital histories. Per capita logged wealth19 is used as the dependent variable and 
thus equal sharing is assumed. In the analysis, two models (basic and elaborated 
marriage models) employing only the current marital status are compared to two 
models which make use of measures that account for marital histories. The 
“elaborated marriage history measure” comprises 13 categories like “continuously 
married”, “divorced once” or “divorced twice, remarried”. Using OLS semilog 
regression, Wilmoth and Koso show that divorced persons possess 75% less wealth 
than continuously married people. Remarriage partly compensates for the losses: 
those who remarry after one divorce only have 24% less wealth. According to the 
study, women suffer more from divorce. Furthermore, the results suggest that 
accounting for marriage histories primarily has an effect on the outcome of women. 
As regards the simultaneous causality of the probability of being married and the 
amount of wealth holdings, Wilmoth and Koso (2002, p. 265) argue that their 
“analysis does include variables that indirectly control for potential selection factors 
including demographic characteristics (i.e., gender and race) and socioeconomic 
status (i.e., education, income, and occupation)”.  
 
In their study, Zissimopoulos, Karney and Rauer (2008) examine the influence of 
life-time marital history on household wealth levels near retirement employing the 
HRS. For this purpose, they create five single and five married categories which are 
based on the current marital status and account for past family status. The dependent 
variable is per capita logged wealth. Employing linear regression methods, 
Zissimopoulos, Karney and Rauer find that, on average, continuously married 
                                                 
19 Negative values are set to one (Wilmoth and Koso 2002, p. 260). 
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couples own the highest level of wealth, also compared to remarried couples. 
Independent of former marital splits, single households hold lower wealth than ever 
married couples. Within the marital status categories, single women’s wealth 
holdings are lower than those of single men.20 These results persist when including 
social security and pension wealth in the measure of wealth. However, the extent of 
the differences between single and married individuals declines. Zissimopoulos 
(2009) finds that divorce leads to a decrease in wealth already before the divorce 
occurs and that savings increase after the marital break. The change in wealth change 
does not differ between constantly married and not constantly married individuals 
controlled for fixed and unobserved heterogeneity. Remarriage involves an increase 
in wealth.   
 
Guner and Knowles (2007) develop a three-stage macro-economic calibration model 
accounting for the endogeneity of marriage formation in wealth accumulation. 
Starting from the last period, they model the effect of decisions with regard to 
marriage and divorce as well as work and saving decisions in younger and old adult 
ages on the economic status of the elderly. Furthermore, marriage market effects in 
the respective age groups which depend on income and saving decisions are 
modelled as is the effect of the marriage market on optimal decisions. Thus, the 
model allows for endogeneity. By means of their model, Guner and Knowles 
generate relative median wealth by marital history comparable to that resulting from 
an empirical analysis applying HRS and PSID data. They find that wealth holdings 
of elderly people are influenced by marital events when young since those affect 
midlife income and old age marital status. The results indicate that about one fifth of 
the difference in wealth holdings is due to selection on productivity in the first 
period. Differences in saving resulting from economies of scale and second-period 
marriage market incentives account for about 80% of the differences. When the 
marriage process is modelled as exogenous savings are reduced.  
  
                                                 
20 Since the dependent variable in this study is equally shared household wealth, one cannot 
distinguish which spouse actually holds which amount of wealth within a marriage.    
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 Data and Methods 3   
 
The dataset applied for this study is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The 
SOEP is suitable to analyse the interrelation of marital status and wealth as it 
provides data on individual wealth, on marital biographies as well as on a variety of 
socio-demographic and economic indicators. Subsequent to a more detailed 
description of the dataset, potentially applicable methods to tackle the problem of 
endogeneity are discussed. 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a representative yearly survey of 
randomly selected private households and persons in Germany which commenced in 
1984. The first wave contained about 12,000 surveyed persons in approximately 
6,000 households. Sample household members aged 17 and over are interviewed 
annually with respect to socio-demographic and economic factors. Until 2006, eight 
subsamples were added which approximately doubled the initial sample size. The 
survey was extended to East Germany in 1990. Other subsamples comprise an 
immigrant sample in 1994/1995 and a refreshment sample in 1998, for instance. In 
2002, the SOEP introduced a high income sample which over-represents households 
at the top of the income distribution (Frick et al. 2007). More information about the 
SOEP can be found in the codebook of Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) or in 
Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007). 
 
3.1.1 Wealth Data in the SOEP 
In 2002 and 2007, information on the wealth holdings on the individual level was 
surveyed (see Appendix A for the 2002 and 2007 wealth modules in the person 
questionnaires). Respondents were asked for the current value of the following 
wealth components: 
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- owner-occupied property (including debt) 
- other property (including debt)  
- financial assets  
- private pensions (comprising building savings contracts, private pensions and 
life insurance) 
- business assets (before tax but after credit) 
- tangible assets (excluding cars)  
- consumer credits (ex interest) 
 
These components add up to net-wealth which can take negative values in case debts 
exceed wealth holdings. In 2002, building saving contracts, private pensions and life 
insurance were pooled in one question, whereas in 2007, building savings contracts 
were surveyed separately. If a wealth component was co-shared, the respondents 
were asked for their individual share.  
 
Financial and tangible assets as well as consumer credits amounting to less than 
2.500 € were not considered in the 2002 questionnaire. Hence, small wealth holdings 
may be systematically underestimated. The lower threshold was abolished in the 
2007 wealth module. Tangible assets comprise gold, jewellery, coins and other 
valuable collections. Other personal belongings and durables are not surveyed. One 
may argue that almost every household is in possession of household effects and that 
their value does not differ substantially. The inclusion of consumption property 
would therefore have an impact on the level of wealth but not on its distribution. 
However, with regard to the question of this analysis the value of household effects 
would be of interest. If a couple splits up, at least one partner will have to leave the 
household and may have to purchase new home appliances reducing the wealth 
stock. The question of 2002 explicitly excludes motor vehicles. In 2007, the value of 
cars remains unconsidered only implicitly. About three-fourths of German 
households own a car. Only one third of the low income households possess a car 
contrary to almost every household at the top of the income distribution (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2008). The exclusion of cars in the measure of wealth is therefore likely 
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to contribute to lower inequality. It is arguable, however, whether cars constitute 
wealth. Furthermore, the assessment of the current value of vehicles can be complex. 
Pension entitlements from the statutory pension fund (“Gesetzliche 
Rentenversicherung”) and from company pensions are not included in the list of 
questions. The potential consequences of the exclusion of pension entitlements are 
discussed in Chapter 2.3. 
 
3.1.2 Editing and Imputation to Account for (Non-) Sampling Errors     
In general, the collection of wealth data on the basis of a sample survey may raise 
some problems. Firstly, the considerable skewness of the wealth distribution can 
impair estimations as a result of sampling errors (Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 629 
et seq.). Since 2002, the SOEP includes a high income sample which contributes to 
reduce this insufficiency (Frick et al. 2007, Royal Commission 1975, p. 77 et seq.). 
Additionally, surveying wealth data, non-sampling errors can occur. The problem of 
misreporting, i.e. underreporting, rounding or item non-response, as well as (partial) 
unit non-response (Royal Commission 1975, p. 77, or Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 
630) are likely to arise (Davies 2009, p. 129 et seq., or Riphahn and Serfling 2005). 
Opposite to unit non-response, where the whole household does not answer the 
questionnaire, cases where at least one household member refuses to participate are 
referred to as partial unit non-response. Evidence suggests that survey non-response 
is more common among wealthier individuals (Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 630). 
The oversampling of better-off households probably helps to mitigate this problem. 
Partial unit non-response will lead to an underestimation of wealth holdings on the 
household level.  
 
Even if response is obtained, misreporting in case individuals are not able or willing 
to state exact details on their wealth holdings may bias the results. Davies (2009, p. 
129 et seq.) argues that the incidence of underreporting and item non-response 
depends on the wealth component. Financial assets, stocks and bonds in particular, 
tend to be frequently underreported, whereas, in general, housing property is under-
valuated only slightly. The large degree of heterogeneity in the components of 
financial assets is one explanation of the high rate of underreporting and non-
response with respect to financial assets (cp. Frick, Grabka and Marcus 2007, p. 24). 
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The value of other components like business assets can only be ambiguously 
assessed which can involve misvaluation (Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 630). 
Furthermore, rounding and heaping of the value of wealth holdings are widespread 
when collecting wealth data. These phenomena are likely to distort the distribution. 
As regards net-wealth, 80% of the wealth holdings in the national balance sheet are 
captured by the SOEP questions in 2002. Thus, wealth has to be considered slightly 
underreported. Some wealth components, like real property, seem to be well 
assessable by means of the SOEP questions. Financial assets, however, are found to 
be strongly underestimated (Frick, Grabka and Marcus 2007, p. 29 et seqq.). 
 
The SOEP 2002 and 2007 person questionnaires ask for the estimated market value 
of owner-occupied and other property as well as financial assets and the 
corresponding percentages owned by the individual. Assuming that there exist no 
part owners outside of the household, i.e. that the wealth component is owned by a 
couple solely, the shares are supposed to sum up to 100%. The information provided 
by the co-owning couple regarding the market value of the components should 
coincide. If household members state their shares or the market value inconsistently 
or implausibly, this measurement error is attempted to be eliminated by means of 
editing or logical imputation. Logical imputation uses information surveyed by 
further questions in the questionnaire and/or answers of other household members to 
assess the share in or the value of a wealth component. Editing means that a non-
missing but inconsistent value is changed into a reasonable value. Logical imputation 
is generally based on survey information provided by the household questionnaire or 
by other household members (for details see Frick, Grabka and Marcus 2010, p. 16 et 
seqq.).  
 
The problems of item or partial unit non-response are tackled applying multiple 
imputation if neither logical imputation nor editing is implemented (see Frick, 
Grabka and Marcus 2007 and 2010; Schäfer and Schupp 2006 provide a preliminary 
study of imputation). In case of item non-response, logistic regression is applied to 
impute missing values on whether an individual holds a specific wealth component 
or not or to assess their share of this component. If information is missing on the 
market value of a component, the imputation is based on a Heckman maximum 
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likelihood estimation using clustering information to control for selection effects. 
First, a cross-sectional imputation is implemented for 2002. To assess information on 
wealth in 2007, values for 2002 are applied subsequently. In a next step, the imputed 
and observed values for 2007 are used to recalculate the values for 2002. This 
procedure is carried out four times in order to produce convergence of the results. To 
allow for uncertainty resulting from the imputation process and to maintain variance, 
a randomly chosen error term is added to the prediction of the regression model. The 
procedure is repeated seven times with seven different error terms involving a 
multiply imputed dataset. The lowest and the highest implicates are discarded so that 
five implicates remain. Frick, Grabka and Marcus (2007, p. 9 et seqq., and 2010, p. 
12 et seqq.) provide a detailed outline of the editing and regression-based multiple 
imputation process for the respective wealth components. 
 
The imputation process results in five values, i.e. five implicates, for each wealth 
component per individual. These values do not differ if the surveyed information is 
consistent and full or if the value was edited. In case multiple imputation had to be 
applied, five different variables per observation are generated. To estimate simple 
statistics like means and medians, the measures are calculated for each of the five 
implicates separately and averaged subsequently. Other point estimators like 
inequality measures can be computed applying the same procedure. Implementing 
regression analyses it has to be taken into account that the five values per individual 
cannot be considered independent of each other. Treating the implicates as if they 
were independent will probably result in inflated significance and an underestimation 
of standard errors. Kennickell (1998, 2006) provides an approach to account for 
multiple imputation in regression analyses. Another possibility is to apply a STATA-
module provided by Robinson and Blanchette (2009). To assess the variance 
correctly, its “within” and “between” component have to be calculated where the first 
is the mean of the variances estimated for the five implicates I (with d` 
Q
e∑ +fW ghi#eijQ ). The “between” component results from the variances of the five 
estimated coefficients gh  (wherek  QeOQ∑ +fW ghi M g̅#eijQ ). The overall variance 
(mno  d`  p1  Qerk) can then be calculated from the two components (cp. Leopold 
and Schneider 2010, p. 268). 
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Small wealth holdings are underreported for 2002 as the questionnaire does not ask 
for financial and tangible assets as well as consumer credits lower than 2,500 €. This 
threshold was eliminated in 2007. Data for 2007 were used to carry out a logistic 
regression in order to assess whether an individual did possess wealth worth less than 
2,500 € in 2002. Afterwards, values up to 2,500 € observed in 2007 were drawn and 
assigned randomly (Frick, Grabka and Marcus 2010, p. 14 et seq.).  
 
In general, the imputation process may have an impact on the results. Frick, Grabka 
and Marcus (2010, p. 26 et seqq.) show that the mean for the majority of wealth 
components increases in consequence of imputation. The effect is significant for 
owner-occupied property and net-wealth only, however. Inequality of net-wealth 
measured by the Gini-coefficient is found to be reduced after imputation. The top-
sensitive half the squared coefficient of variation (HSCV) rises for 2002 and 
decreases for 2007. The correction of data can hence be considered to have an impact 
on the distribution of net-wealth and its components. The degree of the change in the 
distribution is likely to depend on the share of imputed data. In total, approximately 
30% of net-wealth was imputed or edited. The share of imputed values differs 
between wealth components: about 40% of information on business assets was 
imputed (42% in 2002 and 36% in 2007), whereas only 19% of the values 
concerning consumer credits in 2002 and 9% in 2007 are affected, for instance. To 
account for whether a value was imputed, edited or remained unchanged, Frick, 
Grabka and Marcus (2010, p. 32) recommend to include this information as a control 
variable in regression analyses. 
 
As the purpose of this study is to analyse the relation between marital histories and 
wealth, it has to be noted that the current marital status has been used to impute 
missing values of the personal share of other real estate based on OLS regression 
(approximately 10% of the personal shares exhibit imputed values in 2002, 8% in 
2007). With respect to financial assets and consumer credits, current marital status 
constitutes a control variable in the logistic regression model in case of item non-
response in order to impute the filter variable whether a person owns financial assets 
or whether they have a credit. In total, approximately 12% of the financial assets 
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filters and 11% of the consumer credit filters are imputed in 2002 and 8% of both 
filters in 2007. Imputation due to item non-response cannot be distinguished from 
imputation due to partial unit non-response in the data provided. The share of values 
that has been imputed using the current marital status may therefore be smaller than 
these percentages. Finally, the covariate is also applied to impute the personal share 
of financial assets using logistic regression (imputation is carried out for about 17% 
of the shares in 2002 and 15% in 2007). As imputation using the current marital 
status is implemented in a small fraction of data and as the marital status is not 
applied to impute the value of any wealth component, the results of the study at hand 
are assumed to be affected only marginally by imputation.   
 
Although it is likely that the incidence of extreme values is reduced in consequence 
of the editing and imputation processes, the values of the respective implicates of the 
wealth components as well as net-wealth are 0.1% top-coded in order to avoid 
distortion of the distribution caused by extreme outliers. For those components which 
can take negative values, a supplemental 0.1% bottom-coding is carried out. 
Analysing wealth holdings of the whole sample, outliers may affect measures like the 
mean to a lesser extent than in case smaller subsamples are examined. For the 
purpose of this study it is therefore appropriate to implement top- and bottom-coding. 
 
3.1.3 Martial Histories in the SOEP 
Besides information about individual wealth holdings, the SOEP provides data 
concerning the individual biography of family status (Pischner and Groh-Samberg 
2008). Marital histories have been recorded retrospectively since 1985, first by the 
use of person questionnaires, subsequent 1985 using the supplementary biographical 
questionnaire “Lebenslauf” (life history) (see Figure A3 in Appendix A for the 
retrospective survey). In the following, changes of the family situation and the 
current marital status have been surveyed annually (see Figures A4 and A5 in 
Appendix A). In case of temporary non-response, a supplemental collection of 
information on marital status is undertaken in subsequent years if possible. The 
SOEP provides individual spells of marital status which are generated using 
information on the family status “single”, “married”, “divorced” and “widowed”. 
The “married” category does not differentiate between couples who live together and 
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those who are separated. One spell is defined by at least four variables: the individual 
identifier, the marital status as well as the beginning and the end of the spell.  
 
In the following, the generation process of the spells implemented in the SOEP 
(Pischner and Groh-Samberg 2008) is outlined in more detail. Persons under the age 
of 15 are assumed to be single. If a change in family status is surveyed, the marital 
status is changed for the stated month of the change up to the date of the survey. In 
case that the family status is missing for one year, it is carried forward if the status of 
the immediately subsequent year is the same as in the previous year, provided no 
indication of family status change in the additional questions for temporary drop 
outs. In a next step, inconsistencies are eliminated. For example, assume that a 
person states that they changed their status from “single” to “married” to “single” to 
“divorced” to “married". In this case, the sequence would be changed to “single”, 
“married”, “divorced”, “divorced” and “married". Through the corrected time series, 
monthly spells are generated. Monthly data are available from the month of the first 
survey until the month of the last survey. Furthermore, yearly spells are generated. 
Annual data are available for the year of birth until the year of the last survey.  
 
For this study a combination of the annual and the monthly family status data is 
applied. First, marital histories are constructed using yearly data. The two years of 
particular interest are 2002 and 2007 as individual wealth holdings were surveyed in 
these years. If in these years an individual was interviewed in a month before the 
change in marital status took place, their family status is changed to the previous 
status. For example, if an individual was interviewed in March 2002 and got married 
in August 2002 their marital status applying the yearly data would be “married”. For 
this analysis, their status is changed to the previous status, for instance “never 
married”. If individuals divorce and remarry in the course of one year, this change is 
considered. Regarding wealth holdings, short divorced spells are of importance as 
well given that court fees accrue and due to the equalisation of gains accumulated in 
the course of marriage. 
 
Inconsistent cases where a “divorced” spell follows a “never married” spell or a 
“widowed” spell comes after a “divorced” spell are omitted. Cases of gaps as a result 
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of temporary missings that could not be closed in subsequent years are also not 
considered. The timing of divorce, for instance, cannot be reconstructed on the basis 
of this data nor can the potential marital changes during the years of lacking 
information.  
 
The retrospective survey of family status could have an impact on the quality and 
reliability of the data. Individuals may not remember the exact year a relationship 
began or ended, depending on the time passed since the change or specific personal 
characteristics like state of health, for instance. Klein and Fischer-Kerli (2000) 
analyse the quality of retrospective data. Applying data provided by the 
Familiensurvey des Deutschen Jugendinstituts (DJI), they find that information on 
the retrospective marital status is reliable. Data on first relationships and on 
persistent marriages seem to be remembered correctly, in particular. An earlier study 
by Peters (1988) which employs data of the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor 
Market Experience (NLS) finds that applying a retrospective survey leads to 
information generally consistent with panel information. Inconsistencies seem to 
occur systematically subject to education, for example. Furthermore, Peters (1988, p. 
501) argues that the exact date of a divorce is likely to be less accurately surveyed 
than the date of marriage as divorce constitutes a process rather than an event.  
 
When analysing divorced individuals applying panel data, the problem of right 
censoring has to be discussed. The SOEP is conceptualised to follow up both spouses 
after a split. In consequence of a divorce, one ex-spouse or even both may refuse to 
continue their participation in the survey due to mental strain or may not be 
contactable as their new address is unknown, for instance (cp. Schwarze and Härpfer 
2000, p. 15). As regards the descriptive analyses, panel attrition as a result of divorce 
is accounted for by means of weighting. To assess the probability that an individual 
is re-interviewed, covariates like whether a couple separated or whether the head of 
the household is married are employed (Kroh 2010). 
 
On the basis of marital history data, eight family status categories are generated (cp. 
Table 2). These classes constitute the current marital status accounting for past 
family formations and comprise four single and four married categories. Individuals 
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who are currently divorced and had been widowed before are not included in the 
analysis as well as currently widowed persons who had been divorced.21 
 
Table 2: Marital status categories 
 
Current marital status Single  Married 
   
Marital History  1)     never married 5)      ever (continuously) married 
 
2)     divorced once1  6)      remarried after one divorce1 
 
3)     divorced more than once1 7)      remarried after more than 
one divorce1 
 
4)     widowed2 8)      remarried after widowhood2 
 
1never widowed, 2 never divorced 
 
Some studies allude to the increasing importance of cohabitation as a substitute for 
marriage (e.g. Stevenson and Wolfers 2007, p. 36 et seqq.). Hao (1996, p. 274) 
argues that cohabitation does not involve obligations to the partner and therefore 
saving as well as labour supply decisions are likely to be made differently than in a 
legal marriage. The analysis at hand therefore refrains from accounting for 
cohabitation in a distinct category and is limited to legal marital status. 
 
Individuals in the course of legal separation period are not considered in a distinct 
category. Advantages of marriage as the taxation of the total income of a married 
couple on the basis of equal halves do not apply for the period of separation. 
Separated individuals are likely to differ from married individuals living together as 
regards labour supply or saving decisions, for instance, depending on the duration of 
the period of separation. But the equalisation of gains accumulated in the course of 
marriage, which is likely to affect wealth holdings substantially, is implemented only 
                                                 
21 For the economic consequences of widowhood see Burkhauser et al. (2005), Hurd and Wise (1989) 
or Zick and Holden (2000), for instance. Morgan (1989) compares divorced and widowed women’s 
economic well-being. 
64 
 
with legal divorce (cp. Zissimopoulos, Karney and Rauer 2008, p. 11 footnote 1). 
Court and legal fees are not incurred until legal divorce in large part as well. Using 
data provided by the Familiensurvey des Deutschen Jugendinstituts (DJI), Brüderl 
and Engelhardt (1997) find that the effects of determinants of marital splits do not 
differ significantly depending on whether separation or divorce is the applied 
definition of marital breakup. They suggest, however, to carry out distinct analyses 
for both definitions. 80% of the marriages are found to be divorced after two years of 
separation, 90% after five years. 5% of the separated couples, however, are not 
divorced even after a ten year separation period. Thus, it would be advantageous for 
this study, if a distinction between couples who are married and live together and 
individuals who are married but separated could be drawn by means of the marital 
history data. A lack of SOEP life history data concerning separation impedes the 
inclusion of this marital status.22  
 
Additional to the eight categories in Table 2, categories that account for the change 
in marital status between 2002 and 2007 are generated (see Table 3). The only 
category in comprising individuals who may have experienced divorce and 
widowhood is the “married > once → married > once” category. 
 
  
                                                 
22 One approach to restrict the analyses to individuals, who were not separated in 2002, could be to 
examine only married persons living in one household with their partner in 2002. However, the 
partner in the household may not be the actual spouse but a new partner, as couples do not 
mandatorily divorce after separation. It could be, for instance, that a couple separated twenty years 
ago and never got a divorce and both spouses have lived with their new partners for the last twenty 
years. A more practical reason to refrain from this procedure is the very small number of individuals 
who were married once and lived in one household with a partner in 2002 and got a divorce until 
2007. 
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Table 3: Categories of marital changes 
 
Marital status in 
2002 
Single Married 
                    2002→2007                     2002→2007 
Change in 
marital status 
between 2002 
and 2007 
1) never married → never married 
 
  9) married once → married once 
 
2) never married → married 
 
10) married once → divorced once1 
3) divorced once → divorced once1 11) married once → widowed once2 
 
4) divorced once → remarried1 
 
 
12) married > once → married > once 
 
 
5) divorced > once → divorced > once1 13) married > once → divorced >once1 
 
 
6) divorced > once → remarried1 
 
14) married > once → widowed >once2 
 
7)widowed → widowed2 
 
 
 
8) widowed → remarried2 
 
 
 
1 never widowed, 2 never divorced 
 
 
3.2 Methods 
 
In the following, potential methods for the analysis and problems that can arise when 
analysing the influence of marital histories on wealth holdings are discussed. 
 
3.2.1 The Problem of Endogeneity 
Let a regressor in an OLS regression model  
 
(11) !  s6 s ⋯ s ⋯ s   
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stand for marital status. To obtain an unbiased and consistent estimator for the 
relationship between the dependent variable, wealth ('), and family status (), the 
error term u has to be stochastically independent of . If  u|#  0, i.e. if the 
expected value of the error term was not correlated with the regressor , marital 
status could be referred to as exogenous with regard to wealth. If, however, a 
correlation exists (and thus Nw+x , uy z 0) marital status must be considered 
endogenous involving biased coefficients and standard errors (for an overview see 
Wooldridge 2002, for instance). 
 
One source of endogeneity is referred to as simultaneity or reverse causality, 
respectively. It occurs if one or more regressors affect the dependent variable and at 
the same time this dependent variable has an impact on the explanatory variable. 
Hence,  and u would be correlated and therefore  could not be considered 
exogenous. Marital status must therefore deemed to be endogenous with regard to 
wealth, if the level of wealth has an impact on the propensity to marry or divorce and 
if marital status affects the amount of wealth held.  
 
On the one hand, economic theory suggests that higher wealth holdings increase the 
gains from marriage and therefore involve higher marital stability, i.e. a lower 
propensity to divorce, and an increase in the probability of getting married in the first 
place (Becker 1973, p. 821). In other words, selectivity into and out of marriage in 
dependence of wealth holdings is implied. On the other hand, divorce can be 
considered to affect wealth and its accumulation directly and indirectly. Marital splits 
cause court fees, for example. Moreover, marriage and divorce are associated with 
adjustment of labour supply and other determinants of wealth accumulation.  
 
Lundberg (2005a, p. 601) argues that “[i]f men and women decide with whom they 
are going to live, if these decisions are not irrevocable, and if family structure is 
related to economic opportunities in complex ways, then treating family status as 
exogenous or even predetermined can result in biased inferences”. Waite (1995, p. 
497 et seq.) states that “perhaps we have been too quick to assign all the 
responsibility to selectivity [...], and not quick enough to consider the possibility that 
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marriage causes some of the better outcomes we see for the married”. As both 
directions of causality between wealth and marriage or divorce are possible, marital 
status can be considered endogenous in terms of simultaneous causality as regards 
wealth levels. 
 
Another form of endogeneity, omitted variable bias, can emerge, if a variable not 
considered in the analysis is correlated with the dependent variable as well as with 
one or more regressors. In case of an unobservable variable, this bias is also referred 
to as unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, if a factor not observed had an impact on 
wealth accumulation as well as on marital status decisions, the regression results 
would be biased. Lupton and Smith (2003, p. 148) argue that prudence is the most 
likely source of unobserved heterogeneity when analysing the relationship between 
family status and wealth accumulation. Other potential unobservable factors are the 
distribution of power within the household, values and norms or the extent of caring 
for the partner, for instance.  
 
An overview of empirical techniques like fixed-effects methods or the use of an 
instrumental variable (IV) that have been employed to estimate the benefits of 
marriage in conjunction with health, earnings and children is given by Ribar (2004). 
Fixed-effects estimation would be suitable only if the correlation between marital 
status and the error terms was time-invariant and the effect of marriage emerged 
solely while an individual was actually married (e.g. Lundberg 2005a, p. 600). 
Furthermore, by means of a fixed-effects model the effect of remaining married or 
remaining divorced between 2002 and 2007, for instance, could not be estimated. 
Applying IV-estimators can be difficult in practice since finding capable instruments 
is complicated. 
 
3.2.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
A couple of studies have tried to tackle the problem of endogenous marital status 
applying an instrumental variable. In the following, possible IVs are briefly 
discussed.  
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A valid instrumental variable is supposed to fulfil two requirements: the IV has to be 
correlated with the endogenous variable (Nw+{cm,7| z 0) but uncorrelated with the 
error term u (thus Nw+{cm, u|  0). The first requirement is referred to as “relevance 
of the instrument” and the latter as “exogeneity of the IV”. An IV appropriate for the 
purpose of this study would have to affect the probability of getting divorced but 
must not be correlated with the process of wealth accumulation. 
 
Applying an invalid IV, i.e. a variable that does not fulfil the exogeneity-assumption 
and has an impact on wealth aside from affecting the marital status, can involve even 
more biased estimates than an OLS regression (Murray 2006, p. 114). Furthermore, 
the instrumentalisation of weak IVs which are of little relevance raises problems as 
they cause only little variation.23 In the context of this study, this suggests that the 
correlation between a potential IV and an individual’s marital status should be high. 
Thus, to solve the problem of endogeneity by means of the IV approach, a variable 
that features no correlation with the amount of wealth holdings and that is highly 
correlated with marital status (or the probability of divorce, respectively) is to be 
detected. 
 
Factors that have an influence on the probability of divorce theoretically are 
summarised by Finke and Pierce (2006, p. 228 et seq.) or Bryant and Zick (2006, p. 
290 et seqq.), for instance. However, most of these parameters (such as education 
and education of the parents, age at marriage, income or the presence of children) 
affect wealth accumulation directly or indirectly, as well. Living in urban areas is 
likely to impair the stability of marriages (Gautier, Svarer and Teulings 2009). At the 
same time the incidence of owner-occupied property is lower, though. Some studies 
(Hank 2003 or Lloyd and South 1996) use female labour force participation rates on 
a regional level to explain differences in marital transition. The variation in women’s 
economic independence measured by the participation rates is assumed to have an 
impact on the regional marriage markets. Amongst other things, due to the increasing 
importance of internet use in order to search for potential partners (cp. Stevenson and 
Wolfers 2007, p. 47 et seq.), even in distant regions these regional differences cannot 
be seen as appropriate IVs. 
                                                 
23 On the handling of weak instruments see Murray (2006), for instance. 
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In recent years, some researchers instrumentalised the gender of the first born child. 
Former studies show that having a boy decreases the probability of marital instability 
for US-American couples (for an overview see Lundberg 2005b, p. 347, Dahl and 
Moretti 2008, p. 1094 et seq. or Raley and Bianchi 2006, p. 411 et seqq.). Bedard and 
Deschênes (2005) use the sex of the first born child as an IV to analyse the impact of 
divorce on the economic status of women. The same approach is chosen by Ananat 
and Michaels (2008) who estimate the effect of marital dissolution on female 
income. However, exploiting child gender as an IV is disputable. First, it implies the 
absence of sex-selective abortion. Second, the sex of the first born child may have an 
impact on the allocation of the resources and time of the parents (Lundberg 2005a, p. 
601 et seq. or Lundberg 2005b, p. 352 et seq. or Choi, Joesch and Lundberg 2008, p. 
798 et seq.). To account for the fact that women who gave premarital birth to a boy 
are more likely to marry subsequently than mothers of girls who are born outside 
marriage (e.g. Raley and Bianchi 2006, p. 412), only individuals conceiving during 
marriage should be considered to avoid another stage of endogeneity. Furthermore, 
this approach limits the analysis to men and women with children by omitting 
childless individuals. Aside from that, offspring gender can influence parental 
investment decisions (Bogan 2010) and therefore cannot be considered exogenous 
regarding wealth holdings.  
 
According to Borghans et al. (2009), personality measures can be conducive to 
economic analyses. Psychologists linked marital stability to the “Big Five” 
personality traits, i.e. agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and 
openness (for an overview see Donnellan, Conger and Bryant 2004, p. 482 et seqq. 
or Bodenmann 2001). Neuroticism seems to impair marital quality in particular (e.g. 
Bouchard, Lussier and Sabourin 1999). Recently, economists have started to include 
psychological traits in their analyses. Lundberg (2010) finds that several 
psychological traits are strongly related to marital stability. However, personality 
traits turn out to have an impact on the economic outcome as well. They can affect 
saving behaviour and portfolio choice (Wärneryd 1999 or Nyhus and Webley 2001) 
or earnings (Mueller and Plug 2006 or Heineck and Anger 2010), for instance. 
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Wealth can therefore not be considered independent of the “Big Five”. Hence, 
personality traits are not a feasible IV for the purpose of this study, as well.  
 
Another IV one can possibly think of applying is the divorce rate. However, if 
divorce rates are high, single individuals are assumed to save less as divorced 
individuals raise the quality of the marriage pool and thus anticipated income (or 
wealth) is higher as finding an appropriate match may be easier. As regards married 
couples, one could argue that higher divorce rates increase precautionary saving to 
protect against income losses in case of a divorce. On the other hand, saving could be 
impaired, especially for women, if investments in human capital were increased, for 
instance. The net impact of divorce rates on wealth is of minor importance at this 
point. What matters is that both cannot be seen as uncorrelated. 
 
Marriage is highly valued in almost every religion (Mahoney et al. 2001). Marital 
status can be affected by religion as beliefs have an impact on the subjective costs 
(like feelings of guilt or reprobation) in case of a divorce as well as on the probability 
of getting married in the first place (cp. Lehrer 2009, p. 175 et seqq.). Furthermore, 
religion may provide support in matters of marital conflict. However, the importance 
of these effects seems to differ with religious affiliation (cp. Mahoney et al. 2001, 
Lehrer 2004a, p. 709, 2004b, or Vaaler, Ellison and Powers 2009). On the other 
hand, the religious belief can affect wealth accumulation indirectly through 
differences in educational attainment, gender roles or income, for instance (Lehrer 
2009, p. 205 et seqq.). A direct effect can arise from the value of saving, the 
allocation of time and money or sacrificial giving (cp. Keister 2003, 2008, p. 1239 et 
seq., or Lehrer and Chiswick 1993, p. 386). Waite and Lehrer (2003) show that 
marriage and religion have an influence on similar domains of life such as health, 
happiness or economic well-being, and that the pathways of their effect on these 
outcomes are comparable. 
 
As can be deducted from this section finding an appropriate and valid IV is 
associated with various difficulties (see also Blundell and Dias 2009, p. 607 et seq.). 
Another approach to account for endogenous regressors is by means of quasi-
experimental approaches. 
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3.2.3  Quasi-experimental research design 
The intention of quasi-experimental research is to approximate the design of a true 
experiment. By these means it is intended to avoid the pitfall of selection bias and 
provide the opportunity to estimate causal effects.  
 
One potential quasi-experimental approach is to compare outcomes before and after 
an exogenous intervention like an amendment of law. A change from fault to no-fault 
divorce, the implementation of a unilateral divorce law or changes in property 
division rules or alimony payment regulation can have an impact on the bargaining 
power of spouses and thus on intra-marital allocation and the propensity to divorce 
(e.g. Stevenson 2007, González and Viitanen 2009, Whittington and Alm 2003, or 
Kneip and Bauer 2009). As outlined in Chapter 2.2, major changes in the legal 
regulation of marriage and divorce in Germany occurred in the late 1970s and after 
2007. Thus, these adjustments are not capable to analyse the impact of marital status 
on wealth in 2002 and 2007 within a quasi-experimental framework.  
 
Another quasi-experimental design, the matching approach, provides the opportunity 
to compare the (counterfactual) outcomes of individuals who receive a treatment 
(e.g. divorce) to untreated individuals.  
 
3.2.4 Matching 
Appling matching methods is a possibility to implement the Rubin Causal Model 
(RCM) (Rubin 1974) statistically. This approach allows to estimate causal 
parameters without the need for restrictive assumptions (cp. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983, p. 48). 
 
To assess the effect of participation in a treatment ) (with )  0,1) on an outcome 
variable b, i.e. in case of the study at hand to assess the effect of divorce on wealth, 
the individual outcome in the case of participation, divorce, (bQ  b|)  1) is 
compared to the outcome in the case of no treatment, remaining married, (b: 
b|)  0) with individual characteristics } 
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(12) ∆ ^	,    M ^	,   6  ^ M ^6 
 
in the RCM. However, this difference (or unit effect) is not measurable, as an 
individual that participates in the treatment cannot belong to the group of the 
untreated at the same time. In the context of this study this means that an individual’s 
observed marital status can either be divorced or continuously married. The actual 
individual outcome can be written as  
 
(13) ^∗ ≡ ^  	 M ^6 , with    6, . 
 
To determine the causal effect, a counterfactual estimation of the latent outcome has 
to be implemented (cp. Gangl and DiPrete 2006, p. 400). 
 
Table 4: Counterfactual inference 
 bQ b: 
treated group ()  1) observable counterfactual 
control group ()  0) counterfactual observable 
 
One solution is to oppose the average outcome of the treated divorced individuals to 
the average outcome of individuals in the control group who are not divorced 
 
(14) ∆∗ 	^∗  M 	^6∗ . 
 
Causal interpretation of this (population) average treatment effect (ATE) is possible 
only if treated and untreated individuals are comparable in terms of characteristics 
and if no self-selection into the respective status takes place (see Gangl and DiPrete 
2006, p. 401). For the purpose of this study, the ATE constitutes no appropriate 
measure as selection into divorce is likely to depend on individual characteristics.   
 
Making some assumptions, a treatment effect can be assessed, however. The 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) presumes that the outcome variable 
(bQ, b:), wealth, and the exposure to treatment ()), i.e. divorce, are independent 
73 
 
conditional on characteristics } which simultaneously affect wealth and marital 
stability 
 
(15) ^, ^6  |. 
 
This assumption is also referred to as unconfoundedness or selection on observables 
(e.g. Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, p. 35, Blundell and Dias 2009, p. 294). 
 
To assess the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT)  
 
(16) H  	^|,    M 	^6|,    
 
the CIA can be weakened insofar as the actual treatment status is assumed not to 
affect the potential outcome in case of non-treatment (conditional mean 
independence assumption CMIA or unconfoundedness for controls)  
 
(17) ^6  |, 
 
where  0  W	)  1|}  1 (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997, p. 610 et seq.). 
This requirement is referred to as common support or overlap condition 
(u&&wW	}|)  1 ∩ u&&wW	}|)  0). In other words, the distributions of 
participants and non-participants have to overlap as regards the relevant 
characteristics } (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004, p. 35 or Caliendo and Hujer 
2006, p. 204). If both the unconfoundedness and the common support assumption are 
satisfied, the assignment to treatment is strongly ignorable according to Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983, p. 43). 
 
The CMIA implies that 
 
(18) 	^6|,     	^6|,   6  	^6|. 
 
Conditional on characteristics }, the mean counterfactual outcome of the untreated 
(	b:|}, )  1), i.e. the mean wealth of ever married individuals, if they had gotten 
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a divorce, can be constructed from the actual mean outcome of the ever married 
individuals (	b:|}, )  0). The ATT can therefore be written as  
 
(19) H  	^|,    M 	^6|,   6  	^| M 	^6|. 
 
Under the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) the participation of a 
treated individual has no effect on the outcome of other individuals, i.e. that whether 
an individual gets a divorce or not, is assumed not to affect the wealth holdings of 
other individuals (Rubin 1980, p. 591, or 1990, p. 475). Interference between the 
treated and the untreated group or peer and general equilibrium effects are ruled out 
(e.g. Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996, p. 446).  
 
Since self-selection into divorce is likely to occur, the affiliation to a particular group 
cannot be considered random. An experimental design has to be simulated ex post. 
Therefore, the distributions of covariates of the groups have to be aligned by means 
of a matching method.24 
 
Matching provides one opportunity to account for confounding factors when 
estimating treatment effects on an outcome variable. The basic idea behind the 
approach is to match individuals in the treated group to individuals in the control 
group whose characteristics are as similar as possible to eliminate systematic 
differences. 
 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, p. 42), a balancing score 	} can be 
employed to make comparisons between the groups possible. The distribution of the 
observed characteristics conditional on the balancing score is supposed to be the 
same for the treated and the control group so that 
 
(20)   |	. 
 
                                                 
24 For an overview, see Gensler, Skiera and Böhm (2005), Gangl and DiPrete (2006), Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008) or Blundell and Dias (2009), for instance. 
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Applying an exact matching method (where 	}  }), individuals are matched on 
the basis of an n-dimensional vector of characteristics, which impedes finding 
appropriate matching partners for a large n since all confounding factors have to be 
in accordance (cp. Blundell and Dias 2009, p. 596 et seq.). 
 
Another possibility to implement matching is by means of the Mahalanobis Distance 
 
(21) BG    M #′CO  M #,  
 
where } are the vectors of characteristics of a treated individual and } those of an 
untreated individual. N constitutes the covariance matrix (cp. Mahalanobis 1936, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985, p. 36 et seq., Gangl and DiPrete 2006, p. 410). Thus, 
the Mahalanobis metric maps the multiple characteristics into a scalar.   
 
By contrast, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, p. 42 et seq.) propose to implement the 
matching procedure by means of a single one-dimensional measure, the propensity 
score 	}. The index constitutes the probability of being exposed to the treatment 
subject to characteristics } 
 
(22) 	 ≡ A	  |  	| 
 
with 0  	}  1, i.e. within the region of common support. In the context of this 
study, the propensity score expresses the probability of getting a divorce dependent 
on individual characteristics. 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, p. 45) show that if the CIA applies for the 
characteristics } it is also valid for a balancing score like 	} 
 
(23) ^, ^6  |	. 
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This implies that receiving a treatment is random for a given propensity score 	} 
(see Becker and Ichino 2002, p. 359 or Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997, p. 612). 
Like with respect to exact matching the CIA can be weakened 
 
(24) ^6  |	 and thus 
 
(25) 	^6|	,     	^6|	,   6   ^6|	#. 
 
The ATT in consideration of the propensity score can then be written as 
 
	26	 H  	^|	,    M 	^6|	,   	
										  bQ|	}# M  b:|	}#.	
 
The ATT assesses the mean difference of outcomes within the region of common 
support which is weighted by means of propensity score distribution (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008, p. 36).  
 
Matching methods  
 
In general, one can distinguish between four PSM approaches: Nearest Neighbour 
Matching, the Caplier Algorithm, Stratification Matching and Kernel Matching. 
Since matching methods can be perceived as weighting procedures, the outcome of 
the untreated group can be generalised (cp. Gensler, Skiera and Böhm 2005, p. 53) 
 
(27)  ^6|	#  ;∑ ∑ !^6∈j6∈j , 
 
with Q as the number of treated individuals and ' as the weight subject to the 
applied matching method. The ATT can then be written as (cp. Heckman et al. 1998, 
p. 1024) 
 
(28) H  p ;∑ ^∈j r M p ;∑ ∑ !^6∈j6∈j r. 
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Applying Nearest Neighbour Matching, the n (with n≥1) individuals from the control 
group who are closest as regards the propensity score are matched to a treated 
individual. An untreated individual can serve as the matching partner for several 
individuals (matching with replacement) or for solely one (matching without 
replacement).25 The set of matching partners from the control group (N) can be 
written as 
 
(29) C  |	 M  # 
 
(cp. Heckman et al. 1998, p. 1023 et seq.). The weighting parameter to construct the 
counterfactual mean is 
 
(30) !  ,  ∈ C6, >@> . 
 
To avoid bad matches, i.e. matches with wide distances between 	} and  }#, 
Caliper Matching implements a tolerance level  of the maximum propensity score 
distance and hence imposes a common support condition: 
 
(31) CC  |	 M  #  , and 
(32) !C  ,  ∈ CC6, >@> . 
 
If no matching partner can be found within the caliper, the observation is excluded 
(cp. Heckman et al. 1998, p. 1024 or Smith and Todd 2005, p. 315).26 
                                                 
25 Smith and Todd (2005, p. 315) point out that the decision between matching with or without 
replacement involves a trade-off between the variance and the average quality of the matches. 
Allowing for replacement reduces the bias but increases the variance of the estimator. Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008, p. 44) provide an overview of the trade-offs in terms of bias and efficiency in respect 
of several matching methods. 
26 The Caliper Matching method can be modified insofar as the average outcome of all untreated 
individuals within the caliper is used as a counterfactual. This modification is referred to as Radius 
Matching. Furthermore, observations are not excluded but matched to the nearest neighbour outside 
the caliper, if no appropriate matching within the caliper is possible (Dehejia and Wahba 2002, Smith 
and Todd 2005, p. 315 et seq.).   
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Applying Stratification Matching the common support of propensity scores is 
subdivided into a set of strata. The average treatment effect is assessed by calculating 
the mean difference between the outcome of the treated and untreated group within 
the respective intervals 
 
(33) H%  ∑ ^∈∈_	;, M
∑ ^∈6∈_	
;,6 , 
 
with c	 as the set of units in stratum  (cp. Becker and Ichino 2002, p. 364). 
The ATT  
 
(34) H%  ∑ H% ∑ ;∈∈_	∑ ;∀j  
 
results from weighting the strata-specific treatment effects J) by the 
corresponding share of treated individuals in the interval (e.g. Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008, p. 43 et seq. or Smith and Todd 2005, p. 316).27 
 
In contrast to the algorithms mentioned above that use only one or few individuals 
from the control group as matching partners, Kernel Matching uses a kernel-
weighted average of several (or all) untreated individuals to construct the 
counterfactual mean with 
 
(35) !T 
T #pr;  
∑ T¡ # #; ¢∈6
 
 
where £\ is a bandwidth parameter and X	∙ a kernel function. Weights depend on 
the distance between the propensity scores of the treated individual and each 
individual from the control group whereby the highest weights are given to those 
individuals that are closest in terms of a propensity score (see Heckman et al. 1998, 
p. 1024 or Smith and Todd 2005, p. 316). As more individuals are included in the 
                                                 
27 On the determination of the number of strata see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008, p. 43), for instance. 
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estimation, this approach helps to reduce the variance. On the other hand, the quality 
of matches can decrease on account of this (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, p. 43). 
Concerning the bandwidth parameter, a trade-off between bias and variance arises. A 
large bandwidth evens the estimated density function and thus decreases the variance 
between the true underlying and the estimated density function. However, the quality 
of matches can decrease as underlying features may be smoothed away (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2008, p. 44). 
 
Some authors propose Local Linear Matching as a generalised implementation of 
Kernel Matching whereby a linear term is added to the propensity scores of a treated 
individual. The weighting parameter can be written as  
 
(36) !¥¥  T ∑ T 	O	#
GO¦Tp #O	r§x∑ T 	O	#∈6 y∈6
∑ T∈6 ∑ T 	O	#G∈6 Ox∑ T 	O	#∈6 yG , 
 
with X  X 	} M  }# £\⁄ #. This helps if the observations of the untreated 
group are distributed asymmetrically around the observations of the treated group, 
which would be the case if the distribution of the propensity scores exhibits gaps or 
boundary points (e.g. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997, p. 630 et seq., Heckman et 
al. 1998, p.1041, Smith and Todd 2005, p. 316 et seq. or Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008, p. 43 et seq.).  
 
Gangl and DiPrete (2006, p. 409 et seq.) note that matching algorithms can be 
combined to some extent: kernel-based matching within strata or Nearest Neighbour 
Matching in combination with a caliper, for instance. Thus, the analysis can benefit 
from the respective advantages of the methods. 
 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) can be applied to assess the effect of a treatment 
when selection into treatment cannot be considered random. To achieve valid results, 
comparable frameworks for the treated and untreated individuals have to be 
constructed (e.g Blundell and Dias 2009, p. 600 et seq., or Gangl and DiPrete 2006, 
p. 417). Two individuals with the same characteristics have to be equally likely to get 
a divorce. It has to be assured that for divorced and ever married individuals the 
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distributions of relevant characteristics, i.e. parameters affecting wealth as well as the 
probability of divorce, overlap. After the matching process, the distribution of 
characteristics of the divorced individuals should resemble the distribution of 
characteristics of the ever married individuals to rule out self-selection into divorce 
depending on observable characteristics. The bias caused by reverse causality could 
be completely eliminated by means of matching methods, if no unobserved variables 
had an impact on the outcome and the treatment status. Otherwise the bias can only 
be reduced (cp. Becker and Ichino 2002, p. 358, or DiPrete and Gangl 2004, p. 276). 
 
Whether the common support assumption and the CMIA can be fulfilled is likely to 
depend on the quality and richness of the dataset as well as on the degree of 
selectivity. Imbens and Wolldridge (2009, p. 46) state that the unconfoundedness 
assumption is not directly testable. In practice, the quality of matching can be 
assessed by means of different approaches, however (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, 
p. 47 et seq.). It can be checked whether significant differences between the means of 
the covariates of the treated and untreated group exist using t-statistics. Another 
suggestion is to compare the standardised bias of every covariate before and after 
matching. The standardised bias is the difference of the sample means of the treated 
and untreated group as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in the groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). According to a rule-of-thumb, 
standardised biases lower than 5% are considered sufficient (cp. Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008, p. 48). A third alternative is to re-estimate the propensity score using 
the matched sample. The pseudo-R2 should be low after matching, if systematic 
differences have been eliminated. Besides, it has to be assured that the distributions 
of characteristics of the treated and untreated group overlap, i.e. that a region of 
common support exists. One solution is to confine the analysis to individuals whose 
propensity score lies between the minimum and the maximum propensity score of 
the other group. Furthermore, the region of common support can be restricted by 
excluding propensity scores for which the estimated density is below a particular 
value (cp. Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, p. 45 et seq., or Smith and Todd 2005, p. 
317).  
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Whether the SUTVA can be considered fulfilled, i.e. whether the divorce of one 
individual can be assumed not to have an effect on the potential wealth holdings of 
other individuals, has to be decided theoretically. Marriage and divorce always affect 
two persons and consequently an interaction between the spouses exists. As men and 
women are analysed separately, however, this interference is eliminated. Also, due to 
the common incidence of divorce and since divorce has become socially accepted to 
a large extent, peer group effects are unlikely. Assuming that a market in marriage 
exists, one could argue that the wealth of single individuals can be affected by the 
divorce of other individuals, insofar as divorced persons improve the quality of the 
marriage pool and therefore anticipated income (and subsequently wealth) is higher 
as marriage becomes more likely. However, this effect can be regarded as rather 
indirect and time-lagged. Furthermore, in practice, is rather unlikely that two 
individuals from different households surveyed in the SOEP interact with each other. 
Thus, analysing the relation between divorce and wealth, the SUTVA can be 
considered fulfilled.   
 
The calculation of standard errors for the treatment effects should include the 
variance resulting from the estimation of the propensity score as well as the 
imputation of the region of common support. Bootstrapping constitutes one 
possibility to assess standard errors. It has to be noted, however, that bootstrapping 
has not been formally justified (Imbens 2004) and may fail for nearest neighbour 
matching with replacement (Abadie and Imbens 2008). Bootstrapping is likely to be 
valid for kernel estimators, though (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, p.42). Another 
approach by Abadie and Imbens (2006) uses the average of the conditional variances 
in the two treatment groups to assess standard errors.28   
 
3.2.5 Conditional Difference-in-Differences Matching 
The above-mentioned matching methods assume that conditional on observable 
characteristics mean outcomes can be considered independent of treatment status. 
However, treated and untreated individuals could differ systematically in terms of 
                                                 
28 For a broader overview see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008, p. 51 et seqq.) or Imbens and Wooldridge 
(2009, p. 42 et seq.). 
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unobserved characteristics. Even if the bias of the treatment effect can be reduced 
applying matching methods, reverse causality between the outcome and the treatment 
cannot be completely eliminated if unobserved heterogeneity occurs (cp. Becker and 
Ichino 2002, p. 358).  
 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, p. 622 et seqq.) and Heckman et al. (1998, p. 
1030 et seq.) decompose the conventional measure of evaluation bias  
 
(37) ¨  	^6|   M 	^6|  6 
 
into three components  
 
(38) ¨  © 	^6|,   % 	|  B M © 	^6|,   6%6 	| 6B  ¨ ¨G ¨ª 
 
where * (with K  0,1) is the support of } for )  K.29 The particular components of 
bias can be written as 
 
(39) ¨  © 	^6|,   %∖%6 	|  B M 
         © 	b:|}, )  0¬∖­¬ 8	}|)  0®} , 
 
(40) ¨G  © 	^6|,   6%6 ¯	|   M 	|  6°B, 
 
(41) ¨ª  © ¯	^6|,    M 	^6|,   6°%6 	|  B, 
 
with *Q: as the region of common support and * ∖ *Q: (with K  0,1) as the region 
that is contained in * but not in *Q:. Bias kQ arises, if supports of the observed 
characteristics for the treated and the control group do not overlap. Bias kP arises 
from differences in the distribution of observable characteristics between the two 
                                                 
29 In other words, * is the set of values of the characteristics in the particular treatment status.  
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groups (observed heterogeneity). Bias k± depends on selection on unobservables 
(unobserved heterogeneity). Hence, it constitutes a bias that can arise even if the 
outcomes are compared in a region of common support and outcomes are 
conditioned on observable characteristics. By means of the common support 
condition and the matching procedure, the two first components of bias can be 
eliminated. The third part is zero if the CIA applies. Otherwise, the selection into 
treatment caused by unobservables can be accounted for employing difference-in-
differences matching. 
 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, p. 612 et seq.) and Heckman et al. (1998, p. 
1029 et seq.) define a non-parametric conditional difference-in-differences estimator 
that extends matching to a cross-sectional or panel context and thus allows to control 
for selection on unobservables. In the classical difference-in-differences approach, 
the outcomes of individuals before and after treatment are compared (e.g. Caliendo 
and Hujer 2006, p. 207 et seq.) 
 
(42) ²²   ^D M ^ # M  ^6D M ^6 #. 
 
The conditional difference-in-differences estimator opposes the before and after 
treatment outcomes conditional on the propensity score 
 
(43) ²²%   ^D M ^ |	,   # M  ^6D M ^6 |	,   6#. 
 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, p. 613) show that if  
 
(44)  ^6D M ^6 |	,   #   ^6D M ^6 |	,   6# 
 
holds, i.e. if the relevant characteristics are balanced between the groups and the 
common support assumption is fulfilled, ³³´µ can identify the ATT. Furthermore, 
if it is assumed that unobserved heterogeneity is stable over time  
 
(45) ¨D	  ¨	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the conditional difference-in-differences estimator does account for selection on 
unobservables. Thus, applying matching methods in combination with difference-in-
differences estimators constitutes an approach to account for selection into treatment, 
simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
3.3 Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 
The skewness of the distribution of net-wealth requires a transformation of the 
dependent variable. The method applied must be able to account for the negative 
values as well as the frequent occurrence of zero wealth holdings which impede the 
implementation of log-transformation. One possible solution lies in employing the 
inverse hyperbolic sine-transformation (IHS).30 Net-wealth (') is transformed as 
follows: 
 
(46) !¶>A  · p!  ¸	!G  r  	 ¹ºO!. 
 
For large absolute values of ' this transformation approximates ln	'. The 
derivative of  '½¾¿ÀÁ is 
 
(47) !′¶>A   √!G  ⁄  . 
 
To account for the highly skewed distribution of wealth, 0.1% top-coding is 
implemented for every contemplated source of wealth and thus also for net-wealth. 
Wealth components that can take negative values are additionally 0.1% bottom-
coded.  
 
                                                 
30 See Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988) or Pence (2006, p. 5 et seqq.) for a detailed description of 
the IHS. In general, the transformation contains a scaling parameter Ã  
('½¾¿ÀÁ  ln pÃ'  ¸	ÃP'P  1r /Ã  	 sinhOQ	Ã' /Ã). Following Frick and Grabka (2009b), Ã 
is set to one. 
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In the following, the implementation of theoretic determinants of wealth applied in 
an OLS regression is described. As the purpose of this study is to analyse the relation 
of wealth and divorce, marital history categories which account for the current 
marital status as well as former family changes (cp. Table 2) are included in the 
regression.  
 
One main determinant of wealth is income. Pursuant to the life-cycle approach, 
higher permanent income involves saving on a higher rate and therefore higher 
wealth. On the one hand, household income averaged over the last three years is 
considered as a proxy for permanent income.31 Instead of using equivalised 
household income, the logarithmised household size is included as a distinct 
explanatory variable.32 A dummy variable contains the quintiles of permanent 
household income.  On the other hand, accounting for the fact that saving is likely to 
depend on the level of individual income as well (e.g. Browning 1995), a measure of 
individual earnings is introduced which is also averaged out over the last three 
years.33 In consequence of using averaged income measures, the data are restricted to 
individuals who have been surveyed two years before the year information on wealth 
holdings have been observed. One shortcoming of the restriction to a balanced panel 
is the drop out of cases. Systematic differences between married and unmarried 
individuals may arise with respect to individual earnings. As these differences 
constitute one potential reason for variation in wealth holdings, however, it is 
feasible to apply a measure of permanent individual earnings. The same applies for 
household income. 
 
Because the age-wealth-distribution is assumed to be hump-shaped it is controlled 
for age and squared age. Wealth is expected to be positively correlated with health 
(e.g. Meer, Miller and Rosen 2003). Although precautionary saving can arise by 
                                                 
31 For the use of average income as a proxy for permanent income see Smith (2001, p. 87) or Juster, 
Smith and Stafford (1999, p. 265 et seqq.), for instance.  
32 Schwarze (2003) shows that including the logarithmised income and logarithmised household size 
instead of a measure of equivalent income increases the flexibility since no assumption with regard to 
the equivalent scale applied has to be made.  
33 The indicator takes the value zero if an individual does not have any earnings. The variable 
becomes one if a person earns up to 5,000 €, two for 5,001 € to 10,000 €, three for 10,001 € to 30,000 
€, it takes the value four for earnings between 30,001 € and 50,000 € and five for earnings higher the 
50,000 €. 
86 
 
reason of poor health higher medical expenses and loss of wages are expected to 
abate wealth levels (Finke and Pierce 2006, p. 230). Bad health can impede an 
individual’s labour supply and involve medical expenses. The dummy variable for 
health status takes the value zero if health is rated “(very) good”, one if “satisfactory” 
and two if it is rated “not so good or bad”. One determinant for the earnings potential 
is educational attainment. Applying the ISCED classification, four educational 
classes are generated: low, middle, (higher) vocational and higher education.34  
 
To account for the different feasibilities to accumulate wealth in former East-
Germany and West-Germany, a dummy variable which indicates whether an 
individual lived in East-Germany before 1989 is introduced. Amongst other things, 
the difference in wealth holdings between former East- and West-Germany exists 
since real estate property is less prevalent in East-Germany (Frick and Grabka 2009b, 
p. 590). Because owner-occupied property is more common in rural areas, a dummy 
variable is included which takes the value zero if an individual lives in a rural area 
with up to 5,000 inhabitants, one if he or she lives in a city (5,000-100,000 
inhabitants) and three if they live in a town with more than 100,000 inhabitants. 
Furthermore, it is controlled for whether a person has a migration background, i.e. 
whether they do not have the German citizenship or were not born in Germany. 
 
To account for whether a value was imputed, edited or remained unchanged, Frick, 
Grabka and Marcus (2010, p. 32) recommend to include this information as a control 
variable in regression analyses. Children can have an impact on labour supply and 
therefore on income and on saving behaviour. Thus, the number of children in the 
household is controlled for. As the effect of children is likely to decrease with an 
increasing number of children the squared number of children in the household is 
also included. Wealth accumulation may differ depending on the age of children. 
Three dummy variables taking the value one if an individual has at least one baby 
aged 0-4, a child of school age (5-17) or children elder than 17, respectively, are 
therefore considered.  
 
                                                 
34 The corresponding ISCED specifications are: low: ISCED=0,1,2; middle: ISCED=3; (higher) 
vocational: ISCED=4,5; higher education: ISCED=6. 
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To assess the employment history, the years an individual spent in full-time 
employment, in part-time employment or unemployed are included. Moreover, it is 
controlled for whether an individual is in the labour force at the moment. The 
defined benefit pension scheme provides different incentives for different 
occupational groups with regard to old-age provision. While the pension scheme is 
statutory for the major part of the population, it is optional for self-employed or 
professionals (“Freiberufler”). A separate tax financed system without explicit 
contributions exists for civil servants who are exempt from paying contributions to 
the statutory pension system. Thus, wealth holdings are likely to differ depending on 
whether an individual is self-employed or a civil servant due to distinct incentives for 
retirement saving.  
 
Other determinants of current wealth are inheritances and gifts received. One dummy 
variable comprises information about whether an individual received inheritances or 
gifts before 1992. Another dummy variable becomes one if a person inherited before 
2002 but after 1992. Since 2002 information on inheritances and gifts in the SOEP is 
available only on the household level. A third dummy variable expresses whether an 
individual lived in a household where any of the household members received 
inheritances and gifts in between 2002 and 2007. Saving is assumed to determine 
wealth. The dummy variable included takes the value one if the household an 
individual has lived in has saved continuously over the last three years and zero 
otherwise. Information on saving is provided on the household level only. Changes 
in the composition of the household may have an impact on the saving behaviour. As 
with regard to income, it is reasonable to introduce a proxy of permanent saving 
instead of a measure concerning one year only.    
 
The educational level of an individual’s parents constitutes one determinant of their 
well-being as well as their descendants’ education – and is therefore likely to be 
related to wealth (e.g. Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2005 or Heineck and Riphahn 
2009). Hence, two dummy variables are considered taking the value one if the 
mother or the father, respectively, is highly educated. Another explanatory variable 
included to assess the families’ socio-economic background concerns the regional 
environment a person (predominantly) grew up in. The dummy variable takes the 
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value one if a person grew up in a small town or in a rural area, and zero otherwise. 
As owner-occupied property is more common in less densely populated areas, 
individuals from rural areas may be more likely to inherit, for instance.    
 
Wealth accumulation can be affected by religion indirectly through differences in 
educational attainment, gender roles or income, for instance (Lehrer 2009, p. 205 et 
seqq.). A direct effect can arise from the value of saving, the allocation of time and 
money or sacrificial giving (cp. Keister 2003, 2008, p. 1239 et seq., or Lehrer and 
Chiswick 1993, p. 386). A dummy variable contains information on whether an 
individual stated to be Catholic or Evangelical, to be a member of a different 
Christian denomination or religious community, an Islamic religious community or 
another religious community or to be undenominational.  
  
The level of wealth can differ by the willingness to take risks in financial matters. 
Risk preferences were surveyed in 2004 by means of a scale from zero (no 
willingness to take risks in financial matters) to ten (very willing to take risk). Life 
satisfaction is correlated with determinants of wealth like consumption or investment 
behaviour (Frey and Stutzer 2002, p. 430). Overall life satisfaction is surveyed by 
means of a scale ranging from zero (completely dissatisfied) to ten (completely 
satisfied). 
 
Pursuant to equation (10), wealth holdings are determined by wealth holdings in the 
previous period. In the regression for 2007, the value of net-wealth held in 2002 is 
therefore included (cp. Frick and Grabka 2009, p. 594). The measure is transformed 
by means of the hyperbolic sine-transformation.   
 
All regression analyses are implemented for men and women separately. The 
determinants of wealth accumulation are likely to differ in their influences between 
the sexes. With regard to marital status these differences can be considered relevant, 
in particular.     
 
In a second step, an OLS regression on the change in net-wealth between 2002 and 
2007 is implemented. The dependent variable is the difference between net-wealth in 
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2007 and 2002, each value transformed applying the inverse hyperbolic sine-
transformation.  
 
It is controlled for the change in marital status between the two years (cp. Table 3). 
Categories containing less than 50 individuals are omitted. Atkinson and Harrison 
(1978, p. 250 et seqq.) suggest to analyse the accumulation of wealth by age class to 
account for the hump-shaped pattern of saving over the life-cycle. The dummy 
variable comprises ten age classes (17-25, 26-30, 31-15, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 
56-60, 61-65 and older than 65). Further control variables included different from the 
variables in the OLS regression model are a proxy for permanent earnings, average 
earnings over the period from 2002 to 2007. A further variable represents the years a 
person was in the labour force between the five years. Quintiles of permanent 
household income contain information on the average income of the household(s) an 
individual lived in between 2002 and 2007.  
 
Whether an individual lived in a household that has constantly saved between 2002 
and 2007 is expressed by a dummy variable. Furthermore, information on whether an 
individual lived in a household where loans had to be paid off permanently is 
included. A variable considered as a proxy for a precautionary saving motive is 
whether an individual worried about their health in 2002. Inheritances can positively 
affect wealth holdings. Thus, a dummy variable taking the value one if any person in 
the current household received an inheritance or gift between 2002 and 2007 is 
included. Information on whether wealth was imputed, edited or remained unchanged 
is provided by a dummy variable with three values: zero if information on wealth 
remained unchanged, one if the value was imputed for 2002 or 2007, and two if 
imputation was carried out for both years. 
 
To account for changes in income between 2002 and 2007, two categorical variables 
express the change in individual earnings and the change in household income. Both 
variables comprise nine categories comparing income in the two years: a loss higher 
than 50%, up to 50%, up to 25% or up to 10%, a change in either direction not higher 
than 5%, and four categories if an individual’s income increased corresponding to the 
loss-categories. Other changes considered are whether an individual had a child or 
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retired between 2002 and 2007. Furthermore, it is controlled for whether their health 
worsened.    
 
The same explanatory variables as for the OLS regression on the change in wealth 
are applied to carry out probit regressions on whether an individual increased their 
wealth stock by more than 5% or incurred a loss higher than 5% between 2002 and 
2007. In a third model, the dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value one 
if an individual’s wealth changed up to 5% in either direction. Moreover, an ordered 
probit regression is implemented. The categorial dependent variable takes the value 
zero if the wealth stock of a person more than halved. It becomes one if the loss 
amounts to 25% to 50%, two for 10% to 25% losses and three for 5% to 10% losses. 
If the changes in wealth are not higher than 5%, regardless of whether it increases or 
decreases, the variable takes the value four. The categories for an increase in wealth 
correspond to the loss-categories. The dependent variable amounts to five if wealth 
increased by 5% to 10%, six in case of an 10% to 25% increase and seven for 25% to 
59% increases. It becomes eight if an individual more than doubled their wealth.  
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Table 5: Overview of dependent and control variables for OLS regressions and (ordered) probit regression models 
 OLS regression on 
wealth  
OLS regression on 
the change in 
wealth 
probit regressions 
on the change in 
wealth  
ordered probit 
regression on the 
change in wealth 
dependend variable IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2007 
(IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2007) - (IHS-
transformed net-wealth 
2002) 
(1) decrease > 5% 
(2) increase > 5% 
(3) change up to 5% 
 
nine categories of changes 
in wealth 
control variables     
marital history x    
marital status change between 2002 and 2007  x x x 
age x    
squared age x    
age class  x x x 
physical health x x x x 
education x x x x 
region  x x x x 
East-Germany before 1989 x x x x 
migration background x x x x 
imputed x x x x 
number of children x x x x 
squared number of children x    
child(ren) aged 0-4 x x x x 
child(ren) aged 5-17 x x x x 
child(ren) older than 17 x x x x 
quintiles of permanent HH-income x x x x 
log(household size) x x x x 
…continued      
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…continued (overview of dependent and control variables for regression models) 
permanent earnings x x x x 
years full-time employment x x x x 
years part-time employment x x x x 
years unemployment x x x x 
in the labour force x x x x 
years in the labour force between 2002 and 2007  x x x 
self-employed x x x x 
civil servant x x x x 
IHS-transformed net-wealth 2002 x x x x 
saved the last three years  x    
saved continuously between 2002 and 2007   x x x 
inheritance before 1992 x    
inheritance between 1992 and 2002 x    
inheritance between 2002 and 2007 x x x x 
paid off loans continuously between 2002 and 2007  x x x 
worried about health  x x x 
father highly educated x x x x 
mother  highly educated x x x x 
grew up in rural area x x x x 
religion x x x x 
risk x x x x 
life satisfaction x x x x 
change in individual earnings  x x x 
change in household income  x x x 
birth  x x x 
retired  x x x 
health worsened  x x x 
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To assess the causal effect of divorce on wealth, conditional difference-in-differences 
matching is implemented. The dependent variable estimating the propensity to 
divorce takes the value zero if an individual was continuously married between 2002 
and 2007. It amounts to one if an individual underwent a divorce during this period. 
  
In the following, factors that are assumed to have an impact on the probability of 
divorce are specified taking the theory of marriage and wealth accumulation into 
account. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008, p. 38) or Smith and Todd (2005, p. 333) note 
that variables included in the estimation of the propensity score should 
simultaneously influence the outcome variable to ensure that the CIA is fulfilled. 
Thus, parameters considered should have an impact on the probability of divorce as 
well as on wealth holdings. It should be kept in mind that – although the likelihood 
of divorce should be validly estimated – the main purpose is not to predict the 
probability of divorce but to balance the distribution of relevant characteristics.  
 
In order to estimate the propensity score, individual and marital characteristics as 
well as information concerning the family background are considered.35 To avoid 
that a male is matched to a female individual, direct matching with respect to sex is 
applied.  
 
According to economic theory of marriage, the higher a person’s educational 
attainment and age the lower is the likelihood of divorce. The physical health of a 
person can influence the probability of divorce insofar as poor health increases the 
search costs and thus increases the gains from marriage. However, sustaining a 
relationship may be better feasible for individuals in good health (cp. Lillard and 
Panis 1996, p. 314 et seq.). The same is true for mental health (e.g. Bartel and 
Taubman 1986 or Wade and Pevalin 2004).36  
 
As marital disruptions are more likely to occur in urban areas (e.g. Gautier, Svarer 
and Teulings 2009) the region of residence is included as a control variable. To 
                                                 
35 For an overview on factors that are expected to affect marital dissolution see Finke and Pierce 
(2006, p. 228 et seq.), Bryant and Zick (2006, p. 290 et seqq.), Smock, Manning and Gupta (1999, p. 
802 et seq.) or White (1990), for instance.  
36 The mental health scale in the SOEP ranges from 0 to 100 (see Andersen et al. 2007 on the 
construction of the measure). 
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account for the different attitudes to divorce in former East-Germany and West-
Germany (Engelhardt, Trappe and Dronkers 2002 or Böttcher 2006), information on 
whether a person lived in East-Germany before 1989 is considered. As attitude 
towards divorce may also differ depending on cultural factors, it is controlled for 
whether a person has a migration background, which also constitutes a determinant 
of wealth.  
 
A further parameter which is related to divorce as well as to wealth accumulation is 
religious affiliation. Since marriage is highly valued in almost every religion, divorce 
probabilities of religious individuals are presumed to be lower than for non-
denominational persons. Moreover, life satisfaction is assumed to be related to 
marital happiness and thus lower the propensity of divorce (cp. Waite and Lehrer 
(2003, p. 257 et seq.).37  
 
Children can be seen as marriage-specific capital which lowers the probability of 
divorce (Becker, Landes and Michael 1977, p. 1152). Hence, the number of children 
living in the household and the age of children are considered in the analysis. 
Younger children are assumed to stabilise marriages, whereas this effect is likely to 
decrease with their increasing age.  
 
Household income is considered since couples with higher socio-economic status 
have a lower probability of divorce and are able to save more. Additionally, 
individual earnings are included as a measure for economic independence.38 
Furthermore, it is controlled for the years an individual spent in employment or 
unemployed to assess the employment history.  
 
A further variable included is the ratio between the years an individual worked and 
the duration of marriage. It is sought to represent human capital accumulated during 
marriage as well as a proxy for bargaining power within marriage. According to 
economic theory of marriage, search costs decrease with age and as a consequence 
                                                 
37 Personality traits are related to both wealth and marital status (cp. Chapter 3.2.2). However, as the 
“Big Five” were surveyed in 2005 in the SOEP and divorce may change personality traits (Mroczek 
and Spiro Ill 2003), the measure is not included in the analysis.  
38 Both income measures are averaged over three years and logarithmised. As earnings can amount to 
zero, one Euro is added to the original amount before taking the logarithm. 
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the gain of marriage increases (Becker, Landes and Michael 1977, p. 1151). 
Diekmann and Klein (1993, p. 351) or Rapp (2008, p. 507 et seq.) discuss in more 
detail why the probability of divorce is likely to decrease with the age at first 
marriage. As the effects are assumed to decrease with increasing age at marriage, the 
logarithm of the parameter is taken. Marital-specific capital increases with the 
duration of marriage and thus lowers the risk of a separation (Becker 1974a, p.23). 
The marginal utility of marital-specific capital diminishes over the years (Becker, 
Landes and Michael 1977, p. 1152 et seq.). Thus, the risk of divorce differs subject 
to the duration of marriage (cp. Rapp 2008). The risk is the highest at the beginning 
of marriage and decreases subsequently. Hence, the duration of marriage is 
logarithmised. Additionally, wealth accumulation is likely to increase with the 
duration of marriage as couples may take advantage of the marriage institution 
benefits proportionately longer. If an individual inherited during marriage, has an 
impact on the power within marriage. Moreover, inheritances increase the wealth 
stock. 
 
To assess the families’ socio-economic status, the parental education is considered. 
Lyngstad (2006, p. 50) states that “[i]f education had a positive correlation with the 
divorce rate for the parental generation, then, for their offspring, parental education 
will be correlated with having experienced parental divorce”.39 Additionally, a 
variable concerning the regional environment a person (predominantly) grew up in is 
included. As living in an urban area is assumed to increase the probability of divorce, 
an individual who grew up in a rural area may be less likely to have undergone 
parental divorce.  
 
  
                                                 
39 Parental divorce is found to increase the probability that their offspring undergoes a divorce (e.g. 
Diekmann and Engelhardt 1999). 
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 Empirical Evidence 4   
 
In the following, the distribution of wealth is outlined by means of some descriptive 
statistics. Subsequently, the distribution of wealth depending on marital status is 
examined. Wealth changes in consequence of changes in marital status are analysed 
in Chapter 4.3. In a next step, the causal effect of divorce on wealth is sought to be 
assessed.   
 
4.1  The Distribution of Wealth 
 
Figure 3 exhibits the percentage share of net-wealth held in 2002 and 2007 over the 
deciles of the wealth distribution. The high concentration of wealth becomes evident. 
The wealthiest 10% hold more wealth than the individuals of all other deciles 
combined. As net-wealth can also take negative values in case debts exceed positive 
wealth holdings, the share of wealth can become negative as in case of the lowest 
decile. Net-wealth is slightly more concentrated in 2007 than in 2002. The share of 
wealth in the lower deciles decreased, whereas the percentage possessed in the ninth 
and tenth decile increased between 2002 and 2007.  
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Figure 3: Percentage share of net-wealth over deciles in 2002 and 2007. 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
 
The measures in  
Table 6 and Table 7 provide additional evidence that wealth and its single 
components are distributed unequally. On average, i.e. regarding the mean and the 
median of net-wealth, the level of wealth remained stable between 2002 and 2007.40 
Compared to 2002, fewer individuals did not possess any wealth in 2007, but the 
share of persons with debts increased from about 5% to 6.5%. Owner-occupied 
property is the most important source of wealth in Germany. The slight decrease in 
the value of owner-occupied property is compensated by a rise in private pensions. 
This increase is most likely due to the “Riester Rente” which was introduced in 2002 
                                                 
40 The parameters for 2002 and 2007 can only be compared nominally. The SOEP provides a 
consumer price index which may be used to make income comparable over the years. The index is not 
appropriate for the adjustment of wealth holdings, however, as it focuses on consumer prices only. An 
index suitable to adjust wealth holdings would have to incorporate inflation rates for every 
contemplated component of net-wealth like housing wealth or financial assets. Hence, the calculation 
of such an indicator is extremely complex, if feasible at all.  
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and is targeted to extend private retirement provisions. Furthermore, financial assets 
gained in importance. 
 
Table 6: The distribution of wealth in 2002 
 
 2002 net-
wealth 
owner-
occ. 
property 
other 
property 
financial 
assets 
private 
pensions 
business 
assets 
tangible 
assets 
consumer 
credits 
         Wealth in 
€         
mean  81,756 42,952 12,316 9,375 8,921 7,265 1,299 2,239 
median  15,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% share 
wealth=0 
21.1 60.4 88.0 53.0 49.0 95.0 89.6 87.8 
% share 
wealth< 0 
5.2 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
Percentiles         
10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
75% 97,780 66,400 0 8,975 7,798 0 0 0 
90% 208,266 140,000 0 25,000 24,392 0 0 3,000 
Inequality         
Gini 0.776 0.781 0.980 0.825 0.827 0.989 0.963 0.959 
HSCV 3.418 1.826 19.893 4.333 4.622 62.380 19.944 22.265 
 
n= 23,158 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
The high skewness of the distribution becomes evident by comparison of the mean 
and the median of net-wealth. The former is about five times as large as the latter in 
both years. As regards the different components, the median is zero in almost all 
cases. The selected quantiles contribute more evidence for the unequal distribution of 
wealth. The 10% and 25% least wealthy individuals do not possess any wealth. The 
90% percentile on the other hand is about 2.5 times as high as the mean and 14 times 
higher than the median in both years.  
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Table 7: The distribution of wealth in 2007 
 
 2007 net-
wealth 
owner-
occ. 
property 
other 
property 
financial 
assets 
private 
pensions 
business 
assets 
tangible 
assets 
consumer 
credits 
         Wealth in 
€         
mean  82,138 39,945 11,953 11,331 11,444 7,123 724 2,415 
median  15,000 0 0 0 309 0 0 0 
% share 
wealth=0 
17.3 59.0 88.5 48.8 45.9 95.4 93.9 84.0 
% share 
wealth< 0 
6.5 0.6 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
Percentiles         
10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
75% 93,335 52,500 0 9,202 10,000 0 0 0 
90% 210,052 135,983 0 28,727 30,000 0 0 5,000 
Inequality         
Gini 0.795 0.807 1.026 0.842 0.821 0.991 0.980 0.940 
HSCV 4.048 2.135 24.782 5.398 4.000 73.946 31.196 13.116 
 
n= 20,623  
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
The inequality measures listed support the picture of the dispersion. Gini-coefficients 
turn out to be relatively high.41 The coefficient takes values close to one for those 
components that are owned by a minority of the population such as business assets. 
Besides, the comparison of the values for half the squared coefficient of variation 
(HSCV) in 2002 and 2007, which is sensitive to changes at the top of the 
distribution, provides evidence that the increase in inequality of wealth is affected 
more strongly by the top of the distribution, as the rise in the latter measure is larger 
                                                 
41 As net-wealth and some of its components can take negative values the estimates of the Gini for 
these measures may be higher than one because the Lorenz curve lies under the horizontal axis in 
these cases (cp. Jenkins and Jäntti 2005, p. 16). 
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compared to the increase in Gini-coefficients, which are sensitive to changes in the 
middle of the distribution.42 This is in accordance with the changes over the deciles 
of the wealth distribution shown in Figure 3. Thus, although the level of net-wealth 
remained relatively stable between 2002 and 2007 the inequality of the wealth 
distribution increased.43  
 
Table 8 and Table 9 exhibit the distribution of net-wealth and its different sources 
with respect to gender. They show that women hold less wealth than men. This 
applies for every contemplated component and measure. Over the distribution, men 
are found to own approximately 1.4 times more net-wealth than women, on average. 
Furthermore, the share of women not holding any wealth is higher than of men 
throughout the sources. Only with regard to tangible assets the shares are slightly 
lower for women. However, women seem to be less often in debt.   
 
A decrease of the level of wealth between 2002 and 2007 can be shown for women, 
whereas male wealth holdings increased, on average. As regards the median, the 
changes run in the other direction. Median wealth holdings increased for women and 
decreased for men. The share of individuals not holding any wealth decreased for 
both sexes. However, a higher share of men and women in debt can be observed in 
2007 compared with 2002. Male wealth holdings in the 90% quantile increased 
between the two years, whereas women in the ninth decile seem to have incurred 
losses. The changes at the upper end of the distribution can therefore be considered 
the major determinant of the respective changes in the means for men and women. 
                                                 
42 Not implementing top-coding of the wealth measures involves an even more substantial increase of 
half the squared coefficient of variation relative to Gini-coefficients.  
43 Keeping in mind that the HSCV increased for 2002 and decreased for 2007 in consequence of the 
data imputation process, the increase in inequality between the two years affected by changes at the 
top of the distribution may rather be underestimated.  
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Table 8: The distribution of wealth by gender 2002 
 2002 net-wealth owner-occ. 
property 
other property financial assets private 
pensions 
business assets tangible assets consumer 
credits 
  male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 
mean  95,987 68,566 45,698 40,407 14,138 10,628 10,905 7,956 12,176 5,904 11,627 3,222 1,498 1,115 2,772 1,744 
median  21,932 10,851 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% share 
wealth=0 
18.1 23.2 58.2 61.7 86.4 89.4 49.4 55.7 43.6 53.8 92.4 97.3 89.6 89.4 85.4 89.8 
% share 
wealth< 0 
5.8 4.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10% 
percentile 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25% 
percentile 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
75% 
percentile 
109,920 85,745 71,356 61,460 0 0 10,000 7,301 10,014 5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90% 
percentile 
237,617 184,607 149,570 133,000 5,000 0 25,852 20,000 30,000 15,609 0 0 0 0 5,000 0 
 
n (male) = 11,178; n (female) = 11,979  
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
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Table 9: The distribution of wealth by gender 2007 
 2007 net-wealth owner-occ. 
property 
other property financial assets private 
pensions 
business assets tangible assets consumer 
credits 
  male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 
mean  99,566 65,960 43,370 36,766 14,789 9,320 12,879 9,895 15,416 7,757 11,864 2,722 826 630 3,017 1,856 
median  20,236 11,037 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,839 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% share 
wealth=0 
15.2 19.1 56.3 60.9 87.0 89.7 46.7 50.5 41.4 50.1 93.0 97.5 94.2 93.5 81.4 86.2 
% share 
wealth< 0 
7.1 6.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10% 
percentile 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25% 
percentile 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
75% 
percentile 
108,110 78,983 60,000 49,726 0 0 10,000 7,976 14,589 6,988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90% 
percentile 
247,466 178,496 142,111 125,985 2,896 0 30,000 25,000 41,834 20,564 0 0 0 0 7,516 3,000 
 
n (male) = 9,817; n (female) = 10,806  
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
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4.2 The Distribution of Wealth by Marital History 
 
The distribution of wealth depending on the marital history and current marital status 
can be read off Table 10 and Table 11. The mean as well as the median of net-wealth 
are lower for singles than for married individuals in 2002 and 2007. Values in the 
“never married” category are the lowest in 2002, whereas in 2007 individuals, who 
were divorced more than once, possess even less wealth than never married 
individuals. The share of individuals who do not hold any wealth at all is higher for 
the single than for the married categories. Wealth holdings are comparatively high in 
the widowed category where age averages out the highest. If one partner dies, the 
widow or widower usually inherits a large part of their partner’s wealth, which can 
be considered one reason for higher wealth holdings in this category. Additionally, 
elder individuals are likely to hold more wealth (cp. Figure A 1 in the Appendix). 
Amongst other things, the relatively low wealth holdings of never married 
individuals can be attributed to their lower average age.  
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Table 10: The distribution of wealth by marital history 2002 
2002 SINGLE MARRIED 
  
never married divorced 
once 
divorced 
more than 
once 
widowed ever married remarried 
after one 
divorce 
remarried after 
more than one 
divorce 
remarried 
after 
widowhood 
Net-wealth in € 
mean  30,208 56,748 48,134 109,553 111,271 97,944 75,071 112,170 
median  1,301 5,869 925 19,088 50,946 18,817 24,247 50,771 
share wealth=0 40.8 24.1 32.7  13.0 12.4 16.8 16.2 
share wealth< 0 5.1 10.8 11.1 1.9 4.8 8.2 11.7 4.7 
Percentiles         
10% 0 -1,916 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 0 4,008 11 108 3,386 
75% 15,429 53,972 34,483 158,336 134,436 92,384 102,470 161,807 
90% 75,820 175,587 150,295 307,088 256,680 223,327 187,396 295,085 
Components(mean)         
owner-occ, property 11,548 28,694 25,814 71,534 60,153 43,142 36,190 60,941 
other property 4,160 6,786 9,055 16,604 15,836 17,015 8,398 25,873 
financial assets 6,773 9,097 5,282 13,834 10,807 10,879 10,076 11,358 
private pensions 5,401 8,615 5,940 3,409 12,033 14,927 12,409 7,161 
business assets 2,228 4,389 1,936 2,271 10,820 12,945 16,260 10,525 
tangible assets 562 1,712 2,129 1,166 1,635 2,030 1,497 2,115 
consumer credits 1,319 3,114 2,246 529 2,827 4,077 6,693 6,627 
Inequality         
Gini 0.915 0.850 0.888 0.731 0.704 0.807 0.777 0.683 
HSCV 7.616 4.014 3.121 1.904 2.655 4.553 3.491 1.460 
          
n 5,332 1,186 187 1,222 12,938 1,225 130 217 
Ø age  31 51 52 73 51 53 56 65 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
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Table 11: The distribution of wealth by marital history 2007 
2007 SINGLE MARRIED 
  
never married divorced 
once 
divorced 
more than 
once 
widowed ever married remarried 
after one 
divorce 
remarried after 
more than one 
divorce 
remarried 
after 
widowhood 
Net-wealth in € 
mean  38,739 55,582 32,670 107,287 104,092 83,218 61,512 127,243 
median  2,608 6,124 0 23,360 40,420 18,270 12,254 19,828 
share wealth=0 29.5 19.5 29.6 19.4 11.1 15.6 14.8 16.7 
share wealth< 0 7.5 11.9 16.7 2.1 5.4 8.9 15.4 4.1 
Percentiles         
10% 0 -3,100 -8,000 0 0 0 -8,900 0 
25% 0 0 0 1,000 2,500 0 0 0 
75% 19,836 49,900 32,255 150,000 125,222 89,366 64,732 126,324 
90% 89,431 160,239 106,340 292,646 246,588 193,701 146,671 373,841 
Components(mean)         
owner-occ. property 12,372 24,981 15,098 68,776 53,171 34,038 27,335 52,002 
other property 5,559 6,959 10,358 9,941 15,386 12,831 3,444 12,208 
financial assets 7,752 9,842 4,187 18,824 12,177 12,290 8,922 13,824 
private pensions 8,085 9,918 5,931 4,283 14,325 15,081 11,029 10,072 
business assets 3,875 5,210 3,012 3,970 8,714 9,749 13,712 39,878 
tangible assets 349 712 89 904 830 1,045 1,052 829 
consumer credits 1,296 3,299 6,098 577 2,819 3,759 5,258 4,744 
Inequality         
Gini 0.901 0.886 1.102 0.721 0.725 0.809 0.858 0.779 
HSCV 12.045 4.753 9.223 1.797 2.919 4.686 5.045 2.021 
          
n 4,795 1,190 209 1,145 11,060 1,266 158 128 
Ø age  32 53 55 74 53 54 56 66 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
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Except for the “widowed” or “widowed and remarried” categories, the largest values 
are realised by people who have been continuously married, whereas individuals in 
the two divorced categories hold the least net-wealth. Remarriage seems to 
compensate for losses resulting from divorce to some extent, but the level of wealth 
holdings in the “ever married” category is not achieved. The mean of net-wealth of 
ever married individuals is about twice as high as of divorced persons and three 
times higher than the mean net-wealth of individuals, who had been divorced several 
times by the year 2007. Net-wealth is higher in the “ever married” category over the 
entire distribution. For instance, the 75% quantile is 2.5 times and the 90% quantile 
still 1.5 times higher than in the “divorced once” category in 2002 and 2007. 
Furthermore, more individuals who do not hold any wealth as well as more 
individuals who are in debt can be found among the divorced than the ever married 
individuals.  
 
As regards the single components of wealth, the pattern of the distribution is similar 
as for net-wealth. On average, wealth holdings of the “ever married” category are 
higher than for divorced individuals. This applies in particular concerning owner-
occupied property. Inequality measures show that dispersion of wealth is below the 
overall inequality as regards ever married individuals. Amongst divorced individuals, 
however, net-wealth seems to be even more unequally distributed than in the case 
when all individuals are considered.   
 
Table 12 and Table 13 exhibit the distribution of net-wealth depending on the sex of 
the individual and their marital histories. The mean as well as median wealth 
holdings of men are higher for every marital status category. The share of men 
without any wealth holdings is generally lower than the corresponding share of 
women.  
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Table 12: The distribution of wealth by marital history and gender 2002  
 
  SINGLE  MARRIED  
 2002 never married divorced once divorced more 
than once 
widowed ever married remarried after 
one divorce 
remarried after 
more than one 
divorce 
remarried after 
widowhood 
  male  female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 
Net-wealth 
in €                 
mean  32,377 23,137 68,890 41,514 83,428 18,740 122,988 96,754 122,034 83,854 127,864 54,792 88,572 42,788 112,866 96,071 
median  1515,4 1,000 10,104 4,000 8,852 0 43,162 14,820 56,583 35,942 26,674 13,540 32,177 9,340 59,297 41,706 
share wealth=0 38.8 42.7 18.7 28.1 24.7 38.6 15.5 25.6 10.3 15.6 9.3 15.2 17.8 16.1 13.3 19.3 
share wealth< 
0 
5.7 4.3 13.6 8.9 10.1 12.3 10.9 2.1 5.2 4.5 8.7 7.9 9.6 12.6 6.5 2.8 
Percentiles                 
10% 0 0 -2,948 0 0 -1,396 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,600 0 5,976 1,950 2,900 0 1,000 0 4,294 2,240 
75% 16,391 10,296 65,562 39,538 103,249 12,587 180,578 132,580 139,518 110,400 113,444 62,105 109,126 64,007 156,000 127,454 
90% 82,332 54,800 204,959 143,299 350,198 55,471 311,393 274,789 270,247 200,470 289,590 139,220 284,323 128,097 285,555 235,956 
… continued 107 
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.. continued (distribution of wealth by marital history and gender 2002) 
 
never married divorced once divorced more 
than once 
widowed ever married remarried after 
one divorce 
remarried after 
more than one 
divorce 
remarried after 
widowhood 
  male  female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 
Components 
(mean)                 
owner-occ. 
property 
10,927 10,526 28,143 25,673 46,250 9,035 82,523 62,637 60,701 50,914 51,043 29,347 33,255 34,246 69,898 43,892 
other property 4,154 3,540 10,463 3,408 15,401 3,724 11,971 16,290 17,257 12,051 25,042 6,725 7,943 7,621 11,883 35,855 
financial assets 6,846 5,668 11,744 6,166 9,092 2,099 17,776 11,671 11,826 8,172 14,371 5,920 14,143 2,493 12,694 8,502 
private 
pensions 
6,204 3,656 11,388 5,651 9,908 2,574 5,325 2,646 14,788 7,382 18,162 9,659 15,634 5,641 6,681 6,641 
business assets 3,423 506 7,382 1,774 2,748 1,163 3,687 1,729 15,333 4,482 21,635 2,565 19,554 8,734 9,678 9,896 
tangible assets 647 379 2,695 821 2,200 1,833 800 1,154 1,702 1,329 1,826 1,949 955 2,023 2,947 1,019 
consumer 
credits 
1,304 1,138 4,210 1,977 2,687 1,687 466 498 3,200 2,025 5,057 2,544 2,706 11,302 2,474 9,735 
                  
n 2,841 2,491 501 685 75 112 256 966 6,441 6,497 597 628 72 58 109 108 
Ø age  31 31 50 52 54 52 72 74 53 50 55 50 57 54 68 63 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
108 
109 
 
Table 13: The distribution of wealth by marital history and gender 2007  
  SINGLE  MARRIED  
 2007 never married divorced once divorced more 
than once 
widowed ever married remarried after 
one divorce 
remarried after 
more than one 
divorce 
remarried after 
widowhood 
  male  female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 
Net-wealth 
in €                 
mean  47,723 28,379 74,230 42,078 56,166 18,864 146,275 97,041 126,221 81,184 107,642 59,109 73,288 49,467 211,643 39,015 
median  2,663 2,597 8,904 5,036 3,218 0 63,331 19,486 51,804 30,760 25,521 12,200 21,533 9,849 68,000 0 
share wealth=0 29.6 29.3 16.8 21.4 25.6 32.5 13.4 21.0 8.6 13.6 13.2 18.0 7.1 23.1 10.0 26.9 
share wealth< 
0 
8.3 6.7 13.6 10.7 16.4 16.8 2.5 1.9 5.7 5.1 9.9 8.0 15.7 15.1 3.8 4.6 
Percentiles                 
10% 0 0 -7,000 -1,660 -15,000 -6,800 0 0 0 0 -340 0 -3,200 -13,200 0 -3,540 
25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,700 0 5,000 210 40 0 580 0 6,904 0 
75% 23,338 15,325 65,446 40,020 57,244 18,837 203,599 136,049 144,287 106,795 101,307 66,988 64,634 63,895 235,278 54,714 
90% 111,200 69,477 192,069 147,832 200,601 72,390 371,768 265,235 284,498 198,111 242,373 152,296 173,203 126,000 591,688 117,400 
… continued 
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.. continued (distribution of wealth by marital history and gender 2007) 
 
never married divorced once divorced more 
than once 
widowed ever married remarried after 
one divorce 
remarried after 
more than one 
divorce 
remarried after 
widowhood 
  male  female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 
Components 
(mean)                 
owner-occ. 
property 
12,995 11,654 26,908 23,586 23,851 9,955 94,451 62,028 59,667 46,446 36,253 31,852 27,474 27,193 78,551 24,249 
other property 7,208 3,657 12,920 2,641 20,144 4,607 13,712 8,950 18,280 12,390 17,956 7,772 3,338 3,553 17,914 6,244 
financial assets 8,290 7,131 11,455 8,674 6,312 2,938 25,204 17,148 14,449 9,825 17,707 6,943 9,075 8,765 21,698 5,594 
private 
pensions 
10,291 5,541 13,062 7,642 8,323 4,526 4,405 4,251 18,739 9,756 20,130 10,097 15,710 6,240 16,507 3,345 
business assets 6,397 967 11,115 933 7,081 621 7,559 3,027 13,784 3,466 16,329 3,254 17,658 9,675 77,711 329 
tangible assets 464 217 815 637 62 105 1,064 861 958 698 963 1,126 1,172 929 1,049 600 
consumer 
credits 
1,572 977 5,043 2,036 9,653 4,009 305 648 3,290 2,331 4,767 2,764 4,557 5,974 7,996 1,345 
                  
n 2,502 2,293 493 697 87 122 251 894 5,445 5,615 619 647 83 75 77 51 
Ø age  32 32 52 53 57 54 75 74 55 51 56 51 59 52 68 63 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
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For both sexes, the mean and the median of net-wealth in the single categories turn 
out to be lower than for individuals who are currently married. They are considerably 
lower in the “divorced” classes than for ever married individuals. The differences are 
substantial for women, in particular. Although remarriage after a divorce is beneficial 
for both, it seems to pay off more for men than for women in relative terms.44 The 
mean of the single components of net-wealth is mostly lower for divorced than for 
ever married individuals for both sexes. Currently divorced men and women own 
less owner-occupied and other property than ever married individuals, in particular.  
 
The descriptive results so far show that wealth holdings of divorced individuals are 
lower than those of ever married individuals. Women hold less wealth than men. 
This difference seems to be amplified in consequence of divorce.  
 
The coefficients of the OLS regressions in Table 14 provide insight into the relation 
of divorce and wealth when controlling for the individual’s socio-economic 
background. However, the results have to be considered descriptive and do not 
identify causal effects. As results for 2002 are comparable to those for 2007, only the 
findings for 2007 are presented here. 
 
The results of the OLS regressions confirm the findings of the previous descriptive 
analyses. In comparison to ever married individuals, being divorced once is found to 
be negatively related to wealth holdings. For both men and women the coefficients 
for being divorced once are highly significant. Controlling for the socio-economic 
background, the coefficients decrease in absolute value but remain negative and 
significant at a 0.01 level. The results of the OLS regressions also confirm that being 
divorced more than once is related to lower wealth holdings compared to being 
divorced only once. This applies for women, in particular. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that remarriage is beneficial with regard to wealth. The supplemental control 
variables (cp. Table A 2 and Table A 1 in the Appendix) show that wealth holdings 
are positively related to age – to a decreasing degree, however. Also, the positive 
                                                 
44 The low value for net-wealth held by women who remarried after widowhood may hinge on the 
increased share of zero and negative wealth holdings compared to 2002. However, as the number of 
observations in rather small, the value has to be interpreted with caution. 
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relation between permanent household income and wealth is supported by the results. 
The negative correlation of female individual earnings and wealth can be explained 
considering the distribution of earnings by age and marital status. The omitted 
category – zero earnings – mainly comprises elder women who are continuously 
married. The negative sign for the other categories may not actually be due to the 
amount of earnings, but rather be driven by the life situation, i.e. by factors like age 
or family background. That low earnings are related to lower wealth in comparison 
to zero earnings for men can also be explained by the high share of older men who 
do not have any earnings. As more men derive higher income, however, this effect 
ceases to apply for higher earnings categories.45 A further correlate of wealth is the 
presence of children. The number of children in the household is positively linked to 
wealth for both men and women. This applies for having an infant, too. Elder 
children, however, are found to be associated with lower wealth holdings, which may 
be a consequence of their higher consumption needs.  
 
  
                                                 
45 Adding an interaction term between individual earnings and age the coefficients for earnings 
categories of women are no longer significant. As regards men, only the highest two categories are 
found to be significantly positive related to wealth. 
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Table 14: Coefficients for marital status  
     (OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007) 
  MEN WOMEN 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
MARRIED     
remarried after one 
divorce 
-1.715*** -1.357*** -1.597*** -1.485*** 
(0.346) (0.315) (0.329) (0.300) 
remarried after more 
than one divorce 
-2.780*** -3.031*** -2.357*** -1.909** 
(0.846) (0.755) (0.864) (0.777) 
remarried after 
widowhood 
-0.0684 -0.638 -0.0649 0.299 
(0.830) (0.743) (1.002) (0.896) 
     
SINGLE     
never married -3.085*** 0.212 -2.486*** -0.435 
(0.229) (0.308) (0.234) (0.288) 
divorced once -2.789*** -1.587*** -2.431*** -1.464*** 
(0.378) (0.367) (0.306) (0.298) 
divorced more than 
once 
-4.422*** -3.564*** -5.573*** -4.384*** 
(0.863) (0.777) (0.682) (0.627) 
widowed -0.229 -0.641 -0.433* -0.978*** 
(0.469) (0.452) (0.259) (0.297) 
R2 4.34 25.90 3.48 24.27 
adj. R2 4.23 25.38 3.37 23.79 
n 5,693            5,693            6,386            6,386            
  
omitted category: ever married; dependent variable: IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 
(1): controlled for marital status only; (2): controlled for socio-economic background  
see Table A 1 and Table A 2 in the Appendix for a detailed overview of supplemental coefficients 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
 
 
Table 15 exhibits coefficients for the “divorced once” category resulting from 
augmented model specifications. Model (3) additionally controls for savings and 
inheritances. Model (4) adds covariates concerning the parental background and 
model (5) includes religious affiliation, risk preferences and life satisfaction. Finally, 
model (6) is extended by wealth holdings in 2002. The exhaustive models can be 
found in Table A 1 and Table A 2 in the Appendix. Adding supplemental control 
variables to the OLS regression model, the coefficients for being divorced once 
decrease for men as well as for women. They remain negative, however, and are 
highly significant for all models.  
 
Important determinants of wealth are saving and inheritances. Living in a household 
that has constantly saved for the last three years comes along with higher wealth 
holdings. Furthermore, inheritances, independent of when they were received, are 
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found to be positively related to wealth. Individuals who grew up in a rural area 
possess more wealth than individuals who spent their childhood in towns or cities, 
which may be a consequence of higher inheritances in the form of owner-occupied 
property. Having a highly educated mother seems to be beneficial as regards wealth 
holding of men. Religion is found to be significantly related to wealth as well. 
Catholic individuals hold the most wealth in comparison to persons with other 
religious affiliations. This applies for members of Islamic religious organisations, in 
particular. As assumed, the willingness to take risk in financial matters is related to 
higher wealth holdings. The positive relation between previous and present wealth 
holdings supports the assumption that a higher initial wealth stock is conducive to 
current wealth. Their high correlation becomes apparent, as the addition of net-
wealth in 2002 approximately halves the coefficients for being divorced once for 
both sexes.  
 
Table 15: Coefficients for the “divorced once” category  
      (OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007, augmented models)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       MEN       
       
divorced once -2.789*** -1.587*** -1.424*** -1.424*** -1.344*** -0.803** 
(0.378) (0.367) (0.361) (0.361) (0.362) (0.343) 
       
adj. R2 4.23 25.38 28.04 28.10 28.52(* 38.70(* 
n 5,693            5,693            5,693            5,693            5,639            5,635            
 
WOMEN       
       
divorced once -2.431*** -1.464*** -1.272*** -1.237*** -1.178*** -0.619** 
(0.306) (0.298) (0.292) (0.292) (0.291) (0.279) 
       
adj. R2 3.37 23.79 26.96 27.02 27.76(* 36.32(* 
n 6,386            6,386            6,386            6,386            6,271            6,262            
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
omitted category: ever married; dependent variable: IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 
(1): controlled for marital status only; (2): plus socio-economic background; (3): plus saving and inheritances; 
(4): plus parental information; (5): plus religion, risk and life satisfaction; (6) plus IHS-transformed net-wealth 
2002  
see Table A 1 and Table A 2 in the Appendix for a detailed overview of supplemental coefficients 
(*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size; results for the previous models do not 
change, however, if they are estimated on the basis of the smaller sample 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
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So far, marital status categories applied do not account for changes in family status 
between 2002 and 2007. Analysing the changes in wealth between the two years by 
marital status changes categories (cp. Table 3 in Chapter 3.1.3) can bring additional 
insight into the relation of divorce and wealth.  
 
4.3 The Distribution of Wealth by Marital Changes 
 
Mean wealth holdings in 2002 and 2007 by changes in marital status between the 
two years can be read off Figure 4. Categories comprising less than 50 individuals 
are excluded.46 The level of average net-wealth of individuals who were single in 
2002 is lower than for individuals who were married. Marriage or remarriage, 
respectively, seems to be beneficial with regard to wealth. The level of wealth differs 
considerably between the categories. Except for individuals who were married in 
2002 and widowed in 2007, individuals who were continuously married over this 
period hold the highest wealth, on average. Wealth holdings increase for every 
category (albeit to a different extent) except for the “married once → divorced once” 
and the “divorced more than once → divorced more than once” classes. The two 
categories of particular interest for this study are the “married once → married once” 
and the “married once → divorced once” categories.   
 
Individuals who are married in 2002 and got a divorce during the next five years 
initially hold less wealth, on average, than individuals who were continuously 
married over the period from 2002 to 2007 (cp. Figure 4). This suggests that 
selection out of marriage on the basis of lower wealth holdings has to be considered. 
However, on average, individuals in the “ever married” category are ten years older 
than individuals who got divorced for the first time between 2002 and 2007, which 
may be a reason for their higher wealth holdings. Furthermore, a loss in net-wealth 
between the two years can be observed for the group that underwent a divorce, 
whereas wealth holdings of ever married individuals increased. This indicates that 
divorce involves a decrease in wealth.      
                                                 
46 The categories excluded are “divorced > once → remarried”, “widowed → remarried”, “married > 
once → divorced >once” and “married > once → widowed >once”. 
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Figure 4: Net-wealth in 2002 and 2007 by marital status changes categories 
 
n(“never married→ never married”) = 2,836;   n(“never married → married”) = 619;  
n(“divorced once → divorced once”) = 726; n(“divorced once → remarried”) = 143; 
n(“divorced > once → divorced > once”) = 106; n(“widowed → widowed”) = 777; 
n(“married once → married once”) = 8,984; n(“married once → divorced once”) = 246;  
n(“married once → widowed”) = 224; n(“married > once → married > once”) = 1,069; 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
The change in mean net-wealth between 2002 and 2007 by gender for the “married 
once → married once” and the “married once → divorced once” category can be 
read off Figure 5. On average, men hold more wealth than women in the respective 
categories. Individuals who were continuously married possess more wealth in 2007 
than in 2002, on average. Wealth holdings of ever married men increased by a higher 
share compared to wealth of ever married women. Wealth held by individuals who 
underwent a divorce decreased. The losses incurred between 2002 and 2007 are 
higher for divorced women in relative terms. In absolute terms, the differences in 
initial wealth holdings between continuously married women and those who got 
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divorced until 2007 are slightly higher than for men, on average, whereas the 
absolute difference is higher for men in 2007. Relative differences between the two 
categories are higher for women in both years, however. On average, women who 
got divorced hold 58% less wealth than continuously married women in 2002 and 
61% less in 2007. As regards men, the relative differences amount to 38% and 43%. 
Thus, the relative difference between men increased to a slightly higher extent than 
between women in the respective categories. These findings imply that the pathways, 
through which the difference in wealth holdings between individuals in uninterrupted 
marriages and divorced persons emerge, may differ by gender. Male wealth holdings 
are reduced by a lower share in consequence of divorce than female wealth, but 
wealth of divorced men is reduced to a higher extent relative to wealth of 
continuously married men. On the other hand, although women lose a higher share of 
their wealth, the difference in the change in wealth between women who got 
divorced and women who remained married is relatively smaller compared to men. 
The higher difference between net-wealth in 2002 for women in the distinct 
categories could be an indicator for higher selection of women out of marriage due to 
wealth compared to men. 
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Figure 5: Net-wealth in 2002 and 2007 by marital status changes categories and 
gender 
 
n(female)=4,537and n(male)= 4,447 (“married once → married once”) 
n(female)= 128 and n(male)= 118 (“married once → divorced once”) 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
By means of the results from an OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed 
net-wealth, it can be checked whether the negative relation of divorce and wealth 
accumulation persists controlling for several individual characteristics. Table 16 
exhibits that individuals who got divorced between 2002 and 2007 accumulated less 
wealth than continuously married individuals during this period. The coefficients are 
higher for men. One explanation may be the relatively higher increase in net-wealth 
for continuously married men in comparison to men who got divorced (cp. Figure 5).  
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Table 16: Coefficients for marital status changes between 2002 and 2007  
     (OLS regression on IHS-transformed change in net-wealth) 
  MEN WOMEN 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
marital status 
2002 
marital status 
2007 
    
      
married once divorced once -1.432** -2.437*** -0.0314 -0.878* 
(0.661) (0.572) (0.598) (0.507) 
      
married once widowed -0.384 -0.0494 0.147 0.822* 
(0.817) (0.688) (0.526) (0.445) 
      
married more 
than once 
married more 
than once 
-0.0961 -0.674*** -0.391 -0.592** 
(0.291) (0.247) (0.338) (0.286) 
    
never married never married 0.628*** -0.177 0.951*** -0.429 
 (0.197) (0.281) (0.223) (0.279) 
      
never married married 1.700*** 0.325 1.492*** -0.260 
 (0.436) (0.413) (0.402) (0.442) 
      
divorced once divorced once 0.202 -0.536 0.133 -0.688** 
 (0.403) (0.363) (0.345) (0.302) 
      
divorced once remarried 1.673** -0.571 0.171 -1.158* 
  (0.809) (0.700) (0.822) (0.685) 
      
divorced more 
than once 
divorced more 
than once 
-1.714 -2.311** -1.020 -2.898*** 
(1.209) (0.986) (0.770) (0.651) 
      
widowed widowed -0.561 -0.293 -0.675** -0.733*** 
  (0.511) (0.444) (0.277) (0.279) 
     
      
R2  0.65 31.53 0.71 33.40 
adj. R2  0.51 30.93 0.59 32.88 
n  6,419 6,419 7,077 7,077 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
omitted category: married once → married once; dependent variable: difference between IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2007 and IHS-transformed net-wealth 2002 
(1): controlled for marital status only; (2): plus socio-economic background, saving, inheritances and IHS-
transformed net-wealth 2002  
see Table A 3 and Table A 4 in the Appendix for a detailed overview of supplemental coefficients 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
 
Adding supplemental control variables, the coefficients decrease only slightly. They 
are significant at a 1% level for men and on a 10% level for women. The augmented 
model specifications (cp. Table A 3 and Table A 4 in the Appendix) reveal that 
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wealth accumulation increases with age and household income. In comparison to 
women who do not derive individual earnings, earning an income is found to be 
negatively related to the change in wealth for women. The same applies for men in 
the lower earnings categories compared to men without individual earnings. This 
finding is likely to be due to the high share of older and continuously married 
individuals in the zero earnings categories. The number of children in the household 
is negatively related to the change in wealth for men. One reason may be the 
additional consumption needs of children. In contrast, for women the coefficients 
with regard to children are not significant. The relation between having an infant and 
wealth is found to be positive for men. Potential explanations are higher 
specialisation gains when mothers reduce their labour supply and fathers enhance 
theirs or a higher extent of saving for precautionary or bequest reasons. Furthermore, 
continuous saving and inheriting are positively related to wealth accumulation, 
whereas a negative relation between paying off loans steadily and wealth is found. 
Why the signs of the coefficients of net-wealth in 2002 are negative for both men and 
women, is less obvious. One explanation is the higher probability of high losses in 
the upper deciles of the wealth distribution (cp. Frick and Grabka 2009b, p. 249). 
Another reason may be that in consequence of the transformation of the wealth 
variable, changes in wealth are relatively lower for individuals at the top of the 
distribution in comparison to individuals who held only little wealth in 2002.  
 
The exhaustive models with respect to the coefficients listed in Table 17 can be 
found in Table A 3 and Table A 4 in the Appendix. Adding supplemental control 
variables, the coefficients decrease only slightly. They are significant at a 1% level 
for men and on a 10% level for women. In model (3), it is additionally controlled for 
the change in household income and individual earnings. Despite of an increase in 
household income up to 50%, which is found to be positively related to wealth 
accumulation for both men and women only the coefficients for men whose earnings 
decreased by more than half are significantly negative. Model (4) adds covariates 
concerning changes in living conditions. The retirement of an individual is positively 
related to a change in wealth, which is likely to be due to the higher age of 
individuals who retire. The impairment of health seems to abate wealth holdings of 
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men, in particular. As regards parental background (model (5))47, a highly educated 
father is found to be conducive to female wealth accumulation. Other family 
background variables are not significantly related to wealth accumulation. Finally, 
model (6) reveals that higher risk preferences are correlated with higher changes in 
wealth for women, in particular.   
 
Table 17: Coefficients for the “divorced once” category  
     (OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007, augmented models)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       MEN       
       
married once → 
divorced once 
-1.432** -2.437*** -2.368*** -2.354*** -2.349*** -2.319*** 
(0.661) (0.572) (0.572) (0.572) (0.573) (0.571) 
       
adj. R2 0.51 30.93 31.16 31.32 31.30 31.58(* 
n 6,419 6,419 6,419 6,419 6,419 6,374 
 
WOMEN       
       
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.0314 -0.878* -0.839* -0.849* -0.838* -0.717 
(0.598) (0.507) (0.509) (0.509) (0.509) (0.509) 
       
adj. R2 0.59 32.88 32.90 32.91 32.93 33.43(* 
n 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 6,981 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
omitted category: married once → married once; dependent variable: difference between IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2007 and IHS-transformed net-wealth 2002 
(1): controlled for marital status only; (2): plus socio-economic background, saving, inheritances and IHS-
transformed net-wealth 2002; (3): plus changes in income; (4): plus other changes; (5): plus parental information; 
(6) plus religion, risk and life satisfaction;  
see Table A 3 and Table A 4 in the Appendix for a detailed overview of supplemental coefficients 
 (*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size; results for the previous models do not 
change, however, if they are estimated on the basis of the smaller sample 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
 
 
The OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth shows that getting 
a divorce is negatively related to changes in wealth compared to remaining married.  
By means of the results, it is not possible to infer, however, whether divorced 
individuals only accumulate less wealth than continuously married individuals or 
whether they are more likely to incur losses in wealth. For this purpose, subsidiary 
                                                 
47 It should be mentioned here that the explanatory power of model (5) decreases slightly compared to 
model (4) for men.  
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probit regressions on whether wealth decreased or increased by more than 5% or 
changed only up to 5% are carried out (see Table 18 and Table 19).48 Additionally, 
an ordered probit on the degree of changes in wealth is implemented. The dependent 
variable categorises changes in wealth as follows: a loss in wealth higher than 50%, 
up to 50%, up to 25% or up to 10%, a minor change up to 5% in either direction or 
an increase in wealth up to 10%, up to 25%, up to 50% or higher than 50%.  
 
Table 18: Results of (ordered) probit regressions on the change in wealth for men 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
omitted category: married once → married once; dependent variable: difference between IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2007 and IHS-transformed net-wealth 2002 
(1): controlled for marital status only; (2): plus socio-economic background, saving, inheritances and IHS-
transformed net-wealth 2002; (3): plus changes in income; (4): plus other changes; (5): plus parental information; 
(6) plus religion, risk and life satisfaction;  
see Table A 6 to Table A 11 in the Appendix for a detailed overview of supplemental coefficients 
 (*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size; results for the previous models do not 
change, however, if they are estimated on the basis of the smaller sample 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
 
                                                 
48 The augmented models can be found in Table A 6 to Table A 11 in the Appendix. 
 
marital change (omitted: married once 
→ married once) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
probit 
decrease 
married once → 
divorced once 
0.359*** 0.565*** 0.517*** 0.513*** 0.517*** 0.516*** 
(0.136) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) 
 Pseudo- R
2 
 
1.04            10.09           10.77           10.86            10.88         10.90(*          
        
probit 
increase 
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.353** -0.501*** -0.451*** -0.448*** -0.450*** -0.444*** 
(0.137) (0.147) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) 
 Pseudo-R
2 
 
0.52 7.58            8.39            8.51            8.54            8.65(*           
        
probit no 
change 
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.0178 -0.211 -0.235 -0.222 -0.233 -0.248 
(0.208) (0.269) (0.268) (0.268) (0.270) (0.271) 
 Pseudo-R
2 
 
2.62           24.52            24.91            25.04            25.14           25.15(*         
        
ordered 
probit change 
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.358*** -0.547*** -0.498*** -0.495*** -0.499*** -0.494*** 
(0.118) (0.124) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
 Pseudo-R
2 
 
0.32 4.45 4.79 4.84 4.86 4.91(* 
        
observations  6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,371 
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The results show that – in comparison to continuously married individuals – both 
men and women who underwent a divorce were less likely to accumulate wealth as 
well as more likely to incur a decrease in wealth between 2002 and 2007. The 
estimated coefficients for men are highly significant and higher than for women. The 
probability of minor changes in wealth, i.e. a decrease or increase up to 5%, is lower 
for men who got a divorce than for constantly married men. The coefficients are not 
significant, however. By contrast, no substantial differences between the categories 
can be found for women as regards minor changes.  
 
Table 19: Results of (ordered) probit regressions on the change in wealth for women 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
omitted category: married once → married once; dependent variable: difference between IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2007 and IHS-transformed net-wealth 2002 
(1): controlled for marital status only; (2): plus socio-economic background, saving, inheritances and IHS-
transformed net-wealth 2002; (3): plus changes in income; (4): plus other changes; (5): plus parental information; 
(6) plus religion, risk and life satisfaction;  
see Table A 6 to Table A 11 in the Appendix for a detailed overview of supplemental coefficients 
 (*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size; results for the previous models do not 
change, however, if they are estimated on the basis of the smaller sample 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
 
In accordance with the results of the probit regressions, an ordered probit regression 
reveals that in comparison to continuously married persons, individuals of either 
marital change (omitted: married once 
→ married once) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
probit 
decrease 
married once → 
divorced once 
0.0258 0.150 0.121 0.127 0.126 0.125 
(0.127) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.145) 
 Pseudo-R
2 
 
0.68 12.71            13.18            13.22            13.23            13.30(*           
        
probit 
increase 
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.141 -0.127 -0.110 -0.109 -0.111 -0.103 
(0.126) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.136) 
 
 Pseudo-R
2 
 
5.90 7.56 7.98 8.01 8.02 8.26(*        
        
probit no 
change 
married once → 
divorced once 
0.246 0.0229 0.0266 0.0162 0.0195 -0.00112 
(0.157) (0.197) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) (0.211) 
 Pseudo-R
2 
 
1.35 27.54           28.05            28.15            28.16            28.49(*           
        
ordered 
probit change 
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.0825 -0.155 -0.138 -0.139 -0.139 -0.133 
(0.110) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) 
 Pseudo-R
2 
 
0.36 5.05 5.28 5.29 5.30 5.41(* 
        
observations  7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 6,979 
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gender who got a divorce between 2002 and 2007 are less likely to be found in a 
higher category of wealth change. These subsidiary results show that getting a 
divorce is negatively related to wealth accumulation as well as that divorced 
individuals are more likely to incur losses in wealth than individuals in uninterrupted 
marriages. The correlation between changes in wealth and divorce seems to be of 
importance for men, in particular.       
 
The previous results show that wealth and divorce are negatively related. However, 
whether the causal direction runs from divorce to wealth or whether the lower wealth 
holdings of divorced persons can be explained by selection out of marriage on the 
basis of wealth and related determinants cannot be identified by means of these 
descriptive statistics.  
 
4.4  Assessing the Causal Effect of Divorce on Wealth  
 
It may be that the differences in wealth holdings and wealth accumulation between 
continuously married individuals and individuals who undergo a divorce hinge on the 
different distribution of background characteristics of individuals in the two groups. 
In order to assess the causal effect of divorce on wealth accounting for selection into 
divorce, for simultaneity and for unobserved heterogeneity, conditional difference-
in-differences matching is applied. If relevant characteristics for wealth accumulation 
and the propensity to divorce can be considered balanced between those individuals 
who got divorced (treated) and those who remained married (untreated) between 
2002 and 2007, the estimator can be regarded as the impact of divorce on wealth (cp. 
Chapter 3.2.4 and Chapter 3.2.5).  
 
Table 20 and Table 21 exhibit the conditional difference-in-differences estimators 
resulting from several matching methods. As no matching algorithm can be 
considered best a priori, different matching methods are applied. Besides nearest 
neighbour matching with replacement within a certain caliper and with a different 
number of neighbours, kernel matching as well as local linear matching are carried 
out using a biweight kernel. To confine the analysis to the region of common 
support, individuals whose propensity score lies under the minimum or over the 
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maximum propensity score of the other group are excluded. Furthermore, trimming 
is carried out for some estimators.49 Standard errors listed are calculated by means of 
bootstrapping for kernel-based estimators and on the basis of the approach suggested 
by Abadie and Imbens (2006) as regards nearest neighbour matching. The measure 
for the standardised bias listed is the mean of standardised biases for the single 
characteristics applied to implement matching. 
 
The distribution of background characteristics before and after matching for the 
treated and untreated group differ (cp. Table A 16 to Table A 25). On average, 
continuously married individuals are older, they have been married for a longer time, 
lived less often in East-Germany before 1989 and more often grew up in rural areas 
than individuals who got a divorce between 2002 and 2007, for instance. To make 
the mean outcome comparable between the treated and the untreated group, i.e. to 
assess the average treatment effect, the distributions of characteristics have to be 
comparable or “balanced”. For this purpose, propensity score matching methods are 
implemented. To account for potential unobserved heterogeneity, a difference-in-
differences estimator is applied.  
 
The results of the conditional difference-in-differences matching can be found in 
Table 20 and Table 21.50 One possibility to assess whether the sample can be 
regarded as balanced between the treated and the untreated group is by means of 
standardised biases. If the measure of the standardised bias after matching is lower 
than 5%, the unconfoundedness assumption can be deemed to be fulfilled (cp. 
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, p. 48). Furthermore, low values for the pseudo-R2 after 
matching indicate that the model implemented for matching has no explanatory 
power after matching. The estimators, which can be considered to be calculated on 
the basis of a balanced sample according to these two requirements, are printed in 
bold. An additional approach to assess whether the samples can be considered 
balanced is on the basis of t-statistics for the differences between the means of the 
covariates of the treated and untreated group. For a selection of the matching models 
carried out, the t-statistics can be read off Table A 16 to Table A 25. As regards the 
                                                 
49 See Chapter 3.2.4 for an overview of matching estimators and underlying assumptions.  
50 For the calculation of the propensity scores see Table A 15 in the Appendix. 
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models which were considered to fulfil the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) on the basis of the two other validation approaches, no significant differences 
between the means of the control variables after matching can be found for any 
parameter. Thus, the distribution of the characteristics can be regarded as balanced 
for those estimators which are printed in bold.  
 
For both men and women the estimators of the average treatment effect of the treated 
are negative. However, none of the estimators is significant. Some estimators – such 
as that based on matching to ten nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper and 5% 
trimming for men – are positive, i.e. they suggest that divorce is beneficial for wealth 
holdings. For none of the positive effects the sample can be considered balanced, 
though, neither for men nor for women. The extent of the treatment effects differs 
depending on the matching method applied. This may be due to the small number of 
individuals in the treated groups (74 men and 100 women).51 As the measure 
expresses mean changes and wealth holdings are distributed rather unequally, the 
extent of the average treatment effect is likely to be sensitive to the number and 
selection of treated individuals into the region of common support.  
 
None of the treatment effects estimated is found to be significant. Thus, divorce 
cannot be considered to actually reduce wealth on the basis of these results. The 
negative relation between divorce and wealth rather seems to hinge on differences in 
background characteristics of individuals who remain married and individuals who 
undergo a divorce. However, the lack in significance may also be linked to 
difficulties in the calculation of standard errors for the treatment effects (cp. Chapter 
3.2.4). The suitability of bootstrapping to assess standard errors has not been 
formally justified (Imbens 2004). The standard errors do not differ to a great extent 
depending on whether they are assessed by means of bootstrapping in case of kernel-
based matching or on the basis of the approach of Abadie and Imbens (2006) for 
nearest neighbour matching, though. Thus, the insignificance of the estimators is not 
very likely to be driven by the failure of the calculation of standard errors.  
                                                 
51 The number of individuals who got a divorce between 2002 and 2007 is reduced compared to 
previous statistics (cp. Figure 5). Firstly, as a measure of permanent income is used to estimate the 
propensity scores, individuals must have been surveyed in the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
Additionally, missing observations for single control variables reduce the sample.  
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On the basis of the results of the conditional difference-in-differences matching, a 
causal direction from divorce to a reduction in wealth cannot be inferred. Minimising 
differences in the distribution of factors, which influence the propensity to divorce 
and which are related to wealth at the same time, no significant difference in the 
change in wealth holdings of divorced and continuously married individuals can be 
found. This suggests that the differences in the change in wealth, which were 
described in the previous chapters, are likely to depend on the different background 
characteristic of individuals in uninterrupted marriages and individuals who get a 
divorce. Furthermore, unobservable determinants of marital stability and wealth such 
as prudence or values and norms may bias the descriptive results. Unobserved 
heterogeneity, which may emerge in connection with both wealth and the propensity 
to divorce, is accounted for by means of the difference-in-differences analysis. Thus, 
the results of this study suggest that wealth and divorce are negatively related, but no 
evidence can be provided that divorce itself actually causes losses in wealth.   
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Table 20: Results of conditional difference-in-differences matching for men 
Model DDPSM S. E. t-stat # treated off 
support 
# treated on 
support 
# untreated 
off support 
# untreated 
on support 
standardised 
bias after 
matching(1  
pseudo-R2 
after 
matching(2  
10 nearest neighbours          
caliper 0.005 -0.412 1.266 -0.325 4 70 876 2,580 6.755 2.50 
caliper 0.05 -0.300 1.225 -0.245 2 72 838 2,618 3.897 1.30 
caliper 0.01 -0.385 1.196 -0.321 2 72 844 2,612 5.008 1.80 
caliper 0.05, trim 1% -0.113 1.194 -0.094 11 63 34 3,422 4.466 1.50 
caliper 0.05, trim 5% 0.396 1.245 0.318 19 55 172 3,284 7.036 4.50 
caliper 0.01, trim 1% -0.110 1.282 -0.086 16 58 34 3,422 4.917 2.20 
caliper 0.01, trim 5% 0.421 1.250 0.336 25 49 172 3,284 5.938 4.00 
5 nearest neighbours          
caliper 0.005 -0.207 1.284 -0.161 4 70 876 2,580 6.660 2.90 
caliper 0.05 -0.153 1.277 -0.120 2 72 838 2,618 4.625 2.00 
caliper 0.01 -0.121 1.233 -0.098 2 72 844 2,612 5.130 2.50 
caliper 0.05, trim 1% 0.042 1.210 0.034 11 63 34 3,422 5.085 2.20 
caliper 0.05, trim 5% 0.397 1.205 0.329 19 55 172 3,284 8.669 5.00 
1 nearest neighbour          
caliper 0.005 -0.686 1.400 -0.490 4 70 876 2,580 8.888 8.40 
caliper 0.05 -0.369 1.433 -0.258 2 72 838 2,618 8.972 8.80 
caliper 0.01 -0.369 1.387 -0.266 2 72 844 2,612 8.972 8.80 
caliper 0.05, trim 1% -1.019 1.432 -0.712 11 63 34 3,422 9.515 11.50 
caliper 0.05, trim 5% -0.465 1.286 -0.361 19 55 172 3,284 12.259 12.70 
kernel          
bw 0.01 -0.384 1.221 -0.315 2 72 844 2,612 4.481 1.40 
bw 0.05 -0.755 1.214 -0.622 2 72 838 2,618 4.242 1.60 
bw 0.06 -0.714 1.181 -0.605 2 72 838 2,618 5.197 2.10 
llr          
bw 0.01 -0.576 55.256 -0.010 5 69 866 2,590 5.444 2.30 
bw 0.05 -0.805 2.023 -0.398 2 72 839 2,617 2.322 0.70 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1 before matching standardised bias = 30.544, (2 before matching pseudo-R2 = 21.29 
n(treated)=74, n(untreated)=3,456 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
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Table 21: Results of conditional difference-in-differences matching for women 
Model DDPSM S. E. t-stat # treated off 
support 
# treated on 
support 
# untreated 
off support 
# untreated 
on support 
standardised 
bias after 
matching(1  
pseudo-R2 
after 
matching(2  
10 nearest neighbours          
caliper 0.005 -0.309 1.089 -0.283 9 91 728 2,715 5.247 1.70 
caliper 0.05 -0.184 0.908 -0.202 5 95 668 2,775 4.358 1.50 
caliper 0.01 -0.006 1.001 -0.006 6 94 694 2,749 4.715 1.80 
caliper 0.05, trim 1% -0.470 0.987 -0.477 19 81 34 3,409 3.128 0.90 
caliper 0.05, trim 5% -0.657 1.114 -0.590 24 76 172 3,271 3.708 1.70 
caliper 0.01, trim 1% -0.337 1.077 -0.313 20 80 50 3,393 3.388 1.10 
caliper 0.01, trim 5% -0.650 1.147 -0.566 33 67 172 3,271 4.165 3.00 
5 nearest neighbours          
caliper 0.005 -0.490 1.109 -0.442 9 91 728 2,715 4.597 1.80 
caliper 0.05 -0.489 0.943 -0.519 5 95 668 2,775 4.402 1.90 
caliper 0.01 -0.255 1.020 -0.250 6 94 694 2,749 4.530 2.10 
caliper 0.05, trim 1% -0.799 1.013 -0.788 19 81 34 3,409 3.674 1.40 
caliper 0.05, trim 5% -0.787 1.187 -0.663 24 76 172 3,271 4.784 2.40 
1 nearest neighbour          
caliper 0.005 -0.005 1.273 -0.004 9 91 728 2,715 8.536 7.40 
caliper 0.05 0.205 1.129 0.181 5 95 668 2,775 8.548 8.10 
caliper 0.01 0.281 1.191 0.236 6 94 694 2,749 8.967 8.00 
caliper 0.05. trim 1% -0.338 1.218 -0.277 19 81 34 3,409 9.278 7.80 
caliper 0.05. trim 5% -1.376 1.888 -0.728 24 76 172 3,271 14.961 13.20 
kernel          
bw 0.01 0.085 1.065 0.080 6 94 694 2,749 6.071 1.90 
bw 0.05 -0.224 0.964 -0.233 5 95 668 2,775 5.155 1.40 
bw 0.06 -0.258 0.966 -0.267 5 95 668 2,775 5.554 1.70 
llr          
bw 0.01 -0,506 53,390 -0,009 17 83 730 2,713 2,669 0,70 
bw 0.05 -0,198 3,775 -0,052 5 95 668 2,775 4,497 1,10 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1 before matching standardised bias = 30.501, (2 before matching pseudo-R2 = 24.0 
n(treated)=100, n(untreated)=3,443 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.   
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5 Summary 
 
Wealth is an essential parameter for economic well-being. It provides economic 
security, generates direct income and constitutes a source of consumption, for 
instance. Besides, private wealth holdings have become increasingly important with 
regard to retirement provision. Divorce constitutes a potential shock with respect to 
wealth. Marital splits can reduce wealth holdings directly via court and lawyer fees. 
Moreover, divorce is related to wealth indirectly, since family status correlates with 
the determinants of wealth such as income or consumption. Thus, divorce can be 
assumed to be one reason for differences in wealth holdings. Analysing the relation 
between divorce and wealth, the reverse causality between the two factors has to be 
accounted for – marriage not only benefits the accumulation of wealth, but wealthier 
individuals are also less likely to divorce. To analyse the relation between divorce 
and wealth, this study applied data provided by the SOEP. Causal effects are sought 
to be assessed by means of conditional difference-in-differences matching methods. 
 
Altogether, wealth and divorce are found to be negatively related. However, the 
analyses cannot provide any evidence that the effects observed are actually causal, 
i.e. that divorce leads to a reduction of individual wealth holdings. Descriptive results 
show that divorced individuals hold less wealth than individuals in uninterrupted 
marriages. This applies for women, in particular. These findings are supported by 
estimators of OLS regressions, which indicate that being divorced once is related to 
lower wealth holdings in comparison to being continuously married. In a next step, 
the change in wealth depending on the change in marital status was examined. 
Getting a divorce is found to come along with a decrease in wealth. Furthermore, 
wealth holdings of individuals who got a divorce between 2002 and 2007 are initially 
lower compared to continuously married individuals. Men of both marital change 
categories possess more wealth than women in the respective categories. Moreover, 
the relative difference between wealth holdings of men who got a divorce and men in 
uninterrupted marriages is found to increase to a higher extent compared to women. 
In other words, men seem to lose a lower share of their wealth in consequence of 
divorce than women, but as men who remained married accumulated more wealth 
131 
 
than women who remained married, the difference in wealth between continuously 
married men and men who got divorced became higher than between women in the 
respective groups. OLS regressions on the change in wealth support the finding that 
getting a divorce in comparison to remaining married is negatively related to wealth 
for men, in particular. Additionally, the wealth holdings of individuals who got a 
divorce are found to be more likely to decrease and less likely to increase compared 
to continuously married persons. Finally, the causal impact of divorce on wealth is 
sought to be assessed by means of conditional difference-in-differences matching. 
The results indicate that the decrease in wealth for both men and women is not 
actually a consequence of divorce, but seems to be rather driven by the different 
distribution of background characteristics of divorced and continuously married 
individuals or unobserved differences between the groups.  
 
To get a more comprehensive overview of the impact of divorce on economic well-
being, it would be conducive, if the measure of wealth was more comprehensive, i.e. 
if it comprised human capital and social security pensions. Both components are of 
special importance in the context of family formation and dissolution, mainly due to 
the simultaneity of marital status and labour supply decisions – and thus the 
accumulation of human capital and the acquisition of pension entitlements. In this 
context, analysing income changes in consequence of divorce in addition to changes 
in wealth could provide supplemental insight into the relation between divorce and 
economic well-being. Furthermore, it would be advantageous, if by means of the 
marital history data a distinction between couples who are married and live together 
and individuals who are married but separated could be drawn. The differentiation 
could provide more insight into the causal relation between divorce and wealth. As 
separated individuals are likely to differ from married individuals living together 
with regard to labour supply or saving decisions, for instance, it could be analysed, to 
what extent wealth holdings are reduced already during the period of separation and 
depend on the duration of this period or whether major changes occur only as a result 
of legal divorce. The long interval between the years in which wealth is surveyed in 
the SOEP hinders the estimation of the direct effect of divorce on wealth as well. If a 
couple gets divorced in 2004, for instance, it can hardly be assessed whether the 
amount of wealth observed in 2007 was reduced directly in consequence of divorce 
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or in the course of the years subsequent to divorce. Another aspect that may be 
examined in more detail is the survey of wealth and the potential impact of divorce 
on the collection of wealth data. Some components such as financial assets are 
strongly underestimated in the SOEP, which may lead to biased results. As regards 
the relation between divorce and the measurement of wealth, it may be that 
individuals on the verge of divorce have an improved overview of their wealth as a 
result calculations of the equalisation of gains accumulated in the course of marriage 
(“Zugewinnausgleich”). On the other hand, it should be considered that – for the 
same reason – divorce-prone individuals may have a motive for concealing their 
actual level of wealth. 
 
In 2012, wealth data will be collected again in the SOEP. As the number of surveyed 
individuals who underwent a divorce between 2002 and 2007 is relatively low, the 
extension of the analyses by these data will be beneficial. Furthermore, major 
changes in the legal regulation of marriage and divorce in Germany occurred after 
2007, which could provide a possibility to analyse the impact of divorce on wealth 
within a quasi-experimental framework and compare the results to those achieved by 
means of conditional difference-in-differences matching. Besides assessing average 
treatment effects, the causal effect of divorce on wealth could be estimated with 
regard to other moments of the distribution as well. 
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 Appendix 7   
A Person Questionnaires on Wealth Holdings 2002 and 2007 
Figure A 1: SOEP person questionnaire 2002 – balance sheet 
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Figure A 2: SOEP person questionnaire 2007 – balance sheet 
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Figure A 3: SOEP person biography – retrospective recording of family status 
 
 
Figure A 4: Changes in family situation 
 
 
Figure A 5: Current marital status 
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B Additional Empirical Results 
Figure A 6: Mean of net-wealth 2002 and 2007 by age class52 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
 
                                                 
52 Following Atkinson and Harrison (1978. p. 250 et seqq.) wealth changes between 2002 and 2007 
are examined by age group. 
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Table A 1: Coefficients of OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 for 
men 
Control 
variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
marital history 
(omitted: ever 
married) 
      
remarried after one 
divorce 
-1.715*** -1.357*** -1.220*** -1.194*** -1.062*** -0.433 
(0.346) (0.315) (0.310) (0.311) (0.312) (0.300) 
remarried after more 
than one divorce 
-2.780*** -3.031*** -3.002*** -2.932*** -2.874*** -1.548** 
(0.846) (0.755) (0.743) (0.743) (0.742) (0.693) 
remarried after 
widowhood 
-0.0684 -0.638 -0.585 -0.561 -0.326 0.177 
(0.830) (0.743) (0.730) (0.730) (0.732) (0.685) 
never married 
-3.085*** 0.212 0.187 0.170 0.0751 -0.0744 
(0.229) (0.308) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.280) 
divorced once 
-2.789*** -1.587*** -1.424*** -1.424*** -1.344*** -0.803** 
(0.378) (0.367) (0.361) (0.361) (0.362) (0.343) 
divorced more than 
once 
-4.422*** -3.564*** -3.135*** -3.133*** -3.079*** -2.406*** 
(0.863) (0.777) (0.764) (0.764) (0.770) (0.721) 
widowed 
-0.229 -0.641 -0.587 -0.583 -0.597 -0.357 
(0.469) (0.452) (0.444) (0.444) (0.444) (0.411) 
age 
 0.246*** 0.224*** 0.225*** 0.246*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0525) (0.0489) 
squared age 
 -0.00142*** -0.00134*** -0.00134*** -0.00156*** -0.000798** 
 (0.000420) (0.000414) (0.000414) (0.000418) (0.000390) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.487*** -0.397** -0.398** -0.189 -0.237 
 (0.175) (0.172) (0.172) (0.177) (0.165) 
not so good / bad 
 -1.462*** -1.229*** -1.228*** -0.689*** -0.534** 
 (0.221) (0.217) (0.218) (0.240) (0.223) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.429* 0.413* 0.411* 0.298 0.0578 
 (0.245) (0.241) (0.241) (0.243) (0.227) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.355 0.164 0.152 0.0397 -0.274 
 (0.305) (0.300) (0.301) (0.304) (0.286) 
high 
 0.885*** 0.645** 0.592* 0.449 0.145 
 (0.314) (0.309) (0.315) (0.319) (0.299) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.971*** -0.904*** -0.868*** -0.863*** -0.529*** 
 (0.202) (0.199) (0.200) (0.200) (0.187) 
city 
 -1.573*** -1.495*** -1.384*** -1.298*** -0.664*** 
 (0.220) (0.216) (0.230) (0.232) (0.221) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -1.317*** -1.392*** -1.401*** -1.026*** -0.774*** 
 (0.196) (0.193) (0.193) (0.223) (0.212) 
…continued       
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…continued ( OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 for men) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -1.750*** -1.452*** -1.475*** -1.190*** -0.625*** 
 (0.229) (0.226) (0.226) (0.255) (0.236) 
imputed (yes) 
 2.328*** 2.251*** 2.256*** 2.210*** 1.848*** 
 (0.162) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.150) 
number of children 
 0.493 0.398 0.391 0.273 -0.0807 
 (0.427) (0.423) (0.422) (0.423) (0.400) 
squared number of 
children 
 -0.0884 -0.0582 -0.0556 -0.0231 0.0298 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.100) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.584 0.579 0.579 0.541 0.419 
 (0.360) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.326) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 -0.348 -0.236 -0.233 -0.149 -0.117 
 (0.364) (0.359) (0.359) (0.361) (0.332) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.0583 0.0885 0.0838 0.102 -0.0508 
 (0.187) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.176) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 1.085*** 0.708*** 0.728*** 0.661*** 0.340 
 (0.255) (0.252) (0.252) (0.253) (0.239) 
3rd quintile 
 2.055*** 1.419*** 1.439*** 1.347*** 0.764*** 
 (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.288) (0.266) 
4th quintile 
 3.209*** 2.340*** 2.358*** 2.201*** 1.308*** 
 (0.323) (0.325) (0.324) (0.326) (0.304) 
5th quintile 
 3.524*** 2.424*** 2.433*** 2.226*** 1.195*** 
 (0.398) (0.401) (0.400) (0.403) (0.378) 
log(household size) 
 -0.795*** -0.505* -0.504* -0.456 -0.0123 
 (0.296) (0.293) (0.292) (0.294) (0.275) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.816** -0.592* -0.597* -0.582* -0.521 
 (0.355) (0.349) (0.349) (0.350) (0.326) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.508 -0.142 -0.151 -0.110 0.184 
 (0.463) (0.456) (0.456) (0.458) (0.429) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 0.162 0.343 0.354 0.314 0.399 
 (0.368) (0.362) (0.362) (0.362) (0.337) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 0.974** 1.033** 1.032** 0.969** 0.907** 
 (0.413) (0.406) (0.406) (0.404) (0.374) 
> 50,000 € 
 1.759*** 1.776*** 1.785*** 1.712*** 1.389*** 
 (0.464) (0.456) (0.456) (0.456) (0.421) 
years full-time 
employment 
 0.0164 0.0178 0.0184 0.0143 -0.0102 
 (0.0172) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0157) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.00881 -0.000498 -0.00134 -0.00229 0.00361 
 (0.0406) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0373) 
years unemployment 
 -0.287*** -0.245*** -0.241*** -0.208*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0420) (0.0389) 
in the labour force 
(yes) 
 -0.611** -0.675** -0.672** -0.730** -0.440 
 (0.294) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.268) 
…continued 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
  
  
…continued ( OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 for men) 
 
self-employed (yes) 
 0.395 0.803*** 0.791*** 0.774*** 0.572** 
 (0.298) (0.295) (0.296) (0.297) (0.281) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.118 -0.0524 -0.0650 -0.167 -0.163 
 (0.366) (0.360) (0.360) (0.361) (0.338) 
saved the last three 
years (yes) 
  1.985*** 1.986*** 1.827*** 1.393*** 
  (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.149) 
inheritance before 
1992 (yes) 
  0.542* 0.529* 0.486 0.0759 
  (0.308) (0.308) (0.307) (0.286) 
inheritance between 
1992 and 2002 (yes) 
  1.437*** 1.408*** 1.308*** 0.774*** 
  (0.285) (0.286) (0.285) (0.265) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
  0.932*** 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.613*** 
  (0.235) (0.235) (0.231) (0.214) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
   0.0985 0.0935 -0.0200 
   (0.286) (0.287) (0.266) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
   0.753** 0.717* 0.551 
   (0.380) (0.382) (0.358) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
   0.297* 0.288* 0.171 
   (0.163) (0.164) (0.153) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
    -0.343* -0.295* 
    (0.190) (0.176) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
    -0.874* -0.739 
    (0.500) (0.475) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
    -1.928*** -1.277*** 
    (0.495) (0.460) 
other religious 
organisation 
    -0.866 -1.855 
    (1.911) (1.771) 
non-denominational 
    -0.629*** -0.411** 
    (0.220) (0.206) 
risk 
    0.0932*** 0.0355 
    (0.0331) (0.0309) 
life satisfaction 
    0.243*** 0.180*** 
    (0.0490) (0.0466) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
     0.380*** 
     (0.0141) 
Constant 
9.567*** -0.574 -0.789 -1.140 -2.948** -1.495 
(0.105) (1.388) (1.366) (1.372) (1.452) (1.353) 
R2 4.34 25.90 28.59 28.70 29.21 39.30 
adj. R2 4.23 25.38 28.04 28.10 28.52
(* 38.70(* 
observations 5,693            5,693            5,693            5,693            5,639            5,635            
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Table A 2: Coefficients of OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 for 
women 
Control 
variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
marital history 
(omitted: ever 
married) 
      
remarried after one 
divorce 
-1.597*** -1.485*** -1.303*** -1.274*** -1.197*** -0.837*** 
(0.329) (0.300) (0.294) (0.294) (0.297) (0.281) 
remarried after more 
than one divorce 
-2.357*** -1.909** -1.522** -1.469* -1.356* -0.941 
(0.864) (0.777) (0.763) (0.763) (0.760) (0.717) 
remarried after 
widowhood 
-0.0649 0.299 0.332 0.342 0.374 0.280 
(1.002) (0.896) (0.877) (0.877) (0.872) (0.820) 
never married 
-2.486*** -0.435 -0.387 -0.371 -0.428 -0.335 
(0.234) (0.288) (0.282) (0.283) (0.283) (0.266) 
divorced once 
-2.431*** -1.464*** -1.272*** -1.237*** -1.178*** -0.619** 
(0.306) (0.298) (0.292) (0.292) (0.291) (0.279) 
divorced more than 
once 
-5.573*** -4.384*** -4.132*** -4.110*** -4.241*** -2.851*** 
(0.682) (0.627) (0.615) (0.615) (0.619) (0.582) 
widowed 
-0.433* -0.978*** -0.818*** -0.804*** -0.828*** -0.664** 
(0.259) (0.297) (0.291) (0.291) (0.292) (0.277) 
age 
 0.310*** 0.289*** 0.292*** 0.301*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0400) (0.0384) 
squared age 
 -0.00214*** -0.00205*** -0.00207*** -0.00217*** -0.00105*** 
 (0.000340) (0.000334) (0.000334) (0.000340) (0.000325) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.441*** -0.353** -0.352** -0.135 -0.160 
 (0.168) (0.164) (0.165) (0.172) (0.161) 
not so good / bad 
 -0.778*** -0.625*** -0.625*** -0.0752 0.0175 
 (0.205) (0.202) (0.202) (0.225) (0.211) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 1.014*** 0.912*** 0.935*** 0.836*** 0.543*** 
 (0.196) (0.192) (0.192) (0.194) (0.183) 
(higher) vocational 
 1.385*** 1.124*** 1.124*** 1.019*** 0.610** 
 (0.267) (0.262) (0.264) (0.266) (0.254) 
high 
 1.641*** 1.405*** 1.369*** 1.222*** 0.848*** 
 (0.263) (0.258) (0.264) (0.266) (0.251) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.537*** -0.534*** -0.475** -0.421** -0.0505 
 (0.190) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187) (0.175) 
city 
 -1.464*** -1.427*** -1.265*** -1.164*** -0.538** 
 (0.208) (0.204) (0.214) (0.217) (0.209) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.537*** -0.534*** -0.475** -0.421** -0.0505 
 (0.190) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187) (0.175) 
…continued       
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…continued ( OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 for women) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -1.464*** -1.427*** -1.265*** -1.164*** -0.538** 
 (0.208) (0.204) (0.214) (0.217) (0.209) 
imputed (yes) 
 -0.537*** -0.534*** -0.475** -0.421** -0.0505 
 (0.159) (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.152) 
number of children 
 0.783* 0.737* 0.711 0.720 0.629 
 (0.452) (0.445) (0.445) (0.447) (0.444) 
squared number of 
children 
 -0.149 -0.131 -0.127 -0.127 -0.111 
 (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.0999) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.382 0.393 0.426 0.208 0.0817 
 (0.365) (0.358) (0.358) (0.360) (0.345) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 -0.450 -0.386 -0.343 -0.336 -0.402 
 (0.420) (0.413) (0.413) (0.415) (0.400) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.261 -0.0335 -0.0400 -0.00489 0.0593 
 (0.237) (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.222) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 1.271*** 0.790*** 0.799*** 0.671*** 0.362* 
 (0.225) (0.223) (0.223) (0.225) (0.217) 
3rd quintile 
 2.709*** 1.948*** 1.969*** 1.847*** 1.305*** 
 (0.252) (0.251) (0.251) (0.253) (0.240) 
4th quintile 
 3.749*** 2.722*** 2.736*** 2.536*** 1.626*** 
 (0.285) (0.286) (0.287) (0.288) (0.277) 
5th quintile 
 4.874*** 3.588*** 3.584*** 3.345*** 2.293*** 
 (0.329) (0.332) (0.333) (0.336) (0.330) 
log(household size) 
 -1.976*** -1.581*** -1.576*** -1.519*** -1.047*** 
 (0.284) (0.279) (0.279) (0.282) (0.268) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -1.296*** -1.024*** -1.032*** -1.007*** -1.070*** 
 (0.282) (0.278) (0.278) (0.280) (0.262) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.690* -0.449 -0.470 -0.470 -0.407 
 (0.375) (0.369) (0.369) (0.372) (0.356) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 -1.053*** -0.795** -0.802*** -0.787** -0.694** 
 (0.315) (0.309) (0.309) (0.311) (0.292) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 -0.669* -0.672* -0.650* -0.579 -0.560 
 (0.393) (0.385) (0.385) (0.385) (0.361) 
> 50,000 € 
 -0.429 -0.452 -0.432 -0.334 -0.544 
 (0.621) (0.608) (0.608) (0.608) (0.579) 
years full-time 
employment 
 0.000253 0.00229 0.00298 0.00161 0.00352 
 (0.00822) (0.00805) (0.00806) (0.00814) (0.00765) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.0278** 0.0179 0.0180 0.0139 0.00951 
 (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0104) 
years unemployment 
 -0.198*** -0.169*** -0.170*** -0.157*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0314) 
in the labour force 
(yes) 
 0.369 0.318 0.316 0.254 0.261 
 (0.260) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.241) 
…continued      
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
 
 
…continued ( OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007 for women) 
self-employed (yes) 
 0.431 0.567 0.553 0.564 0.617* 
 (0.388) (0.381) (0.383) (0.384) (0.361) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.319 0.182 0.177 0.178 0.0249 
 (0.457) (0.448) (0.448) (0.445) (0.419) 
saved the last three 
years (yes) 
  2.061*** 2.054*** 1.883*** 1.580*** 
  (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.140) 
inheritance before 
1992 (yes) 
  1.236*** 1.228*** 1.182*** 0.674*** 
  (0.271) (0.271) (0.270) (0.255) 
inheritance between 
1992 and 2002 (yes) 
  1.249*** 1.224*** 1.161*** 0.721** 
  (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.281) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
  1.115*** 1.111*** 1.023*** 0.791*** 
  (0.214) (0.214) (0.215) (0.207) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
   0.256 0.303 0.312 
   (0.261) (0.262) (0.249) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
   0.0698 0.00989 -0.138 
   (0.366) (0.366) (0.345) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
   0.390*** 0.357** 0.222 
   (0.151) (0.153) (0.145) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
    -0.453*** -0.454*** 
    (0.172) (0.163) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
    -0.689 -0.124 
    (0.437) (0.410) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
    -1.262** -0.987** 
    (0.497) (0.476) 
other religious 
organisation 
    -0.149 -0.734 
    (1.785) (1.677) 
non-denominational 
    -0.799*** -0.715*** 
    (0.234) (0.224) 
risk 
    0.172*** 0.120*** 
    (0.0372) (0.0352) 
life satisfaction 
    0.261*** 0.220*** 
    (0.0448) (0.0422) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
     0.343*** 
     (0.0135) 
Constant 
8.853*** -2.008* -2.391** -2.859** -4.716*** -2.005* 
(0.104) (1.130) (1.111) (1.120) (1.180) (1.121) 
R2 3.48 24.27 27.46 27.55 28.38 36.88 
adj. R2 3.37 23.79 26.96 27.02 27.76(* 36.32(* 
observations 6,386            6,386            6,386            6,386            6,271            6,262            
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Table A 3: Coefficients of OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-
wealth between 2002 and 2007 for men 
Control 
variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
-1.432** -2.437*** -2.368*** -2.354*** -2.349*** -2.319*** 
(0.661) (0.572) (0.572) (0.572) (0.573) (0.571) 
married once → 
widowed 
-0.384 -0.0494 -0.108 -0.106 -0.104 -0.150 
(0.817) (0.688) (0.690) (0.690) (0.690) (0.696) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
-0.0961 -0.674*** -0.634** -0.609** -0.609** -0.516** 
(0.291) (0.247) (0.248) (0.247) (0.248) (0.248) 
never married →  
never married 
0.628*** -0.177 -0.130 -0.0677 -0.0733 -0.168 
(0.197) (0.281) (0.283) (0.286) (0.286) (0.289) 
never married →  
married 
1.700*** 0.325 0.275 0.131 0.128 0.0911 
(0.436) (0.413) (0.414) (0.423) (0.424) (0.423) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
0.202 -0.536 -0.503 -0.448 -0.451 -0.406 
(0.403) (0.363) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.367) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
1.673** -0.571 -0.620 -0.639 -0.621 -0.584 
(0.809) (0.700) (0.700) (0.701) (0.701) (0.701) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
-1.714 -2.311** -2.153** -2.157** -2.159** -2.169** 
(1.209) (0.986) (0.987) (0.986) (0.985) (0.989) 
widowed →  widowed 
-0.561 -0.293 -0.255 -0.217 -0.216 -0.250 
(0.511) (0.444) (0.443) (0.443) (0.443) (0.444) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 0.0588 0.0856 0.0268 0.0340 0.0856 
 (0.417) (0.422) (0.423) (0.424) (0.426) 
aged 31-35 
 0.774* 0.809* 0.831* 0.839* 0.917** 
 (0.420) (0.431) (0.432) (0.431) (0.433) 
aged 36-40 
 0.918** 0.972** 1.058** 1.073** 1.149** 
 (0.437) (0.445) (0.446) (0.446) (0.448) 
aged 41-45 
 1.143** 1.178** 1.300*** 1.314*** 1.328*** 
 (0.495) (0.502) (0.504) (0.504) (0.506) 
aged 46-50 
 1.005* 1.034* 1.203** 1.209** 1.212** 
 (0.555) (0.562) (0.564) (0.563) (0.565) 
aged 51-55 
 0.960 1.070* 1.247** 1.252** 1.301** 
 (0.608) (0.613) (0.614) (0.614) (0.617) 
aged 56-60 
 1.465** 1.669** 1.694** 1.691** 1.697** 
 (0.689) (0.692) (0.697) (0.697) (0.699) 
aged 61-65 
 1.796** 1.952*** 1.399* 1.397* 1.391* 
 (0.751) (0.752) (0.817) (0.817) (0.818) 
older than 65 
 1.877** 2.012** 2.384*** 2.387*** 2.285*** 
 (0.791) (0.793) (0.797) (0.797) (0.798) 
…continued       
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…continued ( OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth for men) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.0204 -0.0181 -0.112 -0.110 -0.0987 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.160) (0.160) (0.165) 
not so good / bad 
 -0.372* -0.359 -0.578** -0.576** -0.518** 
 (0.226) (0.226) (0.238) (0.238) (0.256) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.220 0.237 0.217 0.217 0.186 
 (0.208) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.152 0.190 0.174 0.174 0.135 
 (0.267) (0.268) (0.268) (0.269) (0.271) 
high 
 0.608** 0.664** 0.608** 0.593** 0.573** 
 (0.268) (0.269) (0.269) (0.273) (0.275) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.405** -0.384** -0.382** -0.372** -0.377** 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.176) (0.178) (0.178) 
city 
 -0.688*** -0.664*** -0.668*** -0.633*** -0.578*** 
 (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.196) (0.198) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.897*** -0.910*** -0.910*** -0.914*** -0.748*** 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.198) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -1.034*** -1.072*** -1.087*** -1.094*** -0.873*** 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.220) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 0.872*** 0.882*** 0.889*** 0.892*** 0.878*** 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 1.534*** 1.549*** 1.544*** 1.545*** 1.529*** 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.200) (0.201) (0.201) 
number of children 
 -0.233 -0.278* -0.264* -0.266* -0.242* 
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.721*** 0.694*** 0.558** 0.560** 0.537* 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.275) (0.275) (0.275) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 0.0922 0.0746 0.0959 0.0945 0.0509 
 (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) (0.254) (0.254) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 0.218 0.182 0.194 0.193 0.218 
 (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.179) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 0.458** 0.412* 0.396* 0.402* 0.384* 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.229) 
3rd quintile 
 0.994*** 0.937*** 0.921*** 0.923*** 0.899*** 
 (0.254) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.256) 
…continued       
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…continued ( OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth for men) 
 
4th quintile 
 1.456*** 1.381*** 1.360*** 1.364*** 1.330*** 
 (0.276) (0.278) (0.278) (0.278) (0.280) 
5th quintile 
 1.929*** 1.818*** 1.784*** 1.770*** 1.719*** 
 (0.333) (0.336) (0.336) (0.337) (0.338) 
log(household size) 
 -0.121 0.0318 0.0525 0.0538 0.0394 
 (0.262) (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.272) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.684** 0.00505 0.0481 0.0398 0.0256 
 (0.290) (0.357) (0.358) (0.358) (0.360) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.887** -0.0641 -0.0299 -0.0213 0.0104 
 (0.392) (0.487) (0.489) (0.489) (0.493) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 0.167 1.028** 1.081** 1.081** 1.027** 
 (0.409) (0.489) (0.491) (0.492) (0.494) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 0.719 1.515*** 1.567*** 1.568*** 1.512*** 
 (0.460) (0.529) (0.531) (0.531) (0.534) 
> 50,000 € 
 0.719 1.503*** 1.553*** 1.560*** 1.516*** 
 (0.521) (0.578) (0.581) (0.582) (0.584) 
years full-time 
employment 
 0.00981 0.0126 0.0107 0.0114 0.0116 
 (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.0340 0.0418 0.0380 0.0379 0.0433 
 (0.0427) (0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0430) (0.0431) 
years unemployment 
 -0.104** -0.103** -0.106** -0.104** -0.0935* 
 (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0477) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 -0.449 -0.0992 -0.111 -0.109 -0.156 
 (0.276) (0.298) (0.298) (0.298) (0.299) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 0.132* -0.0379 -0.0247 -0.0238 -0.0223 
 (0.0720) (0.0844) (0.0843) (0.0844) (0.0848) 
self-employed (yes) 
 -0.321 -0.146 -0.119 -0.129 -0.141 
 (0.251) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.257) 
civil servant (yes) 
 -0.609** -0.615** -0.627** -0.627** -0.653** 
 (0.284) (0.285) (0.284) (0.285) (0.285) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 1.212*** 1.209*** 1.209*** 1.212*** 1.171*** 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -2.840*** -2.818*** -2.785*** -2.784*** -2.844*** 
 (0.323) (0.323) (0.321) (0.321) (0.323) 
worried about health 
 -0.149 -0.139 -0.0863 -0.0847 -0.0944 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 0.771*** 0.769*** 0.754*** 0.745*** 0.722*** 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.635*** -0.634*** -0.635*** -0.636*** -0.643*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0145) 
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…continued ( OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth for men) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.0379 -0.0530 -0.0522 -0.00629 
  (0.328) (0.328) (0.328) (0.328) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  0.233 0.230 0.236 0.263 
  (0.297) (0.297) (0.297) (0.297) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.574* -0.570* -0.578* -0.543 
  (0.333) (0.333) (0.333) (0.333) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  -0.928*** -0.932*** -0.936*** -0.906*** 
  (0.302) (0.302) (0.302) (0.303) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  0.128 0.0958 0.0914 0.0996 
  (0.342) (0.342) (0.342) (0.342) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  -0.0235 -0.0394 -0.0477 -0.0433 
  (0.301) (0.300) (0.301) (0.301) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  0.0146 -0.0136 -0.0221 -0.00232 
  (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  -0.0285 -0.0683 -0.0732 -0.0407 
  (0.286) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  -0.0453 -0.0739 -0.0713 -0.137 
  (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.263) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  -0.0941 -0.121 -0.117 -0.131 
  (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  0.257 0.265 0.267 0.212 
  (0.240) (0.239) (0.239) (0.240) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  -0.332 -0.336 -0.339 -0.318 
  (0.308) (0.308) (0.309) (0.310) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  0.0767 0.0603 0.0584 0.00448 
  (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  0.227 0.231 0.229 0.241 
  (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.235) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  0.499* 0.506** 0.507** 0.507** 
  (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  0.455 0.452 0.454 0.407 
  (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) 
birth (yes) 
   0.449 0.444 0.403 
   (0.295) (0.296) (0.296) 
retired (yes) 
   0.899** 0.903** 0.883** 
   (0.388) (0.388) (0.389) 
health worsened (yes) 
   -0.462*** -0.457*** -0.436*** 
   (0.155) (0.155) (0.156) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
…continued (OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth for men) 
 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    0.0595 0.0348 
    (0.227) (0.228) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    0.253 0.232 
    (0.294) (0.296) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    0.0988 0.0692 
    (0.140) (0.142) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     -0.183 
     (0.165) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     -0.812* 
     (0.456) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     -1.360*** 
     (0.453) 
other religious 
organisation 
     -0.200 
     (1.500) 
non-denominational 
     -0.441** 
     (0.190) 
risk 
     0.0382 
     (0.0285) 
life satisfaction 
     0.0154 
     (0.0462) 
Constant 
0.145 3.034*** 2.595*** 2.531*** 2.416*** 2.602*** 
(0.0971) (0.565) (0.594) (0.598) (0.608) (0.714) 
R2 
 
0.65 31.53 31.92 32.11 32.12 32.48 
adj. R2 0.51 30.93 31.16 31.32 31.30 31.58(* 
observations 6,419 6,419 6,419 6,419 6,419 6,374 
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Table A 4: Coefficients of OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-
wealth between 2002 and 2007 for women 
Control 
variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.0314 -0.878* -0.839* -0.849* -0.838* -0.717 
(0.598) (0.507) (0.509) (0.509) (0.509) (0.509) 
married once → 
widowed 
0.147 0.822* 0.891** 0.874* 0.875* 0.894** 
(0.526) (0.445) (0.451) (0.451) (0.451) (0.456) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
-0.391 -0.592** -0.578** -0.572** -0.571** -0.527* 
(0.338) (0.286) (0.287) (0.287) (0.288) (0.287) 
never married →  
never married 
0.951*** -0.429 -0.426 -0.441 -0.445 -0.517* 
(0.223) (0.279) (0.279) (0.277) (0.277) (0.278) 
never married →  
married 
1.492*** -0.260 -0.268 -0.271 -0.275 -0.325 
(0.402) (0.442) (0.444) (0.458) (0.458) (0.461) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
0.133 -0.688** -0.677** -0.682** -0.674** -0.647** 
(0.345) (0.302) (0.302) (0.302) (0.302) (0.303) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
0.171 -1.158* -1.173* -1.152* -1.156* -1.128 
(0.822) (0.685) (0.685) (0.685) (0.685) (0.691) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
-1.020 -2.898*** -2.837*** -2.833*** -2.826*** -2.938*** 
(0.770) (0.651) (0.653) (0.653) (0.653) (0.656) 
widowed →  widowed 
-0.675** -0.733*** -0.713** -0.724** -0.721** -0.766*** 
(0.277) (0.279) (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) (0.283) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 0.315 0.294 0.306 0.315 0.361 
 (0.371) (0.374) (0.374) (0.375) (0.375) 
aged 31-35 
 0.804** 0.797** 0.809** 0.835** 0.936*** 
 (0.344) (0.346) (0.347) (0.349) (0.350) 
aged 36-40 
 0.888** 0.874** 0.893** 0.921** 0.944** 
 (0.374) (0.374) (0.372) (0.374) (0.377) 
aged 41-45 
 1.098*** 1.106*** 1.134*** 1.162*** 1.245*** 
 (0.413) (0.413) (0.410) (0.411) (0.415) 
aged 46-50 
 1.360*** 1.371*** 1.416*** 1.457*** 1.537*** 
 (0.435) (0.434) (0.433) (0.433) (0.437) 
aged 51-55 
 1.589*** 1.620*** 1.667*** 1.693*** 1.739*** 
 (0.440) (0.442) (0.448) (0.449) (0.453) 
aged 56-60 
 1.869*** 1.923*** 1.828*** 1.839*** 1.850*** 
 (0.481) (0.483) (0.489) (0.490) (0.493) 
aged 61-65 
 2.178*** 2.217*** 1.758*** 1.761*** 1.717*** 
 (0.498) (0.499) (0.575) (0.576) (0.578) 
older than 65 
 2.288*** 2.327*** 2.420*** 2.439*** 2.421*** 
 (0.497) (0.498) (0.502) (0.502) (0.505) 
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physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.275* -0.263 -0.299* -0.301* -0.277 
 (0.161) (0.162) (0.166) (0.166) (0.168) 
not so good / bad 
 -0.562*** -0.559*** -0.658*** -0.654*** -0.552** 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.220) (0.221) (0.233) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.458*** 0.461*** 0.454*** 0.455*** 0.390** 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.167) (0.168) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.609*** 0.629*** 0.621*** 0.594** 0.492** 
 (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.233) (0.235) 
high 
 0.802*** 0.834*** 0.813*** 0.757*** 0.690*** 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.234) (0.238) (0.239) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.0471 -0.0496 -0.0523 -0.0237 0.0155 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.172) (0.172) 
city 
 -0.535*** -0.530*** -0.535*** -0.465** -0.401** 
 (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.192) (0.194) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.420** -0.447** -0.443** -0.426** -0.129 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182) (0.205) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -0.755*** -0.757*** -0.755*** -0.747*** -0.668*** 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.214) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 0.768*** 0.772*** 0.773*** 0.773*** 0.813*** 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 1.940*** 1.954*** 1.950*** 1.957*** 1.957*** 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.188) (0.187) (0.190) 
number of children 
 0.182 0.143 0.140 0.137 0.157 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.146) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 -0.143 -0.172 -0.163 -0.156 -0.217 
 (0.258) (0.259) (0.275) (0.275) (0.276) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 -0.180 -0.197 -0.195 -0.186 -0.210 
 (0.267) (0.267) (0.268) (0.268) (0.269) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.297 -0.300 -0.308 -0.310 -0.288 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 0.908*** 0.890*** 0.896*** 0.896*** 0.837*** 
 (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.210) 
3rd quintile 
 1.688*** 1.643*** 1.641*** 1.637*** 1.532*** 
 (0.227) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.230) 
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4th quintile 
 2.242*** 2.177*** 2.180*** 2.170*** 2.058*** 
 (0.248) (0.250) (0.250) (0.251) (0.253) 
5th quintile 
 2.864*** 2.780*** 2.775*** 2.738*** 2.586*** 
 (0.276) (0.280) (0.280) (0.282) (0.285) 
log(household size) 
 -0.990*** -0.855*** -0.861*** -0.855*** -0.807*** 
 (0.246) (0.258) (0.258) (0.258) (0.260) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.783*** -0.741** -0.727** -0.739** -0.809** 
 (0.246) (0.331) (0.332) (0.332) (0.334) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.358 -0.262 -0.258 -0.276 -0.334 
 (0.337) (0.422) (0.424) (0.424) (0.426) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 -0.503 -0.405 -0.397 -0.415 -0.484 
 (0.352) (0.422) (0.424) (0.424) (0.427) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 -0.437 -0.341 -0.322 -0.331 -0.353 
 (0.416) (0.461) (0.462) (0.463) (0.466) 
> 50,000 € 
 -0.457 -0.386 -0.363 -0.384 -0.379 
 (0.526) (0.563) (0.565) (0.565) (0.569) 
years full-time 
employment 
 -0.000328 0.00135 -0.000289 0.000365 0.000362 
 (0.00746) (0.00749) (0.00757) (0.00758) (0.00765) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.0115 0.0128 0.0113 0.0113 0.00876 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108) 
years unemployment 
 -0.0646* -0.0663* -0.0683* -0.0691* -0.0654* 
 (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0382) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 -0.149 0.0458 0.0262 0.0285 0.0178 
 (0.238) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.268) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 0.154** 0.0779 0.0843 0.0887 0.0913 
 (0.0602) (0.0730) (0.0738) (0.0739) (0.0748) 
self-employed (yes) 
 -0.371 -0.344 -0.352 -0.372 -0.337 
 (0.329) (0.331) (0.331) (0.332) (0.331) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.0529 0.0416 0.0446 0.0312 0.0350 
 (0.349) (0.349) (0.349) (0.350) (0.351) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 1.310*** 1.309*** 1.302*** 1.307*** 1.231*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.136) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -3.575*** -3.536*** -3.536*** -3.532*** -3.536*** 
 (0.339) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.334) 
worried about health 
 -0.251 -0.259* -0.244 -0.241 -0.257* 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 1.013*** 1.003*** 1.004*** 0.992*** 0.947*** 
 (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.662*** -0.661*** -0.661*** -0.661*** -0.671*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0122) 
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…continued ( OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth for women) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  0.666 0.666 0.662 0.617 
  (0.417) (0.417) (0.417) (0.419) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  0.205 0.203 0.196 0.155 
  (0.327) (0.327) (0.327) (0.327) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  0.0936 0.102 0.105 0.0429 
  (0.357) (0.357) (0.357) (0.357) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  -0.115 -0.119 -0.113 -0.106 
  (0.301) (0.301) (0.300) (0.302) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  0.480 0.469 0.467 0.460 
  (0.408) (0.408) (0.408) (0.407) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  0.176 0.178 0.166 0.111 
  (0.348) (0.349) (0.349) (0.349) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.00832 -0.0104 -0.0123 -0.0531 
  (0.383) (0.383) (0.383) (0.383) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  0.249 0.233 0.226 0.194 
  (0.271) (0.275) (0.275) (0.275) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  -0.144 -0.153 -0.161 -0.218 
  (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.274) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  0.0425 0.0455 0.0469 0.0665 
  (0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.218) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  -0.0593 -0.0555 -0.0601 -0.0788 
  (0.233) (0.232) (0.232) (0.230) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  -0.259 -0.252 -0.267 -0.202 
  (0.273) (0.272) (0.272) (0.274) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  -0.0769 -0.0761 -0.0688 -0.0941 
  (0.283) (0.283) (0.283) (0.282) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  0.0741 0.0697 0.0711 0.0645 
  (0.243) (0.244) (0.243) (0.244) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  0.489* 0.485* 0.480* 0.458* 
  (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.263) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  0.288 0.287 0.280 0.236 
  (0.261) (0.262) (0.262) (0.264) 
birth (yes) 
   -0.0174 -0.0144 -0.0482 
   (0.304) (0.304) (0.305) 
retired (yes) 
   0.593* 0.606* 0.647* 
   (0.360) (0.360) (0.364) 
health worsened (yes) 
   -0.184 -0.180 -0.164 
   (0.150) (0.150) (0.149) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other adjusted R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
 
  
…continued ( OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth for women) 
 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    0.354* 0.376* 
    (0.213) (0.214) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    -0.0620 -0.122 
    (0.296) (0.296) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    0.184 0.128 
    (0.134) (0.134) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     -0.347** 
     (0.154) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     -0.209 
     (0.406) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     -1.214*** 
     (0.461) 
other religious 
organisation 
     0.357 
     (1.579) 
non-denominational 
     -0.737*** 
     (0.201) 
risk 
     0.128*** 
     (0.0329) 
life satisfaction 
     0.0591 
     (0.0413) 
Constant 
0.129 3.321*** 3.163*** 3.220*** 3.015*** 2.852*** 
(0.0995) (0.498) (0.522) (0.527) (0.540) (0.641) 
R2 
 
0.71 33.40 33.57 33.61 33.66 34.23 
adj. R2 0.59 32.88 32.90 32.91 32.93 33.43(* 
observations 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 7,077 6,981 
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Table A 5: Coefficients of probit regression on whether net-wealth increased by 
more than 5% between 2002 and 2007 for men 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.353** -0.501*** -0.451*** -0.448*** -0.450*** -0.444*** 
(0.137) (0.147) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) 
married once → 
widowed 
0.150 0.413** 0.433** 0.433** 0.433** 0.411** 
(0.192) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.204) (0.205) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
-0.0256 -0.0170 -0.00501 0.000190 -0.00226 0.0120 
(0.0621) (0.0663) (0.0667) (0.0670) (0.0672) (0.0679) 
never married →  
never married 
0.0170 0.00333 0.0227 0.0316 0.0286 0.0130 
(0.0466) (0.0753) (0.0759) (0.0765) (0.0766) (0.0770) 
never married →  
married 
0.387*** 0.151 0.124 0.102 0.101 0.0928 
(0.102) (0.119) (0.119) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
-0.0635 -0.0353 -0.0208 -0.0105 -0.0104 -0.000409 
(0.0932) (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
0.196 0.0140 0.00160 0.00237 0.00224 0.00563 
(0.173) (0.189) (0.191) (0.192) (0.192) (0.193) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
-0.603** -0.443* -0.380 -0.381 -0.387 -0.389 
(0.257) (0.258) (0.261) (0.262) (0.261) (0.262) 
widowed →  widowed 
-0.320** -0.0893 -0.0808 -0.0730 -0.0708 -0.0720 
(0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) (0.130) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 0.198* 0.230* 0.221* 0.223* 0.227* 
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
aged 31-35 
 0.318** 0.350*** 0.358*** 0.359*** 0.373*** 
 (0.125) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) 
aged 36-40 
 0.309** 0.346** 0.363** 0.363** 0.371*** 
 (0.135) (0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) 
aged 41-45 
 0.331** 0.361** 0.385** 0.384** 0.375** 
 (0.148) (0.154) (0.154) (0.153) (0.154) 
aged 46-50 
 0.263 0.289* 0.323* 0.322* 0.307* 
 (0.160) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.168) 
aged 51-55 
 0.307* 0.362** 0.397** 0.394** 0.391** 
 (0.177) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184) 
aged 56-60 
 0.329 0.407* 0.416* 0.408* 0.396* 
 (0.207) (0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.217) 
aged 61-65 
 0.331 0.394 0.303 0.294 0.284 
 (0.234) (0.240) (0.256) (0.256) (0.257) 
older than 65 
 0.492** 0.552** 0.623** 0.618** 0.588** 
 (0.237) (0.243) (0.244) (0.244) (0.246) 
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…continued (probit regression on an increase in wealth higher than 5% for men) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.0307 -0.0308 -0.0529 -0.0507 -0.0512 
 (0.0546) (0.0551) (0.0576) (0.0574) (0.0604) 
not so good / bad 
 -0.0654 -0.0603 -0.112 -0.108 -0.0923 
 (0.0690) (0.0696) (0.0728) (0.0727) (0.0773) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.0911 0.103 0.0992 0.0980 0.0870 
 (0.0668) (0.0671) (0.0671) (0.0673) (0.0678) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.0909 0.115 0.113 0.109 0.0938 
 (0.0711) (0.0716) (0.0714) (0.0718) (0.0724) 
high 
 0.136 0.158* 0.147* 0.135 0.126 
 (0.0893) (0.0895) (0.0894) (0.0899) (0.0910) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.00108 0.00331 0.00368 0.00556 0.00774 
 (0.0480) (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0485) (0.0487) 
city 
 -0.0637 -0.0580 -0.0592 -0.0538 -0.0423 
 (0.0492) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0522) (0.0528) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.105** -0.111** -0.111** -0.110** -0.0827 
 (0.0452) (0.0455) (0.0456) (0.0457) (0.0534) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -0.196*** -0.210*** -0.213*** -0.213*** -0.164*** 
 (0.0557) (0.0562) (0.0563) (0.0564) (0.0616) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 0.231*** 0.233*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0390) (0.0391) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 0.304*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.311*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0557) (0.0555) (0.0556) (0.0556) 
number of children 
 -0.0607 -0.0851** -0.0832** -0.0848** -0.0809** 
 (0.0378) (0.0381) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0386) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.130* 0.125* 0.105 0.106 0.100 
 (0.0721) (0.0735) (0.0757) (0.0757) (0.0763) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 0.0429 0.0322 0.0351 0.0369 0.0309 
 (0.0701) (0.0708) (0.0707) (0.0710) (0.0714) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.0306 -0.0394 -0.0373 -0.0391 -0.0349 
 (0.0535) (0.0533) (0.0535) (0.0537) (0.0535) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 0.138** 0.130** 0.128** 0.129** 0.123** 
 (0.0612) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0616) 
3rd quintile 
 0.253*** 0.235*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0711) (0.0718) (0.0718) (0.0716) (0.0716) 
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4th quintile 
 0.346*** 0.311*** 0.308*** 0.306*** 0.297*** 
 (0.0780) (0.0792) (0.0793) (0.0791) (0.0789) 
5th quintile 
 0.488*** 0.444*** 0.437*** 0.426*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0947) (0.0955) (0.0958) (0.0960) (0.0960) 
log(household size) 
 -0.0456 0.0247 0.0284 0.0308 0.0328 
 (0.0735) (0.0762) (0.0768) (0.0767) (0.0785) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.0658 0.0704 0.0758 0.0742 0.0616 
 (0.0812) (0.0984) (0.0987) (0.0987) (0.0993) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.108 0.0462 0.0500 0.0482 0.0475 
 (0.103) (0.126) (0.128) (0.128) (0.130) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 0.00638 0.186 0.193 0.190 0.181 
 (0.107) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 0.117 0.287** 0.294** 0.291** 0.281* 
 (0.124) (0.142) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) 
> 50,000 € 
 0.118 0.286* 0.292* 0.290* 0.282* 
 (0.132) (0.148) (0.152) (0.152) (0.154) 
years full-time 
employment 
 -0.00712 -0.00577 -0.00613 -0.00569 -0.00559 
 (0.00478) (0.00479) (0.00481) (0.00484) (0.00494) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.00785 0.0104 0.00976 0.00929 0.0104 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0113) 
years unemployment 
 -0.0245* -0.0244* -0.0251* -0.0243* -0.0210 
 (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0137) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 -0.0769 0.0391 0.0377 0.0395 0.0328 
 (0.0773) (0.0841) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0840) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 0.0608*** 0.0127 0.0151 0.0160 0.0154 
 (0.0187) (0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0223) 
self-employed (yes) 
 -0.295*** -0.260*** -0.255*** -0.258*** -0.259*** 
 (0.0856) (0.0872) (0.0876) (0.0878) (0.0877) 
civil servant (yes) 
 -0.168** -0.158** -0.160** -0.157** -0.165** 
 (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0757) (0.0756) (0.0757) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 0.224*** 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0399) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0410) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.320*** -0.309*** -0.302*** -0.304*** -0.313*** 
 (0.0849) (0.0850) (0.0852) (0.0855) (0.0871) 
worried about health 
 0.0574 0.0600 0.0723* 0.0728* 0.0740* 
 (0.0425) (0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0429) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 0.157*** 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0526) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.0480*** -0.0478*** -0.0482*** -0.0484*** -0.0497*** 
 (0.00389) (0.00392) (0.00392) (0.00391) (0.00395) 
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…continued (probit regression on an increase in wealth higher than 5% for men) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  0.135 0.131 0.131 0.139 
  (0.0896) (0.0897) (0.0896) (0.0907) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  0.0228 0.0224 0.0248 0.0285 
  (0.0829) (0.0830) (0.0830) (0.0822) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.0595 -0.0581 -0.0605 -0.0575 
  (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  -0.180** -0.179** -0.180** -0.169** 
  (0.0775) (0.0784) (0.0784) (0.0786) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  0.00218 -0.00315 -0.00427 -0.00357 
  (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  0.0438 0.0409 0.0400 0.0446 
  (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0762) (0.0765) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  0.122 0.118 0.116 0.122 
  (0.0893) (0.0895) (0.0896) (0.0897) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  0.101 0.0940 0.0936 0.0940 
  (0.0799) (0.0795) (0.0796) (0.0792) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  -0.0865 -0.0930 -0.0923 -0.103 
  (0.0742) (0.0742) (0.0743) (0.0751) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  -0.0626 -0.0675 -0.0660 -0.0697 
  (0.0620) (0.0622) (0.0622) (0.0626) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  -0.0382 -0.0368 -0.0362 -0.0512 
  (0.0683) (0.0681) (0.0681) (0.0682) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  -0.112 -0.114 -0.115 -0.115 
  (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0817) (0.0822) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  0.169** 0.165** 0.167** 0.152** 
  (0.0770) (0.0772) (0.0774) (0.0776) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  0.0768 0.0773 0.0782 0.0739 
  (0.0634) (0.0634) (0.0635) (0.0639) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  0.202*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.202*** 
  (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.0707) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  0.160** 0.159** 0.158** 0.148* 
  (0.0783) (0.0782) (0.0781) (0.0783) 
birth (yes) 
   0.0652 0.0646 0.0564 
   (0.0836) (0.0837) (0.0834) 
retired (yes) 
   0.155 0.157 0.154 
   (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) 
health worsened (yes) 
   -0.109** -0.106** -0.104** 
   (0.0440) (0.0439) (0.0448) 
       
…continued 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
  
…continued (probit regression on an increase in wealth higher than 5% for men) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    0.0917 0.0904 
    (0.0626) (0.0630) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    0.00699 0.00751 
    (0.0849) (0.0858) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    0.0180 0.0123 
    (0.0378) (0.0383) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     -0.0579 
     (0.0464) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     -0.138 
     (0.131) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     -0.351*** 
     (0.116) 
other religious 
organisation 
     0.119 
     (0.428) 
non-denominational 
     -0.0818 
     (0.0525) 
risk 
     0.00544 
     (0.00839) 
life satisfaction 
     0.00570 
     (0.0128) 
Constant 
0.0941*** -0.232 -0.409** -0.411** -0.440** -0.400* 
(0.0212) (0.159) (0.169) (0.173) (0.175) (0.206) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.52 7.58            8.39            8.51            8.54            8.65(*            
observations 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,371 
178 
 
Table A 6: Coefficients of probit regression on whether net-wealth increased by 
more than 5% between 2002 and 2007 for women 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.141 -0.127 -0.110 -0.109 -0.111 -0.103 
(0.126) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.136) 
married once → 
widowed 
0.0565 0.339*** 0.379*** 0.376*** 0.376*** 0.376*** 
(0.112) (0.120) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) (0.124) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
-0.0242 0.000672 0.00831 0.00864 0.00767 0.0159 
(0.0707) (0.0718) (0.0727) (0.0727) (0.0730) (0.0731) 
never married →  
never married 
0.0832* -0.00362 0.00602 0.0154 0.0143 0.00566 
(0.0467) (0.0823) (0.0834) (0.0837) (0.0839) (0.0854) 
never married →  
married 
0.358*** 0.114 0.109 0.0785 0.0789 0.0816 
(0.0911) (0.125) (0.125) (0.130) (0.129) (0.131) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
-0.0719 0.00504 0.0177 0.0180 0.0173 0.0360 
(0.0728) (0.0823) (0.0821) (0.0822) (0.0825) (0.0829) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
-0.0978 -0.290 -0.300 -0.305 -0.305 -0.276 
(0.194) (0.212) (0.216) (0.215) (0.215) (0.218) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
-0.415** -0.399** -0.371** -0.371** -0.371** -0.359* 
(0.172) (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) (0.183) (0.185) 
widowed →  widowed 
-0.252*** 0.00100 0.0147 0.0147 0.0136 0.0195 
(0.0590) (0.0767) (0.0774) (0.0775) (0.0775) (0.0774) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 0.0904 0.0782 0.0747 0.0763 0.0744 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) 
aged 31-35 
 0.101 0.0997 0.108 0.113 0.134 
 (0.0940) (0.0942) (0.0941) (0.0948) (0.0956) 
aged 36-40 
 0.0290 0.0213 0.0394 0.0447 0.0415 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106) 
aged 41-45 
 0.0180 0.0170 0.0404 0.0447 0.0485 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) 
aged 46-50 
 0.0382 0.0424 0.0694 0.0732 0.0749 
 (0.136) (0.135) (0.133) (0.135) (0.136) 
aged 51-55 
 -0.0110 0.00907 0.0394 0.0441 0.0349 
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) 
aged 56-60 
 -0.0744 -0.0412 -0.0187 -0.0143 -0.0247 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.161) 
aged 61-65 
 0.00708 0.0324 0.0242 0.0286 0.0176 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.175) (0.176) (0.178) 
older than 65 
 0.0694 0.0926 0.129 0.134 0.108 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139) 
…continued       
       
179 
 
…continued (probit regression on an increase in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.0276 -0.0198 -0.0243 -0.0236 -0.0148 
 (0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0455) 
not so good / bad 
 -0.0837 -0.0812 -0.0929* -0.0920* -0.0774 
 (0.0518) (0.0519) (0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0592) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0458) (0.0465) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.114* 0.122** 0.118* 0.117* 0.100 
 (0.0616) (0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0627) (0.0633) 
high 
 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0458) (0.0465) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 0.0106 0.00912 0.00827 0.00661 0.0145 
 (0.0453) (0.0454) (0.0453) (0.0458) (0.0463) 
city 
 -0.0106 -0.0102 -0.0105 -0.0141 -0.000373 
 (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0506) (0.0506) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.0984** -0.109** -0.111** -0.112** -0.0740 
 (0.0470) (0.0472) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0544) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -0.201*** -0.203*** -0.204*** -0.206*** -0.179*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0515) (0.0515) (0.0519) (0.0580) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0377) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 0.371*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.379*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0483) (0.0492) 
number of children 
 -0.0155 -0.0360 -0.0344 -0.0355 -0.0366 
 (0.0355) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0358) (0.0370) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.121* 0.113 0.0903 0.0921 0.0876 
 (0.0691) (0.0697) (0.0724) (0.0726) (0.0737) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 -0.00757 -0.0198 -0.0163 -0.0147 -0.0171 
 (0.0678) (0.0690) (0.0692) (0.0696) (0.0707) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.0555 -0.0644 -0.0625 -0.0616 -0.0623 
 (0.0652) (0.0657) (0.0660) (0.0659) (0.0657) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 0.210*** 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0556) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0562) (0.0575) 
3rd quintile 
 0.354*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.334*** 0.321*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0627) (0.0627) (0.0630) (0.0632) 
…continued       
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…continued (probit regression on an increase in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
       
4th quintile 
 0.444*** 0.414*** 0.414*** 0.413*** 0.397*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0688) (0.0712) 
5th quintile 
 0.458*** 0.422*** 0.421*** 0.418*** 0.390*** 
 (0.0725) (0.0734) (0.0734) (0.0745) (0.0762) 
log(household size) 
 -0.0820 -0.000734 0.000248 0.000976 0.0242 
 (0.0666) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0704) (0.0709) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.125* -0.0766 -0.0812 -0.0844 -0.111 
 (0.0752) (0.0990) (0.0989) (0.0995) (0.101) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 0.00346 0.0828 0.0746 0.0724 0.0474 
 (0.0979) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.126) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 -0.0606 0.0119 0.00306 -0.000390 -0.0254 
 (0.0970) (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) (0.121) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 -0.00326 0.0599 0.0545 0.0516 0.0329 
 (0.114) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) 
> 50,000 € 
 0.0611 0.112 0.105 0.102 0.0910 
 (0.142) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) 
years full-time 
employment 
 0.00198 0.00266 0.00261 0.00264 0.00283 
 (0.00202) (0.00203) (0.00204) (0.00205) (0.00207) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.00505* 0.00531* 0.00521* 0.00520* 0.00488* 
 (0.00276) (0.00277) (0.00277) (0.00277) (0.00281) 
years unemployment 
 -0.00824 -0.00976 -0.00954 -0.00951 -0.00764 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 -0.104 -0.0330 -0.0408 -0.0420 -0.0260 
 (0.0689) (0.0765) (0.0763) (0.0766) (0.0772) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 0.0557*** 0.0232 0.0269 0.0276 0.0240 
 (0.0164) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0210) 
self-employed (yes) 
 -0.221** -0.200** -0.201** -0.205** -0.201** 
 (0.0942) (0.0965) (0.0964) (0.0970) (0.0965) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.146 0.147 0.145 0.144 0.153 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 0.287*** 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.285*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0359) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.403*** -0.402*** -0.399*** -0.399*** -0.401*** 
 (0.0856) (0.0853) (0.0852) (0.0854) (0.0861) 
worried about health 
 -0.0158 -0.0188 -0.0165 -0.0171 -0.0274 
 (0.0418) (0.0423) (0.0428) (0.0427) (0.0429) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 0.235*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0521) (0.0526) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.0488*** -0.0488*** -0.0488*** -0.0489*** -0.0503*** 
 (0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00354) 
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…continued (probit regression on an increase in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  0.119 0.119 0.121 0.131 
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.121) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  0.0565 0.0557 0.0562 0.0516 
  (0.0907) (0.0908) (0.0908) (0.0913) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  0.0714 0.0695 0.0715 0.0676 
  (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  -0.0657 -0.0700 -0.0687 -0.0623 
  (0.0854) (0.0858) (0.0861) (0.0872) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  0.138 0.139 0.141 0.141 
  (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.117) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  0.143 0.148 0.148 0.145 
  (0.0979) (0.0976) (0.0975) (0.0997) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  0.105 0.108 0.109 0.103 
  (0.0990) (0.0989) (0.0990) (0.0996) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  0.0519 0.0585 0.0584 0.0541 
  (0.0766) (0.0766) (0.0766) (0.0765) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  -0.0608 -0.0618 -0.0619 -0.0801 
  (0.0760) (0.0760) (0.0759) (0.0752) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  -0.0240 -0.0228 -0.0226 -0.0227 
  (0.0588) (0.0589) (0.0589) (0.0594) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  -0.0493 -0.0476 -0.0474 -0.0542 
  (0.0632) (0.0632) (0.0632) (0.0627) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  -0.187*** -0.183*** -0.184*** -0.194*** 
  (0.0711) (0.0712) (0.0712) (0.0719) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  0.0165 0.0172 0.0165 0.00797 
  (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0770) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  -0.00718 -0.00768 -0.00703 -0.0147 
  (0.0602) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0606) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  0.133* 0.131* 0.131* 0.129* 
  (0.0738) (0.0738) (0.0736) (0.0756) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  0.150** 0.147** 0.147** 0.143** 
  (0.0721) (0.0724) (0.0723) (0.0725) 
birth (yes) 
   0.0968 0.0969 0.0788 
   (0.0791) (0.0792) (0.0804) 
retired (yes) 
   0.0486 0.0490 0.0551 
   (0.1000 
) 
(0.0999) (0.100) 
health worsened (yes) 
   -0.0256 -0.0248 -0.0243 
   (0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0405) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
  
…continued (probit regression on an increase in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    -0.0160 -0.0115 
    (0.0603) (0.0611) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    0.0682 0.0479 
    (0.0830) (0.0836) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    -0.00272 -0.0111 
    (0.0375) (0.0374) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     -0.0835* 
     (0.0426) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     -0.116 
     (0.110) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     -0.334*** 
     (0.124) 
other religious 
organisation 
     0.722 
     (0.485) 
non-denominational 
     -0.118** 
     (0.0569) 
risk 
     0.0227** 
     (0.00913) 
life satisfaction 
     0.00838 
     (0.0115) 
Constant 
0.0544** -0.180 -0.243 -0.265* -0.266* -0.256 
(0.0216) (0.142) (0.149) (0.150) (0.159) (0.182) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
5.90 7.56 7.98 8.01 8.02 8.26(*        
observations 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 6,979 
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Table A 7: Coefficients of probit regression on whether net-wealth decreased by 
more than 5% between 2002 and 2007 for men 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
0.359*** 0.565*** 0.517*** 0.513*** 0.517*** 0.516*** 
(0.136) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) 
married once → 
widowed 
-0.301 -0.449** -0.463** -0.464** -0.462** -0.457** 
(0.193) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.206) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
0.00955 0.0460 0.0361 0.0339 0.0367 0.0250 
(0.0629) (0.0666) (0.0671) (0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0677) 
never married →  
never married 
-0.293*** -0.124 -0.148* -0.160** -0.158* -0.149* 
(0.0513) (0.0793) (0.0798) (0.0805) (0.0806) (0.0809) 
never married →  
married 
-0.367*** -0.139 -0.119 -0.0866 -0.0862 -0.0759 
(0.111) (0.128) (0.129) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
0.00983 0.0371 0.0192 0.0126 0.0119 -0.00224 
(0.0910) (0.103) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
-0.261 -0.0129 -0.00449 -0.00581 -0.000598 0.00941 
(0.181) (0.197) (0.199) (0.200) (0.200) (0.201) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
0.432* 0.482* 0.423 0.427 0.432* 0.437* 
(0.247) (0.256) (0.260) (0.260) (0.259) (0.260) 
widowed →  widowed 
0.281** 0.107 0.0920 0.0863 0.0840 0.0874 
(0.124) (0.129) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 -0.215* -0.237* -0.224* -0.225* -0.227* 
 (0.129) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
aged 31-35 
 -0.343*** -0.361*** -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.384*** 
 (0.128) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) 
aged 36-40 
 -0.344** -0.368*** -0.385*** -0.383*** -0.397*** 
 (0.136) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) 
aged 41-45 
 -0.376** -0.392*** -0.416*** -0.414*** -0.419*** 
 (0.147) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) 
aged 46-50 
 -0.361** -0.373** -0.406** -0.405** -0.411** 
 (0.164) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.171) 
aged 51-55 
 -0.362** -0.401** -0.436** -0.433** -0.443** 
 (0.176) (0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) 
aged 56-60 
 -0.347* -0.407* -0.441** -0.435** -0.438** 
 (0.208) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.217) 
aged 61-65 
 -0.353 -0.398* -0.422* -0.415* -0.413* 
 (0.231) (0.237) (0.247) (0.247) (0.248) 
older than 65 
 -0.429* -0.472** -0.517** -0.511** -0.508** 
 (0.235) (0.240) (0.243) (0.243) (0.245) 
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…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for men) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 0.0217 0.0224 0.0442 0.0425 0.0457 
 (0.0527) (0.0528) (0.0549) (0.0547) (0.0570) 
not so good / bad 
 0.0340 0.0290 0.0784 0.0753 0.0771 
 (0.0693) (0.0697) (0.0726) (0.0724) (0.0762) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.0379 0.0299 0.0312 0.0327 0.0328 
 (0.0673) (0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0678) (0.0684) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.0451 0.0260 0.0239 0.0277 0.0323 
 (0.0725) (0.0728) (0.0727) (0.0731) (0.0733) 
high 
 -0.0176 -0.0361 -0.0305 -0.0218 -0.0214 
 (0.0853) (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0856) (0.0868) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.0266 -0.0311 -0.0320 -0.0300 -0.0334 
 (0.0521) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0528) (0.0530) 
city 
 0.0212 0.0168 0.0183 0.0245 0.0169 
 (0.0525) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0555) (0.0559) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 0.130*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.110** 
 (0.0461) (0.0464) (0.0465) (0.0464) (0.0553) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -0.00272 0.00961 0.0114 0.0106 -0.0136 
 (0.0574) (0.0577) (0.0578) (0.0580) (0.0629) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 -0.0269 -0.0281 -0.0307 -0.0301 -0.0348 
 (0.0432) (0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0434) (0.0434) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 -0.120** -0.124** -0.125** -0.126** -0.128** 
 (0.0572) (0.0587) (0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0591) 
number of children 
 0.0518 0.0735* 0.0701* 0.0712* 0.0707* 
 (0.0385) (0.0390) (0.0390) (0.0390) (0.0396) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 -0.123 -0.120 -0.0920 -0.0926 -0.0897 
 (0.0751) (0.0763) (0.0777) (0.0778) (0.0781) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 -0.0184 -0.00573 -0.00786 -0.00925 -0.00798 
 (0.0703) (0.0709) (0.0709) (0.0711) (0.0716) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 0.0103 0.0186 0.0173 0.0186 0.0201 
 (0.0528) (0.0528) (0.0530) (0.0533) (0.0531) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 -0.00269 0.00465 0.00557 0.00577 0.00807 
 (0.0630) (0.0631) (0.0631) (0.0631) (0.0635) 
3rd quintile 
 -0.122* -0.107 -0.105 -0.104 -0.110 
 (0.0734) (0.0738) (0.0738) (0.0737) (0.0733) 
…continued       
       
185 
 
…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for men) 
       
4th quintile 
 -0.216*** -0.189** -0.187** -0.184** -0.190** 
 (0.0792) (0.0797) (0.0799) (0.0795) (0.0797) 
5th quintile 
 -0.353*** -0.317*** -0.314*** -0.306*** -0.320*** 
 (0.0961) (0.0964) (0.0967) (0.0969) (0.0967) 
log(household size) 
 -0.0655 -0.133* -0.135* -0.137* -0.126 
 (0.0757) (0.0783) (0.0787) (0.0787) (0.0815) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 0.0343 -0.130 -0.126 -0.126 -0.116 
 (0.0868) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 0.361*** 0.172 0.180 0.183 0.165 
 (0.108) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.140) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 0.252** 0.0452 0.0506 0.0536 0.0618 
 (0.113) (0.138) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 0.116 -0.0828 -0.0749 -0.0726 -0.0596 
 (0.125) (0.147) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) 
> 50,000 € 
 0.0369 -0.161 -0.148 -0.146 -0.138 
 (0.138) (0.157) (0.160) (0.160) (0.161) 
years full-time 
employment 
 0.00816* 0.00696 0.00690 0.00662 0.00705 
 (0.00460) (0.00461) (0.00465) (0.00468) (0.00479) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.00278 0.000279 0.000505 0.000782 -0.00138 
 (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0119) 
years unemployment 
 -0.00587 -0.00542 -0.00505 -0.00549 -0.00448 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 -0.0123 -0.119 -0.121 -0.123 -0.112 
 (0.0822) (0.0883) (0.0881) (0.0881) (0.0886) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 -0.0330* 0.0134 0.0127 0.0122 0.00967 
 (0.0193) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0232) 
self-employed (yes) 
 0.239*** 0.199** 0.198** 0.199** 0.204** 
 (0.0778) (0.0794) (0.0797) (0.0799) (0.0799) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.169** 0.166** 0.165** 0.163** 0.169** 
 (0.0787) (0.0784) (0.0785) (0.0784) (0.0788) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 -0.217*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.209*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0402) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 0.628*** 0.626*** 0.618*** 0.620*** 0.624*** 
 (0.0871) (0.0871) (0.0873) (0.0875) (0.0884) 
worried about health 
 -0.0147 -0.0164 -0.0291 -0.0290 -0.0286 
 (0.0427) (0.0430) (0.0433) (0.0433) (0.0436) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.0897* -0.0915* -0.0888 -0.0875 -0.0898* 
 (0.0536) (0.0541) (0.0542) (0.0542) (0.0542) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 0.0829*** 0.0828*** 0.0832*** 0.0833*** 0.0835*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00455) (0.00454) (0.00453) (0.00456) 
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…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for men) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.0940 -0.0917 -0.0907 -0.0908 
  (0.0969) (0.0971) (0.0970) (0.0986) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  -0.00426 -0.00257 -0.00293 -0.00310 
  (0.0838) (0.0840) (0.0840) (0.0835) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  0.116 0.114 0.115 0.108 
  (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  0.201** 0.196** 0.197** 0.189** 
  (0.0843) (0.0852) (0.0851) (0.0849) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  0.0107 0.0164 0.0170 0.0163 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  0.0257 0.0290 0.0278 0.0276 
  (0.0788) (0.0787) (0.0789) (0.0785) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.0867 -0.0821 -0.0823 -0.0814 
  (0.0910) (0.0911) (0.0913) (0.0912) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  -0.0510 -0.0469 -0.0469 -0.0457 
  (0.0839) (0.0839) (0.0840) (0.0836) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  0.0864 0.0930 0.0929 0.0981 
  (0.0758) (0.0759) (0.0759) (0.0769) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  0.0568 0.0604 0.0601 0.0604 
  (0.0650) (0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0656) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  0.0252 0.0259 0.0254 0.0381 
  (0.0704) (0.0703) (0.0703) (0.0708) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  0.170** 0.171** 0.172** 0.169** 
  (0.0833) (0.0833) (0.0834) (0.0842) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  -0.134 -0.131 -0.133 -0.123 
  (0.0844) (0.0847) (0.0847) (0.0850) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  -0.0462 -0.0467 -0.0483 -0.0493 
  (0.0655) (0.0655) (0.0656) (0.0659) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  -0.159** -0.160** -0.161** -0.162** 
  (0.0735) (0.0735) (0.0735) (0.0735) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  -0.144* -0.142* -0.141* -0.136* 
  (0.0814) (0.0813) (0.0812) (0.0817) 
birth (yes) 
   -0.0991 -0.0992 -0.0943 
   (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0849) 
retired (yes) 
   -0.0121 -0.0136 -0.0233 
   (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) 
health worsened (yes) 
   0.104** 0.102** 0.0999** 
   (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0460) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
  
…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for men) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    -0.0680 -0.0642 
    (0.0650) (0.0655) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    0.0341 0.0284 
    (0.0931) (0.0937) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    0.0118 0.0200 
    (0.0392) (0.0397) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     0.0333 
     (0.0479) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     0.0652 
     (0.136) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     0.168 
     (0.123) 
other religious 
organisation 
     -0.265 
     (0.469) 
non-denominational 
     0.0730 
     (0.0568) 
risk 
     0.00578 
     (0.00836) 
life satisfaction 
     0.00374 
     (0.0129) 
Constant 
-0.274*** -0.715*** -0.577*** -0.581*** -0.584*** -0.682*** 
(0.0218) (0.165) (0.175) (0.181) (0.184) (0.213) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
1.04            10.09           10.77           10.86            10.88         10.90(*          
observations 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,371 
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Table A 8: Coefficients of probit regression on whether net-wealth decreased by 
more than 5% between 2002 and 2007 for women 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
0.0258 0.150 0.121 0.127 0.126 0.125 
(0.127) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.145) 
married once → 
widowed 
-0.0317 -0.205* -0.247* -0.244* -0.244* -0.251** 
(0.113) (0.124) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
0.0290 0.0442 0.0398 0.0379 0.0374 0.0264 
(0.0757) (0.0797) (0.0808) (0.0809) (0.0810) (0.0809) 
never married →  
never married 
-0.269*** -0.0186 -0.0399 -0.0450 -0.0457 -0.0445 
(0.0483) (0.0880) (0.0896) (0.0889) (0.0890) (0.0920) 
never married →  
married 
-0.367*** -0.0450 -0.0417 -0.0212 -0.0209 -0.0214 
(0.0963) (0.139) (0.140) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
-0.101 -0.0627 -0.0806 -0.0812 -0.0818 -0.0876 
(0.0749) (0.0872) (0.0871) (0.0873) (0.0876) (0.0872) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
0.0959 0.333 0.338 0.333 0.332 0.298 
(0.200) (0.235) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.243) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
0.114 0.412** 0.374** 0.377** 0.376** 0.367* 
(0.168) (0.186) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.190) 
widowed →  widowed 
0.109* -0.0294 -0.0431 -0.0425 -0.0421 -0.0442 
(0.0592) (0.0775) (0.0786) (0.0786) (0.0786) (0.0782) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 -0.120 -0.104 -0.104 -0.103 -0.0963 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.120) 
aged 31-35 
 -0.136 -0.128 -0.136 -0.136 -0.149 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) 
aged 36-40 
 -0.0947 -0.0813 -0.0962 -0.0973 -0.0958 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) 
aged 41-45 
 -0.162 -0.149 -0.167 -0.167 -0.176 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.130) (0.131) (0.132) 
aged 46-50 
 -0.225 -0.223 -0.247 -0.248 -0.248 
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.150) (0.152) (0.155) 
aged 51-55 
 -0.170 -0.183 -0.208 -0.209 -0.204 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.134) (0.136) (0.136) 
aged 56-60 
 -0.108 -0.134 -0.161 -0.162 -0.161 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.171) (0.173) (0.177) 
aged 61-65 
 -0.133 -0.146 -0.179 -0.180 -0.191 
 (0.165) (0.166) (0.192) (0.193) (0.196) 
older than 65 
 -0.190 -0.203 -0.230 -0.231 -0.244 
 (0.155) (0.156) (0.153) (0.154) (0.156) 
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…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0490) (0.0491) (0.0507) 
 0.0743 0.0730 0.107* 0.107* 0.0828 
not so good / bad 
 (0.0559) (0.0560) (0.0601) (0.0602) (0.0666) 
 (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0490) (0.0491) (0.0507) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.000134 -0.00267 0.000202 -0.000583 -0.00391 
 (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0502) (0.0503) (0.0506) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.0462 0.0386 0.0419 0.0404 0.0366 
 (0.0654) (0.0659) (0.0660) (0.0665) (0.0674) 
high 
 -0.0911 -0.103 -0.0958 -0.0965 -0.0980 
 (0.0701) (0.0705) (0.0707) (0.0721) (0.0727) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.00152 0.000717 0.00226 0.00126 -0.00156 
 (0.0482) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0490) (0.0497) 
city 
 0.00672 0.00889 0.0104 0.00645 0.00778 
 (0.0487) (0.0488) (0.0489) (0.0522) (0.0525) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 0.120** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.116** 
 (0.0478) (0.0481) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0556) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -0.0211 -0.0209 -0.0196 -0.0184 0.0382 
 (0.0554) (0.0557) (0.0558) (0.0561) (0.0629) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 0.0860** 0.0864** 0.0859** 0.0860** 0.0727* 
 (0.0380) (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0392) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 -0.129** -0.136** -0.137** -0.137** -0.146*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0537) (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0547) 
number of children 
 0.0112 0.0321 0.0313 0.0318 0.0385 
 (0.0396) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0403) (0.0410) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.0264 0.0356 0.0474 0.0468 0.0464 
 (0.0752) (0.0761) (0.0803) (0.0808) (0.0826) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 0.0229 0.0365 0.0333 0.0316 0.0229 
 (0.0709) (0.0721) (0.0723) (0.0727) (0.0735) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 0.104 0.114* 0.113 0.112 0.110 
 (0.0681) (0.0687) (0.0689) (0.0687) (0.0683) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 -0.118** -0.113* -0.112* -0.113* -0.105* 
 (0.0603) (0.0602) (0.0604) (0.0605) (0.0634) 
3rd quintile 
 -0.262*** -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.229*** 
 (0.0636) (0.0640) (0.0641) (0.0643) (0.0658) 
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…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
       
4th quintile 
 -0.377*** -0.345*** -0.344*** -0.345*** -0.325*** 
 (0.0756) (0.0756) (0.0757) (0.0756) (0.0802) 
5th quintile 
 -0.425*** -0.390*** -0.386*** -0.387*** -0.357*** 
 (0.0760) (0.0764) (0.0765) (0.0769) (0.0802) 
log(household size) 
 0.0276 -0.0564 -0.0545 -0.0535 -0.0734 
 (0.0699) (0.0732) (0.0732) (0.0733) (0.0735) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 0.158** 0.111 0.118 0.119 0.126 
 (0.0787) (0.101) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 0.0589 -0.0171 -0.00898 -0.00805 -0.0138 
 (0.109) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.134) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 0.209* 0.145 0.154 0.156 0.152 
 (0.107) (0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.127) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 0.151 0.0968 0.103 0.104 0.0990 
 (0.126) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.143) 
> 50,000 € 
 0.0728 0.0345 0.0411 0.0427 0.0251 
 (0.156) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.173) 
years full-time 
employment 
 -0.00137 -0.00191 -0.00202 -0.00203 -0.00228 
 (0.00207) (0.00209) (0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00214) 
years part-time 
employment 
 -0.00476* -0.00496* -0.00494* -0.00494* -0.00485* 
 (0.00287) (0.00288) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00292) 
years unemployment 
 0.00494 0.00604 0.00574 0.00578 0.00353 
 (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0117) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 0.0894 0.0405 0.0455 0.0461 0.0463 
 (0.0728) (0.0808) (0.0798) (0.0801) (0.0802) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 -0.0432** -0.0174 -0.0191 -0.0192 -0.0205 
 (0.0179) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0223) 
self-employed (yes) 
 0.166* 0.144 0.148 0.149 0.153 
 (0.0955) (0.0967) (0.0966) (0.0974) (0.0972) 
civil servant (yes) 
 -0.200* -0.196* -0.198* -0.199* -0.205* 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 -0.262*** -0.256*** -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0380) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 0.715*** 0.717*** 0.715*** 0.714*** 0.717*** 
 (0.0928) (0.0926) (0.0923) (0.0926) (0.0934) 
worried about health 
 0.0545 0.0578 0.0505 0.0508 0.0539 
 (0.0418) (0.0421) (0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0427) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.231*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.232*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0554) (0.0554) (0.0555) (0.0555) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 
 (0.00452) (0.00454) (0.00453) (0.00454) (0.00452) 
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…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.103 -0.104 -0.104 -0.101 
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  -0.0919 -0.0914 -0.0916 -0.0806 
  (0.0940) (0.0940) (0.0940) (0.0942) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.00511 -0.00665 -0.00749 0.00118 
  (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  0.0426 0.0408 0.0406 0.0376 
  (0.0892) (0.0894) (0.0896) (0.0905) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.118 -0.121 -0.122 -0.108 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  -0.0989 -0.105 -0.105 -0.0905 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.105) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.126 -0.129 -0.129 -0.120 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  -0.0126 -0.0163 -0.0161 -0.0139 
  (0.0774) (0.0778) (0.0780) (0.0775) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  0.129 0.132 0.133 0.136* 
  (0.0814) (0.0814) (0.0812) (0.0804) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  0.0702 0.0697 0.0702 0.0670 
  (0.0594) (0.0594) (0.0595) (0.0599) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  0.0548 0.0530 0.0529 0.0538 
  (0.0628) (0.0628) (0.0628) (0.0625) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  0.259*** 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.247*** 
  (0.0750) (0.0750) (0.0748) (0.0755) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  -0.0345 -0.0352 -0.0348 -0.0358 
  (0.0791) (0.0791) (0.0792) (0.0798) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  0.0405 0.0423 0.0423 0.0363 
  (0.0663) (0.0663) (0.0663) (0.0666) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  -0.138 -0.136 -0.137 -0.135 
  (0.0838) (0.0839) (0.0837) (0.0853) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  -0.0750 -0.0737 -0.0736 -0.0838 
  (0.0770) (0.0774) (0.0772) (0.0772) 
birth (yes) 
   -0.0569 -0.0573 -0.0497 
   (0.0850) (0.0851) (0.0863) 
retired (yes) 
   0.0116 0.0116 0.00348 
   (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) 
health worsened (yes) 
   0.0755* 0.0754* 0.0711* 
   (0.0424) (0.0426) (0.0428) 
       
…continued 
 
      
       
       
192 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
  
…continued (probit regression on a decrease in wealth higher than 5% for women) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    0.0182 0.00256 
    (0.0639) (0.0650) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    -0.0377 -0.0286 
    (0.0919) (0.0925) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    -0.0103 -0.00642 
    (0.0405) (0.0408) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     0.0790* 
     (0.0445) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     -0.0929 
     (0.129) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     -0.233 
     (0.147) 
other religious 
organisation 
     -0.356 
     (0.497) 
non-denominational 
     0.0737 
     (0.0580) 
risk 
     -0.0139 
     (0.0100) 
life satisfaction 
     -0.0116 
     (0.0124) 
Constant 
-0.279*** -0.978*** -0.959*** -0.969*** -0.961*** -0.880*** 
(0.0229) (0.156) (0.166) (0.166) (0.175) (0.188) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.68 12.71            13.18            13.22            13.23            13.30(*           
observations 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 6,979 
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Table A 9: Coefficients of probit regression on whether the change in net-wealth 
between 2002 and 2007 did not exceed a 5% decrease or increase for men 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.0178 -0.211 -0.235 -0.222 -0.233 -0.248 
(0.208) (0.269) (0.268) (0.268) (0.270) (0.271) 
married once → 
widowed 
0.300 0.0815 0.0489 0.0550 0.0474 0.0762 
(0.232) (0.257) (0.262) (0.263) (0.263) (0.266) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
0.0459 -0.0710 -0.0772 -0.0829 -0.0830 -0.0960 
(0.0976) (0.127) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.133) 
never married →  
never married 
0.520*** 0.249** 0.254** 0.270** 0.273** 0.293** 
(0.0535) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.120) 
never married →  
married 
-0.134 -0.0961 -0.0830 -0.143 -0.140 -0.145 
(0.157) (0.220) (0.225) (0.242) (0.242) (0.245) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
0.143 0.00747 0.0191 0.0149 0.0156 0.0128 
(0.118) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.161) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
0.128 -0.00402 -0.0115 -0.0203 -0.0209 -0.0399 
(0.238) (0.283) (0.284) (0.284) (0.286) (0.288) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
0.351 0.0132 0.0111 0.0204 0.0277 0.0149 
(0.291) (0.349) (0.348) (0.347) (0.348) (0.348) 
widowed →  widowed 
0.109 -0.0714 -0.0548 -0.0587 -0.0633 -0.0623 
(0.152) (0.183) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.185) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 0.0196 0.0132 0.00298 -0.000920 0.00155 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.167) (0.167) 
aged 31-35 
 -0.0231 -0.0341 -0.0434 -0.0436 -0.0332 
 (0.190) (0.194) (0.197) (0.198) (0.196) 
aged 36-40 
 -0.000239 -0.0158 -0.0162 -0.0165 -0.0159 
 (0.184) (0.187) (0.190) (0.191) (0.191) 
aged 41-45 
 0.00519 -0.0209 -0.0114 -0.0128 0.0195 
 (0.212) (0.217) (0.222) (0.221) (0.221) 
aged 46-50 
 0.197 0.173 0.177 0.174 0.215 
 (0.225) (0.227) (0.235) (0.236) (0.234) 
aged 51-55 
 0.0504 0.0218 0.0284 0.0244 0.0454 
 (0.254) (0.258) (0.264) (0.265) (0.264) 
aged 56-60 
 -0.0512 -0.0896 -0.0323 -0.0315 -0.00641 
 (0.285) (0.292) (0.308) (0.309) (0.307) 
aged 61-65 
 0.0735 0.0408 0.257 0.255 0.264 
 (0.300) (0.306) (0.383) (0.384) (0.384) 
older than 65 
 -0.0488 -0.0829 -0.118 -0.124 -0.0732 
 (0.312) (0.317) (0.322) (0.323) (0.324) 
…continued       
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…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for men) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 0.0415 0.0429 0.0505 0.0492 0.0438 
 (0.0795) (0.0803) (0.0830) (0.0833) (0.0860) 
not so good / bad 
 0.0637 0.0638 0.0876 0.0847 0.0455 
 (0.0964) (0.0956) (0.108) (0.108) (0.123) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 -0.194** -0.199** -0.197** -0.197** -0.182** 
 (0.0794) (0.0797) (0.0802) (0.0803) (0.0813) 
(higher) vocational 
 -0.242** -0.249** -0.248** -0.244** -0.229* 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.120) 
high 
 -0.215* -0.222* -0.216* -0.204* -0.195 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.119) (0.122) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 0.0999 0.102 0.0986 0.0892 0.0918 
 (0.0840) (0.0852) (0.0853) (0.0858) (0.0862) 
city 
 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.103 0.0994 
 (0.0853) (0.0854) (0.0855) (0.0906) (0.0901) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 0.00308 0.00555 0.00238 0.000194 -0.0135 
 (0.0745) (0.0757) (0.0760) (0.0766) (0.103) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 0.353*** 0.359*** 0.362*** 0.363*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0732) (0.0739) (0.0741) (0.0740) (0.0855) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 -0.589*** -0.590*** -0.590*** -0.588*** -0.587*** 
 (0.0795) (0.0806) (0.0804) (0.0803) (0.0832) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 -0.592*** -0.602*** -0.600*** -0.600*** -0.596*** 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.137) 
number of children 
 -0.00177 0.00307 0.00585 0.00693 -0.00125 
 (0.0535) (0.0539) (0.0535) (0.0535) (0.0539) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 -0.0517 -0.0537 -0.0984 -0.0984 -0.0846 
 (0.134) (0.136) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 -0.00311 -0.00129 -0.000701 -0.00492 0.00654 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 0.0363 0.0425 0.0420 0.0446 0.0322 
 (0.0773) (0.0776) (0.0777) (0.0776) (0.0794) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 -0.238*** -0.243*** -0.241*** -0.243*** -0.237** 
 (0.0906) (0.0908) (0.0911) (0.0914) (0.0921) 
3rd quintile 
 -0.260*** -0.264*** -0.262*** -0.262*** -0.232** 
 (0.0985) (0.0998) (0.0998) (0.100) (0.101) 
…continued       
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…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for men) 
       
4th quintile 
 -0.325*** -0.318*** -0.313*** -0.308*** -0.281** 
 (0.109) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.112) 
5th quintile 
 -0.392*** -0.384*** -0.376*** -0.350** -0.299** 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.138) (0.140) (0.145) 
log(household size) 
 0.231** 0.227** 0.229** 0.225** 0.212* 
 (0.102) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.0155 0.0232 0.0113 0.0173 0.0377 
 (0.108) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.366** -0.319* -0.334* -0.331* -0.282 
 (0.153) (0.181) (0.179) (0.180) (0.182) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 -0.512*** -0.468** -0.490** -0.479** -0.465** 
 (0.182) (0.201) (0.204) (0.203) (0.206) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 -0.531** -0.485** -0.502** -0.491** -0.484** 
 (0.231) (0.236) (0.241) (0.241) (0.246) 
> 50,000 € 
 -0.272 -0.221 -0.249 -0.244 -0.221 
 (0.235) (0.243) (0.250) (0.250) (0.255) 
years full-time 
employment 
 -0.00122 -0.00151 -0.000764 -0.000993 -0.00202 
 (0.00665) (0.00672) (0.00673) (0.00669) (0.00665) 
years part-time 
employment 
 -0.0231 -0.0225 -0.0221 -0.0208 -0.0193 
 (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0167) 
years unemployment 
 0.0381** 0.0375** 0.0377** 0.0372** 0.0312* 
 (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0162) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 0.115 0.0930 0.0953 0.0965 0.0860 
 (0.107) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 -0.0393 -0.0295 -0.0317 -0.0353 -0.0297 
 (0.0294) (0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0337) 
self-employed (yes) 
 0.0411 0.0439 0.0349 0.0387 0.0441 
 (0.184) (0.190) (0.192) (0.191) (0.190) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.00503 -0.0144 -0.0147 -0.0118 -0.0143 
 (0.156) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 -0.0448 -0.0443 -0.0389 -0.0402 -0.0175 
 (0.0762) (0.0760) (0.0758) (0.0760) (0.0772) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.673*** -0.691*** -0.694*** -0.697*** -0.680*** 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.180) 
worried about health 
 -0.101 -0.103 -0.106 -0.107 -0.110 
 (0.0713) (0.0725) (0.0734) (0.0734) (0.0734) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.266*** -0.270*** -0.273*** -0.265** -0.257** 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.0434*** -0.0436*** -0.0435*** -0.0433*** -0.0412*** 
 (0.00471) (0.00469) (0.00471) (0.00473) (0.00477) 
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…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for men) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.112 -0.106 -0.105 -0.136 
  (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.180) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  -0.0765 -0.0793 -0.0855 -0.0938 
  (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.137 -0.139 -0.142 -0.132 
  (0.168) (0.168) (0.170) (0.168) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  -0.0402 -0.0403 -0.0420 -0.0583 
  (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  0.0143 0.00918 0.0111 0.00374 
  (0.225) (0.223) (0.222) (0.225) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  -0.194 -0.195 -0.190 -0.201 
  (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.202 -0.206 -0.202 -0.221 
  (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.179) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  -0.0972 -0.0934 -0.0961 -0.110 
  (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  0.0230 0.0239 0.0195 0.0408 
  (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  0.0495 0.0497 0.0467 0.0574 
  (0.0937) (0.0940) (0.0940) (0.0950) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  0.0398 0.0349 0.0347 0.0441 
  (0.0971) (0.0974) (0.0975) (0.0989) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  -0.107 -0.104 -0.101 -0.102 
  (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.128) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  -0.102 -0.101 -0.101 -0.0892 
  (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.135) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  -0.0632 -0.0609 -0.0603 -0.0438 
  (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  -0.168 -0.167 -0.171 -0.167 
  (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.121) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  -0.0340 -0.0388 -0.0354 -0.0255 
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) 
birth (yes) 
   0.159 0.161 0.169 
   (0.140) (0.140) (0.141) 
retired (yes) 
   -0.249 -0.251 -0.221 
   (0.209) (0.210) (0.213) 
health worsened (yes) 
   0.0516 0.0450 0.0450 
   (0.0763) (0.0758) (0.0785) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
  
…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for men) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    -0.155 -0.164 
    (0.109) (0.111) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    -0.000278 0.00458 
    (0.127) (0.128) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    -0.0653 -0.0698 
    (0.0596) (0.0612) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     0.0736 
     (0.0835) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     0.110 
     (0.172) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     0.220 
     (0.138) 
other religious 
organisation 
     0.0703 
     (0.532) 
non-denominational 
     0.0494 
     (0.108) 
risk 
     -0.0289** 
     (0.0129) 
life satisfaction 
     -0.0203 
     (0.0210) 
Constant 
-1.473*** -0.436** -0.375 -0.397* -0.322 -0.211 
(0.0314) (0.222) (0.235) (0.238) (0.240) (0.297) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
2.62           24.52            24.91            25.04            25.14           25.15(*           
observations 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,371 
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Table A 10: Coefficients of probit regression on whether the change in net-wealth 
between 2002 and 2007 did not exceed a 5% decrease or increase for women 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
0.246 0.0229 0.0266 0.0162 0.0195 -0.00112 
(0.157) (0.197) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) (0.211) 
married once → 
widowed 
-0.0680 -0.292 -0.281 -0.282 -0.283 -0.273 
(0.162) (0.191) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.197) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
-0.0101 -0.0945 -0.0936 -0.0912 -0.0900 -0.0869 
(0.0888) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
never married →  
never married 
0.329*** 0.0981 0.124 0.120 0.122 0.130 
(0.0571) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) 
never married →  
married 
-0.0495 -0.140 -0.103 -0.0699 -0.0704 -0.0804 
(0.119) (0.174) (0.177) (0.180) (0.180) (0.183) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
0.336*** 0.139 0.150 0.154 0.155 0.136 
(0.0846) (0.112) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
0.00748 0.0409 0.0540 0.0684 0.0670 0.0794 
(0.239) (0.305) (0.303) (0.303) (0.304) (0.302) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
0.532*** 0.147 0.181 0.173 0.173 0.160 
(0.181) (0.219) (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) (0.222) 
widowed →  widowed 
0.298*** 0.0544 0.0504 0.0523 0.0532 0.0484 
(0.0735) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.113) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 -0.0294 -0.0315 -0.0159 -0.0158 -0.0395 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.155) 
aged 31-35 
 -0.159 -0.170 -0.170 -0.172 -0.218 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.155) 
aged 36-40 
 -0.0718 -0.0760 -0.0750 -0.0783 -0.102 
 (0.160) (0.161) (0.160) (0.160) (0.165) 
aged 41-45 
 0.127 0.0962 0.0997 0.0972 0.0745 
 (0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.167) (0.171) 
aged 46-50 
 0.283* 0.267 0.269 0.267 0.224 
 (0.169) (0.172) (0.172) (0.173) (0.177) 
aged 51-55 
 0.265 0.246 0.247 0.244 0.211 
 (0.183) (0.181) (0.184) (0.184) (0.191) 
aged 56-60 
 0.268 0.240 0.261 0.257 0.236 
 (0.202) (0.200) (0.210) (0.211) (0.214) 
aged 61-65 
 0.194 0.160 0.243 0.239 0.243 
 (0.191) (0.192) (0.243) (0.245) (0.250) 
older than 65 
 0.148 0.112 0.105 0.102 0.134 
 (0.199) (0.201) (0.200) (0.201) (0.205) 
…continued       
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…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for women) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.00763 -0.0103 -0.0308 -0.0314 -0.0348 
 (0.0680) (0.0689) (0.0694) (0.0692) (0.0747) 
not so good / bad 
 0.0534 0.0469 -0.000180 -0.000756 0.00188 
 (0.0891) (0.0900) (0.0926) (0.0930) (0.102) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 -0.269*** -0.270*** -0.273*** -0.272*** -0.246*** 
 (0.0618) (0.0624) (0.0627) (0.0628) (0.0635) 
(higher) vocational 
 -0.249** -0.248** -0.249** -0.250** -0.215** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.106) 
high 
 -0.204* -0.198* -0.201* -0.200* -0.178* 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 0.0308 0.0298 0.0300 0.0324 0.0225 
 (0.0738) (0.0744) (0.0745) (0.0747) (0.0747) 
city 
 0.0737 0.0669 0.0659 0.0707 0.0431 
 (0.0771) (0.0776) (0.0777) (0.0801) (0.0813) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.00278 -0.00747 -0.00510 -0.00463 -0.0682 
 (0.0738) (0.0748) (0.0751) (0.0753) (0.0862) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 0.379*** 0.380*** 0.378*** 0.379*** 0.276*** 
 (0.0682) (0.0689) (0.0691) (0.0691) (0.0816) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 -0.825*** -0.827*** -0.828*** -0.828*** -0.818*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0633) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0643) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 -0.752*** -0.753*** -0.751*** -0.750*** -0.735*** 
 (0.155) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.166) 
number of children 
 0.0155 0.0148 0.0140 0.0149 -0.000814 
 (0.0484) (0.0489) (0.0490) (0.0492) (0.0520) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 -0.388*** -0.389*** -0.370*** -0.371*** -0.380*** 
 (0.115) (0.118) (0.122) (0.122) (0.125) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 0.0429 0.0428 0.0359 0.0343 0.0647 
 (0.103) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.109) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.0927 -0.0836 -0.0887 -0.0890 -0.0792 
 (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 -0.151* -0.149* -0.150* -0.150* -0.150* 
 (0.0802) (0.0823) (0.0822) (0.0822) (0.0840) 
3rd quintile 
 -0.259*** -0.266*** -0.270*** -0.270*** -0.274*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0981) (0.0980) (0.0976) (0.101) 
…continued       
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…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for women) 
       
4th quintile 
 -0.253** -0.260** -0.266** -0.266** -0.266** 
 (0.110) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.118) 
5th quintile 
 -0.222** -0.228** -0.242** -0.240** -0.238* 
 (0.112) (0.115) (0.116) (0.119) (0.121) 
log(household size) 
 0.100 0.0944 0.0953 0.0950 0.0890 
 (0.0964) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.109) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.0522 -0.0319 -0.0324 -0.0286 0.00810 
 (0.0937) (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.134) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.139 -0.138 -0.133 -0.130 -0.0710 
 (0.137) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.169) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 -0.351** -0.372** -0.367** -0.363** -0.318* 
 (0.151) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) (0.177) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 -0.440** -0.449** -0.450** -0.445** -0.427** 
 (0.199) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.204) 
> 50,000 € 
 -0.357 -0.391 -0.384 -0.382 -0.361 
 (0.296) (0.297) (0.297) (0.298) (0.302) 
years full-time 
employment 
 -0.00168 -0.00184 -0.00165 -0.00164 -0.00119 
 (0.00302) (0.00301) (0.00298) (0.00297) (0.00305) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.000895 0.00102 0.00110 0.00110 0.00179 
 (0.00418) (0.00424) (0.00422) (0.00422) (0.00430) 
years unemployment 
 0.00169 0.00314 0.00288 0.00279 0.00234 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0133) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 0.0405 -0.0131 -0.00667 -0.00492 -0.0333 
 (0.0961) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 -0.0313 -0.00435 -0.00796 -0.00863 0.00190 
 (0.0251) (0.0279) (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0287) 
self-employed (yes) 
 0.0898 0.0942 0.0940 0.0942 0.0931 
 (0.170) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.169) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.139 0.144 0.152 0.149 0.152 
 (0.191) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.194) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 -0.115* -0.126** -0.128** -0.128** -0.103 
 (0.0614) (0.0618) (0.0618) (0.0621) (0.0640) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.539*** -0.554*** -0.556*** -0.557*** -0.577*** 
 (0.142) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144) (0.147) 
worried about health 
 -0.119* -0.114* -0.103 -0.102 -0.0950 
 (0.0686) (0.0691) (0.0708) (0.0707) (0.0720) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.110 -0.109 -0.110 -0.109 -0.0837 
 (0.0970) (0.0979) (0.0979) (0.0976) (0.0964) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.0652*** -0.0653*** -0.0655*** -0.0655*** -0.0644*** 
 (0.00406) (0.00410) (0.00410) (0.00410) (0.00428) 
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…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for women) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.192 -0.192 -0.193 -0.238 
  (0.273) (0.270) (0.269) (0.271) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  0.0718 0.0667 0.0654 0.0463 
  (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.147) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.374* -0.370* -0.371* -0.377* 
  (0.193) (0.193) (0.194) (0.194) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  0.00689 0.0163 0.0144 0.00961 
  (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.165 -0.166 -0.168 -0.179 
  (0.216) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  -0.369 -0.371 -0.371 -0.417* 
  (0.230) (0.231) (0.232) (0.242) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  0.00266 -0.00346 -0.00504 -0.0140 
  (0.183) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  -0.116 -0.126 -0.127 -0.128 
  (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  -0.130 -0.136 -0.135 -0.104 
  (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  -0.126 -0.128 -0.129 -0.121 
  (0.0939) (0.0937) (0.0937) (0.0953) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  -0.00526 -0.00616 -0.00618 0.00569 
  (0.0971) (0.0972) (0.0975) (0.0982) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  -0.169 -0.169 -0.170 -0.144 
  (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  0.0330 0.0337 0.0355 0.0518 
  (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.114) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  -0.0530 -0.0549 -0.0551 -0.0267 
  (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  -0.0725 -0.0740 -0.0744 -0.0729 
  (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.119) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  -0.178 -0.172 -0.172 -0.152 
  (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) 
birth (yes) 
   -0.0893 -0.0905 -0.0670 
   (0.118) (0.118) (0.120) 
retired (yes) 
   -0.107 -0.107 -0.0992 
   (0.161) (0.161) (0.167) 
health worsened (yes) 
   -0.104 -0.105 -0.104 
   (0.0742) (0.0737) (0.0746) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
  
…continued (probit regression on a change in wealth not exceeding 5% for women) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    0.0276 0.0402 
    (0.0951) (0.0958) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    -0.0626 -0.0518 
    (0.129) (0.130) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    0.00768 0.0152 
    (0.0599) (0.0619) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     0.00815 
     (0.0738) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     0.198 
     (0.142) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     0.570*** 
     (0.145) 
other religious 
organisation 
     0.122 
     (0.0850) 
non-denominational 
     -0.0261* 
     (0.0150) 
risk 
     -0.00243 
     (0.0217) 
life satisfaction 
     0.00815 
     (0.0738) 
Constant 
-1.351*** -0.133 -0.0358 0.0183 0.0128 -0.0349 
(0.0289) (0.206) (0.220) (0.223) (0.231) (0.254) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
1.35 27.54           28.05            28.15            28.16            28.49(*           
observations 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 6,979 
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Table A 11: Coefficients of ordered probit regression on the change in net-wealth 
between 2002 and 2007 for men 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.358*** -0.547*** -0.498*** -0.495*** -0.499*** -0.494*** 
(0.118) (0.124) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
married once → 
widowed 
0.273* 0.457*** 0.473*** 0.475*** 0.473*** 0.456*** 
(0.165) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.171) (0.172) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
-0.0119 -0.0262 -0.0125 -0.00845 -0.0115 0.000686 
(0.0539) (0.0554) (0.0558) (0.0559) (0.0560) (0.0564) 
never married →  
never married 
0.158*** 0.0298 0.0482 0.0607 0.0577 0.0444 
(0.0393) (0.0644) (0.0646) (0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0656) 
never married →  
married 
0.379*** 0.0938 0.0687 0.0366 0.0361 0.0304 
(0.0957) (0.109) (0.109) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
-0.0559 -0.0768 -0.0631 -0.0539 -0.0541 -0.0422 
(0.0795) (0.0914) (0.0920) (0.0926) (0.0926) (0.0929) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
0.167 -0.0709 -0.0868 -0.0865 -0.0904 -0.0868 
(0.153) (0.165) (0.165) (0.166) (0.166) (0.167) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
-0.513** -0.472** -0.423* -0.422* -0.429* -0.430* 
(0.227) (0.230) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.235) 
widowed →  widowed 
-0.204** -0.0157 -0.00701 -0.00118 0.00119 -0.00242 
(0.0975) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 0.137 0.164 0.151 0.154 0.159 
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) 
aged 31-35 
 0.286*** 0.314*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 0.335*** 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.108) 
aged 36-40 
 0.248** 0.282** 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.310*** 
 (0.111) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
aged 41-45 
 0.231* 0.260** 0.285** 0.285** 0.283** 
 (0.118) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
aged 46-50 
 0.186 0.210 0.243* 0.244* 0.239 
 (0.142) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.147) 
aged 51-55 
 0.164 0.212 0.247 0.246 0.248 
 (0.152) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.157) 
aged 56-60 
 0.204 0.271 0.286 0.280 0.274 
 (0.175) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.179) 
aged 61-65 
 0.218 0.271 0.209 0.203 0.198 
 (0.191) (0.192) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) 
older than 65 
 0.275 0.324 0.388* 0.384* 0.363* 
 (0.196) (0.198) (0.201) (0.201) (0.203) 
…continued       
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…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for men) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.0220 -0.0226 -0.0402 -0.0382 -0.0376 
 (0.0399) (0.0404) (0.0418) (0.0417) (0.0433) 
not so good / bad 
 -0.0854* -0.0808 -0.121** -0.118** -0.104* 
 (0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0550) (0.0551) (0.0584) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.0744 0.0828* 0.0791 0.0775 0.0719 
 (0.0500) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0504) (0.0509) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.0738 0.0921 0.0896 0.0856 0.0777 
 (0.0584) (0.0588) (0.0588) (0.0589) (0.0596) 
high 
 0.144** 0.164** 0.153** 0.142** 0.138** 
 (0.0649) (0.0654) (0.0655) (0.0663) (0.0676) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 -0.0141 -0.00960 -0.00933 -0.0107 -0.00997 
 (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0409) (0.0412) 
city 
 -0.0494 -0.0447 -0.0457 -0.0496 -0.0421 
 (0.0436) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0467) (0.0469) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.122*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.107** 
 (0.0388) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0441) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -0.126*** -0.138*** -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.0973* 
 (0.0476) (0.0479) (0.0481) (0.0482) (0.0525) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 0.153*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0357) (0.0356) (0.0352) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 0.270*** 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0474) (0.0480) 
number of children 
 -0.0644* -0.0862** -0.0838** -0.0852** -0.0835** 
 (0.0337) (0.0343) (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0341) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.118* 0.115* 0.0871 0.0878 0.0822 
 (0.0635) (0.0637) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0680) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 0.0181 0.00726 0.0112 0.0124 0.00814 
 (0.0586) (0.0589) (0.0593) (0.0594) (0.0597) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.0277 -0.0381 -0.0362 -0.0376 -0.0365 
 -0.0644* -0.0862** -0.0838** -0.0852** -0.0835** 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 0.0739 0.0661 0.0648 0.0649 0.0590 
 (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0524) 
3rd quintile 
 0.190*** 0.174*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0598) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0602) (0.0600) 
…continued       
       
205 
 
…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for men) 
       
4th quintile 
 0.279*** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.245*** 0.240*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0638) 
5th quintile 
 0.394*** 0.355*** 0.350*** 0.340*** 0.333*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0776) (0.0779) (0.0788) (0.0786) 
log(household size) 
 0.00594 0.0712 0.0750 0.0777 0.0780 
 (0.0616) (0.0643) (0.0649) (0.0648) (0.0660) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.0971 0.0338 0.0384 0.0372 0.0290 
 (0.0651) (0.0799) (0.0806) (0.0805) (0.0807) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.271*** -0.122 -0.120 -0.123 -0.113 
 (0.0875) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 -0.0793 0.0916 0.0967 0.0927 0.0847 
 (0.0933) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 0.0486 0.213* 0.217* 0.214* 0.203* 
 (0.104) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
> 50,000 € 
 0.0751 0.235* 0.239* 0.235* 0.226* 
 (0.115) (0.130) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
years full-time 
employment 
 -0.00350 -0.00224 -0.00252 -0.00216 -0.00214 
 (0.00395) (0.00396) (0.00399) (0.00401) (0.00412) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.00274 0.00480 0.00420 0.00383 0.00542 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0106) 
years unemployment 
 -0.0116 -0.0113 -0.0118 -0.0113 -0.00993 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0110) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 -0.0641 0.0474 0.0461 0.0485 0.0405 
 (0.0665) (0.0718) (0.0715) (0.0714) (0.0718) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 0.0477*** 0.00205 0.00415 0.00494 0.00554 
 (0.0157) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0190) 
self-employed (yes) 
 -0.261*** -0.226*** -0.222*** -0.224*** -0.230*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0639) (0.0640) (0.0639) (0.0639) 
civil servant (yes) 
 -0.200*** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.191*** -0.195*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0635) (0.0634) (0.0633) (0.0638) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0324) (0.0329) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.490*** -0.481*** -0.475*** -0.477*** -0.486*** 
 (0.0737) (0.0737) (0.0737) (0.0738) (0.0747) 
worried about health 
 0.0270 0.0306 0.0409 0.0410 0.0421 
 (0.0364) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0369) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0455) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.0723*** -0.0722*** -0.0726*** -0.0727*** -0.0738*** 
 (0.00346) (0.00348) (0.00349) (0.00348) (0.00351) 
       
…continued 
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…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for men) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  0.0909 0.0874 0.0866 0.0929 
  (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0801) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  0.0648 0.0639 0.0652 0.0689 
  (0.0668) (0.0669) (0.0670) (0.0675) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  -0.0740 -0.0728 -0.0749 -0.0691 
  (0.0826) (0.0825) (0.0826) (0.0825) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  -0.177** -0.177** -0.178** -0.169** 
  (0.0691) (0.0697) (0.0697) (0.0698) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  -0.0319 -0.0389 -0.0400 -0.0402 
  (0.0866) (0.0875) (0.0873) (0.0868) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  0.0403 0.0373 0.0378 0.0379 
  (0.0673) (0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0673) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  0.0700 0.0649 0.0649 0.0671 
  (0.0751) (0.0753) (0.0754) (0.0752) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  0.0851 0.0782 0.0780 0.0792 
  0.0909 0.0874 0.0866 0.0929 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  -0.0382 -0.0438 -0.0431 -0.0526 
  (0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0646) 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  -0.0602 -0.0649 -0.0640 -0.0661 
  (0.0505) (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0507) 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  -0.00976 -0.00915 -0.00852 -0.0209 
  (0.0562) (0.0562) (0.0562) (0.0566) 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  -0.110 -0.112 -0.113* -0.112 
  (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0691) 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  0.0914 0.0888 0.0906 0.0799 
  (0.0654) (0.0654) (0.0655) (0.0658) 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  0.0699 0.0702 0.0716 0.0726 
  (0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0553) (0.0559) 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  0.178*** 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 
  (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0613) (0.0614) 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  0.176*** 0.176*** 0.175** 0.168** 
  (0.0680) (0.0682) (0.0681) (0.0688) 
birth (yes) 
   0.0999 0.0994 0.0906 
   (0.0822) (0.0824) (0.0811) 
retired (yes) 
   0.121 0.123 0.121 
   (0.0915) (0.0914) (0.0925) 
health worsened (yes) 
   -0.0858** -0.0834** -0.0793** 
   (0.0365) (0.0364) (0.0370) 
       
…continued 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
  
…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for men) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    0.0798 0.0749 
    (0.0531) (0.0534) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    -0.00840 -0.00649 
    (0.0746) (0.0755) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    -0.00351 -0.00956 
    (0.0317) (0.0321) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     -0.0144 
     (0.0411) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     -0.124 
     (0.103) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     -0.233** 
     (0.102) 
other religious 
organisation 
     0.101 
     (0.353) 
non-denominational 
     -0.0485 
     (0.0454) 
risk 
     0.00376 
     (0.00675) 
life satisfaction 
     0.00398 
     (0.0104) 
Constant (cut 1) 
-0.806*** -0.992*** -0.837*** -0.828*** -0.820*** -0.838*** 
(0.0239) (0.137) (0.145) (0.151) (0.153) (0.179) 
Constant (cut 2) 
-0.532*** -0.701*** -0.544*** -0.534*** -0.526*** -0.544*** 
(0.0203) (0.138) (0.146) (0.153) (0.155) (0.181) 
Constant (cut 3) 
-0.356*** -0.511*** -0.352** -0.342** -0.334** -0.351* 
(0.0198) (0.138) (0.147) (0.153) (0.155) (0.181) 
Constant (cut 4) 
-0.300*** -0.449*** -0.290** -0.281* -0.272* -0.289 
(0.0197) (0.138) (0.147) (0.153) (0.155) (0.182) 
Constant (cut 5) 
-0.0650*** -0.196 -0.0348 -0.0250 -0.0168 -0.0363 
(0.0195) (0.139) (0.148) (0.154) (0.156) (0.183) 
Constant (cut 6) 
0.351*** 0.257* 0.421*** 0.432*** 0.440*** 0.424** 
(0.0205) (0.138) (0.148) (0.154) (0.156) (0.182) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.32 4.45 4.79 4.84 4.86 4.91(* 
observations 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,415 6,371 
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Table A 12: Coefficients of ordered probit regression on the change in net-wealth 
between 2002 and 2007 for women 
Control 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
marital change 
(omitted: married once 
→ married once) 
      
married once → 
divorced once 
-0.0825 -0.155 -0.138 -0.139 -0.139 -0.133 
(0.110) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) 
married once → 
widowed 
0.0676 0.265** 0.301*** 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.303*** 
(0.106) (0.112) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
married more than 
once →  married more 
than once 
-0.0325 -0.0358 -0.0296 -0.0284 -0.0285 -0.0179 
(0.0627) (0.0633) (0.0638) (0.0639) (0.0642) (0.0640) 
never married →  
never married 
0.216*** 0.0231 0.0357 0.0450 0.0447 0.0371 
(0.0397) (0.0657) (0.0668) (0.0667) (0.0669) (0.0690) 
never married →  
married 
0.391*** 0.0868 0.0839 0.0544 0.0543 0.0559 
(0.0811) (0.113) (0.112) (0.116) (0.116) (0.120) 
divorced once → 
divorced once 
0.0152 0.00980 0.0261 0.0269 0.0272 0.0398 
(0.0650) (0.0730) (0.0728) (0.0729) (0.0730) (0.0730) 
divorced once → 
remarried 
-0.0362 -0.244 -0.254 -0.256 -0.256 -0.230 
(0.179) (0.198) (0.201) (0.200) (0.200) (0.207) 
divorced more than 
once → divorced  
more than once 
-0.242* -0.378** -0.342** -0.344** -0.343** -0.351** 
(0.144) (0.153) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.156) 
widowed →  widowed 
-0.170*** -0.0262 -0.0159 -0.0161 -0.0165 -0.0124 
(0.0505) (0.0629) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0638) 
age class (omitted: 
aged 17-25) 
      
      
aged 26-30 
 0.111 0.0967 0.0942 0.0950 0.0918 
 (0.0913) (0.0920) (0.0920) (0.0921) (0.0934) 
aged 31-35 
 0.140* 0.139* 0.149* 0.152* 0.172** 
 (0.0813) (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0820) (0.0828) 
aged 36-40 
 0.0602 0.0537 0.0730 0.0766 0.0727 
 (0.0912) (0.0909) (0.0903) (0.0911) (0.0929) 
aged 41-45 
 0.115 0.113 0.138 0.141 0.149 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
aged 46-50 
 0.128 0.133 0.162 0.165 0.168 
 (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.112) 
aged 51-55 
 0.0983 0.119 0.151 0.154 0.149 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.114) 
aged 56-60 
 0.114 0.142 0.173 0.175 0.169 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.122) 
aged 61-65 
 0.152 0.173 0.195 0.197 0.198 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.139) (0.140) (0.142) 
older than 65 
 0.209* 0.230* 0.266** 0.269** 0.261** 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.122) 
…continued       
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…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for women) 
physical health 
(omitted: good / very 
good) 
      
satisfactory 
 -0.0202 -0.0120 -0.0215 -0.0213 -0.0102 
 (0.0385) (0.0388) (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0418) 
not so good / bad 
 -0.0892* -0.0885* -0.111** -0.111** -0.0849 
 (0.0456) (0.0457) (0.0496) (0.0497) (0.0547) 
education (omitted: 
low) 
      
middle 
 0.0964** 0.0986*** 0.0955** 0.0956** 0.0882** 
 (0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0383) 
(higher) vocational 
 0.0679 0.0763 0.0726 0.0716 0.0636 
 (0.0536) (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0543) (0.0549) 
high 
 0.184*** 0.194*** 0.186*** 0.182*** 0.179*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0545) (0.0547) (0.0560) (0.0569) 
region (omitted: rural) 
      
      
town 
 0.0158 0.0165 0.0152 0.0161 0.0208 
 (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0377) (0.0380) 
city 
 -0.0155 -0.0137 -0.0145 -0.0118 -0.00630 
 (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0422) (0.0427) 
East-Germany before 
1989 (yes) 
 -0.0878** -0.0970** -0.0993** -0.0989** -0.0744 
 (0.0401) (0.0403) (0.0404) (0.0402) (0.0452) 
migration background 
(yes) 
 -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.117** 
 (0.0433) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.0484) 
imputed (omitted: 
neither in 2002 nor in 
2007) 
      
      
imputed in 2002 or in 
2007 
 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0340) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0350) 
imputed in 2002 and in 
2007 
 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0410) 
number of children 
 -0.00830 -0.0276 -0.0266 -0.0272 -0.0302 
 (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0331) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 
(yes) 
 0.0605 0.0497 0.0289 0.0301 0.0235 
 (0.0605) (0.0612) (0.0643) (0.0645) (0.0660) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 
(yes) 
 -0.0337 -0.0455 -0.0415 -0.0400 -0.0370 
 (0.0585) (0.0592) (0.0594) (0.0596) (0.0605) 
child(ren) older than 
17 (yes) 
 -0.0830* -0.0896* -0.0879* -0.0876* -0.0857* 
 (0.0491) (0.0493) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0495) 
permanent HH-income 
(omitted: 1st quintile) 
      
      
2nd quintile 
 0.162*** 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0456) (0.0466) 
3rd quintile 
 0.312*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.273*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0531) (0.0531) 
…continued       
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…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for women) 
       
4th quintile 
 0.406*** 0.375*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.351*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0588) (0.0607) 
5th quintile 
 0.427*** 0.389*** 0.386*** 0.385*** 0.351*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0625) (0.0627) (0.0634) (0.0641) 
log(household size) 
 -0.0782 -0.000906 -0.000734 -0.000541 0.0225 
 (0.0584) (0.0603) (0.0603) (0.0604) (0.0607) 
permanent earnings 
(omitted: zero) 
      
      
> 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 
 -0.144** -0.139* -0.146* -0.148** -0.164** 
 (0.0576) (0.0750) (0.0750) (0.0751) (0.0758) 
> 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 
 -0.0164 0.0117 0.00286 0.000782 -0.00925 
 (0.0772) (0.0966) (0.0966) (0.0967) (0.0973) 
> 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 
 -0.114 -0.0889 -0.0991 -0.102 -0.114 
 (0.0817) (0.0959) (0.0962) (0.0963) (0.0974) 
> 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 
 -0.0495 -0.0272 -0.0342 -0.0363 -0.0466 
 (0.0930) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.106) 
> 50,000 € 
 0.000195 0.00724 -0.000365 -0.00345 -0.00897 
 (0.122) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) 
years full-time 
employment 
 0.000783 0.00148 0.00154 0.00158 0.00178 
 (0.00177) (0.00179) (0.00181) (0.00182) (0.00183) 
years part-time 
employment 
 0.00361 0.00392* 0.00389* 0.00388* 0.00361 
 (0.00232) (0.00232) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00236) 
years unemployment 
 -0.00714 -0.00842 -0.00815 -0.00820 -0.00693 
 (0.00865) (0.00866) (0.00865) (0.00863) (0.00876) 
in the labour force in 
2002(yes) 
 -0.0715 -0.0130 -0.0198 -0.0207 -0.0140 
 (0.0595) (0.0660) (0.0657) (0.0659) (0.0663) 
years in the labour 
force between 2002 
and 2007 
 0.0473*** 0.0212 0.0242 0.0248 0.0233 
 (0.0141) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0175) (0.0179) 
self-employed (yes) 
 -0.206*** -0.193*** -0.195*** -0.198*** -0.197*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0747) (0.0746) (0.0750) (0.0751) 
civil servant (yes) 
 0.119 0.118 0.117 0.117 0.125 
 (0.0803) (0.0802) (0.0804) (0.0805) (0.0810) 
saved continuously 
between 2002 and 
2007 (yes) 
 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.252*** 0.236*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0324) (0.0327) 
paid off loans 
continuously between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 -0.561*** -0.555*** -0.552*** -0.551*** -0.554*** 
 (0.0765) (0.0759) (0.0757) (0.0759) (0.0764) 
worried about health 
 -0.0296 -0.0325 -0.0274 -0.0276 -0.0353 
 (0.0368) (0.0373) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0374) 
inheritance between 
2002 and 2007 (yes) 
 0.305*** 0.301*** 0.301*** 0.301*** 0.299*** 
 (0.0432) (0.0433) (0.0433) (0.0434) (0.0436) 
IHS-transformed net-
wealth 2002 
 -0.0812*** -0.0811*** -0.0812*** -0.0813*** -0.0830*** 
 (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00323) 
       
…continued 
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…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for women) 
       
change in individual 
earnings (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
earnings decreased  up 
to 10% 
  0.156 0.156 0.157 0.160 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 25% 
  0.110 0.110 0.109 0.1000 
  (0.0767) (0.0768) (0.0768) (0.0773) 
earnings decreased  up 
to 50% 
  0.0514 0.0508 0.0521 0.0422 
  (0.0853) (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0858) 
earnings decreased  
more than 50% 
  -0.00820 -0.00968 -0.00874 -0.00681 
  (0.0700) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0713) 
earnings increased  up 
to 10% 
  0.114 0.116 0.117 0.108 
  (0.100) (0.0999) (0.0999) (0.101) 
earnings increased  up 
to 25% 
  0.144* 0.150* 0.150* 0.138 
  (0.0842) (0.0842) (0.0841) (0.0862) 
earnings increased  up 
to 50% 
  0.125 0.129 0.129 0.119 
  (0.0834) (0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0838) 
earnings increased  
more than 50% 
  0.0779 0.0843 0.0839 0.0770 
  0.156 0.156 0.157 0.160 
change in household 
income (omitted: 
change up to 5%) 
      
      
household income 
decreased up to 10% 
  (0.0681) (0.0690) (0.0691) (0.0688) 
  -0.0943 -0.0973 -0.0979 -0.108* 
household income 
decreased up to 25% 
  (0.0627) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0621) 
  -0.0248 -0.0243 -0.0242 -0.0249 
household income 
decreased up to 50% 
  (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0491) 
  -0.0444 -0.0433 -0.0432 -0.0475 
household income 
decreased more than 
50% 
  (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0521) (0.0522) 
  -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.180*** 
household income 
increased up to 10% 
  (0.0610) (0.0609) (0.0607) (0.0613) 
  0.0253 0.0257 0.0256 0.0222 
household income 
increased up to 25% 
  (0.0629) (0.0629) (0.0629) (0.0634) 
  0.0218 0.0208 0.0211 0.0204 
household income 
increased up to 50% 
  (0.0519) (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0524) 
  0.136** 0.133** 0.133** 0.135** 
household income 
increased more than 
50% 
  (0.0605) (0.0606) (0.0605) (0.0617) 
  0.140** 0.137** 0.137** 0.136** 
birth (yes) 
   0.0931 0.0936 0.0785 
   (0.0694) (0.0693) (0.0707) 
retired (yes) 
   0.0121 0.0129 0.0136 
   (0.0804) (0.0803) (0.0809) 
health worsened (yes) 
   -0.0507 -0.0502 -0.0460 
   (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0367) 
       
…continued 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
(*not comparable to other pseudo-R2 because of different sample size 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
 
 
 
 
 
…continued (ordered probit regression on a change in wealth for women) 
father highly educated 
(yes) 
    0.00127 0.00701 
    (0.0507) (0.0516) 
mother  highly 
educated (yes) 
    0.0376 0.0210 
    (0.0666) (0.0670) 
grew up in rural area 
(yes) 
    0.00970 0.00534 
    (0.0336) (0.0334) 
religion (omitted: 
catholic) 
      
      
evangelical 
     -0.0742** 
     (0.0343) 
other Christian 
religious organisation 
     -0.0637 
     (0.0950) 
Islamic religious 
organisation 
     -0.122 
     (0.101) 
other religious 
organisation 
     0.575 
     (0.415) 
non-denominational 
     -0.0891* 
     (0.0462) 
risk 
     0.0242*** 
     (0.00814) 
life satisfaction 
     0.0125 
     (0.0102) 
Constant (cut 1) 
-0.763*** -1.015*** -0.956*** -0.945*** -0.934*** -0.882*** 
(0.0203) (0.114) (0.119) (0.120) (0.126) (0.150) 
Constant (cut 2) 
-0.507*** -0.737*** -0.677*** -0.666*** -0.654*** -0.600*** 
(0.0206) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.126) (0.151) 
Constant (cut 3) 
-0.345*** -0.557*** -0.496*** -0.485*** -0.473*** -0.418*** 
(0.0210) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.126) (0.150) 
Constant (cut 4) 
-0.299*** -0.505*** -0.443*** -0.432*** -0.421*** -0.365** 
(0.0209) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.126) (0.150) 
Constant (cut 5) 
-0.0227 -0.205* -0.141 -0.130 -0.119 -0.0652 
(0.0204) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.127) (0.150) 
Constant (cut 6) 
0.360*** 0.212* 0.277** 0.288** 0.299** 0.357** 
(0.0196) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.126) (0.150) 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.36 5.05 5.28 5.29 5.30 5.41(* 
observations 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 6,979 
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Table A 13: Distribution of control variables for the OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth in 2007 
 MEN WOMEN 
control variables mean std. dev. min max mean std. dev. min max 
         
model (1) to model (4)         
marital history             
     ever married 0.647 0.478 0 1 0.589 0.492 0 1 
     remarried after one divorce 0.067 0.250 0 1 0.065 0.247 0 1 
     remarried after more than one divorce 0.010 0.100 0 1 0.008 0.092 0 1 
     remarried after widowhood 0.010 0.100 0 1 0.006 0.077 0 1 
     never married 0.170 0.376 0 1 0.139 0.346 0 1 
     divorced once 0.053 0.224 0 1 0.074 0.261 0 1 
     divorced more than once 0.010 0.098 0 1 0.013 0.115 0 1 
     widowed 0.033 0.178 0 1 0.106 0.307 0 1 
age 52.916 15.633 23 97 52.963 16.312 23 98 
squared age 3,044.398 1,693.133 529 9,409 3,071.133 1,789.802 529 9,604 
physical health                 
     good / very good 0.446 0.497 0 1 0.427 0.495 0 1 
     satisfactory 0.361 0.480 0 1 0.361 0.480 0 1 
     not so good / bad 0.192 0.394 0 1 0.212 0.409 0 1 
education                  
     low 0.119 0.324 0 1 0.197 0.398 0 1 
     middle 0.514 0.500 0 1 0.508 0.500 0 1 
     (higher) vocational 0.146 0.353 0 1 0.126 0.332 0 1 
     high 0.222 0.415 0 1 0.168 0.374 0 1 
region                  
     rural 0.237 0.425 0 1 0.238 0.426 0 1 
…continued  213 
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… continued (distribution of control variables for OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007) 
     town 0.479 0.500 0 1 0.473 0.499 0 1 
     city 0.284 0.451     0.289 0.454     
East-Germany before 1989 0.285 0.451 0 1 0.293 0.455 0 1 
migration background 0.148 0.355 0 1 0.142 0.349 0 1 
imputed 0.317 0.466 0 1 0.326 0.469 0 1 
number of children 0.441 0.846 0 8 0.453 0.845 0 8 
squared number of children 0.909 2.538 0 64 0.919 2.515 0 64 
child(ren) aged 0-4  0.067 0.250 0 1 0.070 0.255 0 1 
child(ren) aged 5-17  0.234 0.423 0 1 0.236 0.425 0 1 
child(ren) older than 17  0.400 0.490 0 1 0.616 0.486 0 1 
permanent HH-income                  
     1st quintile 0.181 0.385 0 1 0.251 0.433 0 1 
     2nd quintile 0.220 0.414 0 1 0.221 0.415 0 1 
     3rd quintile 0.225 0.418 0 1 0.205 0.404 0 1 
     4th quintile 0.216 0.411 0 1 0.190 0.392 0 1 
     5th quintile 0.158 0.365 0 1 0.133 0.339 0 1 
log(household size) 0.861 0.472 0 2.565 0.809 0.493 0 2.565 
permanent earnings              
        0 0.281 0.449 0 1 0.386 0.487 0 1 
     > 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 0.079 0.270 0 1 0.158 0.365 0 1 
     > 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 0.040 0.196 0 1 0.071 0.256 0 1 
     > 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 0.226 0.418 0 1 0.269 0.443 0 1 
     > 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 0.235 0.424 0 1 0.098 0.297 0 1 
     > 50,000 € 0.139 0.346 0 1 0.018 0.134 0 1 
years full-time employment 26.091 12.990 0 59.3 14.352 12.416 0 57 
years part-time employment 0.688 2.069 0 41 5.475 7.635 0 45.8 
…continued         
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… continued (distribution of control variables for OLS regression on IHS-transformed net-wealth 2007) 
years unemployment 0.973 2.172 27 0 0.996 2.263 0 38 
in the labour force  0.620 0.486 0 1 0.507 0.500 0 1 
self-employed 0.079 0.269 0 1 0.036 0.186 0 1 
civil servant 0.050 0.218 0 1 0.027 0.161 0 1 
saved the last three years 0.494 0.500 0 1 0.476 0.499 0 1 
inheritance before 1992 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.057 0.231 0 1 
inheritance between 1992 and 2002 0.063 0.243 0 1 0.068 0.253 0 1 
inheritance between 2002 and 2007 0.125 0.330 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 
father highly educated 0.093 0.290 0 1 0.099 0.298 0 1 
mother  highly educated 0.046 0.210 0 1 0.045 0.208 0 1 
grew up in rural area 0.610 0.488 0 1 0.611 0.487 0 1 
observations 5,693 6,386 
model (5)(*         
religion         
     catholic 0.277 0.447 0 1 0.288 0.453 0 1 
     evangelical 0.320 0.467 0 1 0.377 0.485 0 1 
     other Christian religious organisation 0.025 0.156 0 1 0.027 0.163 0 1 
     Islamic religious organisation 0.033 0.178 0 1 0.025 0.157 0 1 
     other religious organisation 0.001 0.037 0 1 0.001 0.038 0 1 
     non-denominational 0.344 0.475 0 1 0.280 0.449 0 1 
observations 5,685 6,371 
model (6)(*         
risk 2.741 2.304 0 10 1.893 1.917 0 10 
life satisfaction 6.758 1.782 0 10 6.779 1.783 0 10 
IHS-transformed net-wealth 2002 8.445 6.253 -13.190 16.044 7.867 6.092 -13.162 16.044 
observations 5,635 6,262 
(* As the distribution of the previous control variables does not differ to a great extent between the models, they are not listed again.     
Source: SOEP 2007.  
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Table A 14: Distribution of control variables for the OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth between 2002 and 2007 
 
 MEN WOMEN 
control variables mean std. dev. min max mean std. dev. min max 
         
model (1) to model (5)         
marital change             
     married once → married once 0.613 0.487 0 1 0.565 0.496 0 1 
     married once → divorced once 0.014 0.118 0 1 0.015 0.122 0 1 
     married once → widowed 0.008 0.090 0 1 0.019 0.137 0 1 
      married more than once →  married more 0.074 0.262 0 1 0.067 0.250 0 1 
     never married →  never married 0.184 0.387 0 1 0.147 0.355 0 1 
     never married →  married 0.032 0.175 0 1 0.036 0.186 0 1 
     divorced once → divorced once 0.038 0.192 0 1 0.055 0.227 0 1 
     divorced once → remarried 0.009 0.093 0 1 0.008 0.090 0 1 
     divorced more than once → divorced  0.005 0.070 0 1 0.009 0.095 0 1 
     widowed →  widowed 0.023 0.149 0 1 0.079 0.269 0 1 
age class           
     aged 17-25 0.111 0.314 0 1 0.109 0.312 0 1 
     aged 26-30 0.042 0.201 0 1 0.051 0.221 0 1 
     aged 31-35 0.082 0.275 0 1 0.086 0.280 0 1 
     aged 36-40 0.119 0.324 0 1 0.118 0.322 0 1 
     aged 41-45 0.112 0.316 0 1 0.114 0.318 0 1 
     aged 46-50 0.099 0.299 0 1 0.100 0.300 0 1 
     aged 51-56 0.097 0.296 0 1 0.093 0.290 0 1 
… continued 
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… continued (distribution of control variables for OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth) 
     aged 57-60 0.087 0.281 0 1 0.076 0.266 0 1 
     aged 61-65 0.103 0.304 0 1 0.097 0.297 0 1 
     older than 65 0.147 0.354 0 1 0.155 0.362 0 1 
physical health           
     good / very good 0.534 0.499 0 1 0.498 0.500 0 1 
     satisfactory 0.333 0.471 0 1 0.343 0.475 0 1 
     not so good / bad 0.133 0.339 0 1 0.159 0.366 0 1 
education            
     low 0.156 0.363 0 1 0.225 0.417 0 1 
     middle 0.468 0.499 0 1 0.481 0.500 0 1 
     (higher) vocational 0.132 0.338 0 1 0.122 0.327 0 1 
     high 0.245 0.430 0 1 0.172 0.378 0 1 
region            
     rural 0.238 0.426 0 1 0.237 0.425 0 1 
     town 0.459 0.498 0 1 0.458 0.498 0 1 
     city 0.303 0.460 0 1 0.305 0.461 0 1 
East-Germany before 1989 0.268 0.443 0 1 0.277 0.447 0 1 
migration background 0.143 0.350 0 1 0.137 0.344 0 1 
imputed or edited           
     not 0.502 0.500 0 1 0.487 0.500 0 1 
     imputed in 2002 or 2007 0.345 0.475 0 1 0.352 0.478 0 1 
     imputed in 2002 and 2007 0.153 0.360 0 1 0.162 0.368 0 1 
number of children 0.589 0.936 0 8 0.593 0.939 0 8 
child(ren) aged 0-4  0.096 0.295 0 1 0.098 0.298 0 1 
child(ren) aged 5-17  0.260 0.438 0 1 0.269 0.444 0 1 
child(ren) older than 17  0.329 0.470 0 1 0.523 0.500 0 1 
… continued 217 
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… continued (distribution of control variables for OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth) 
permanent HH-income            
     1st quintile 0.169 0.375 0 1 0.230 0.421 0 1 
     2nd quintile 0.197 0.398 0 1 0.201 0.400 0 1 
     3rd quintile 0.205 0.404 0 1 0.189 0.392 0 1 
     4th quintile 0.210 0.407 0 1 0.186 0.389 0 1 
     5th quintile 0.219 0.414 0 1 0.194 0.396 0 1 
log(household size) 0.943 0.467 0 2.485 0.907 0.485 0 2.485 
permanent earnings        
        0 0.205 0.404 0 1 0.313 0.464 0 1 
     > 0 to  ≤ 5,000 € 0.105 0.306 0 1 0.190 0.392 0 1 
     > 5,000 to  ≤ 10,000 € 0.056 0.230 0 1 0.088 0.283 0 1 
     > 10,000 to ≤ 30,000 € 0.230 0.421 0 1 0.274 0.446 0 1 
     > 30,000 to ≤ 50,000 € 0.227 0.419 0 1 0.107 0.309 0 1 
     > 50,000 € 0.177 0.381 0 1 0.029 0.169 0 1 
years full-time employment 22.787 13.801 0 56 12.922 12.052 0 52 
years part-time employment 0.432 1.685 0 38 4.159 6.962 0 42 
years unemployment 0.557 1.521 0 22 0.635 1.694 0 38 
in the labour force in 2002 0.661 0.473 0 1 0.520 0.500 0 1 
years in the labour force between 2002 and 3.831 2.558 0 6 3.119 2.645 0 6 
self-employed 0.080 0.271 0 1 0.038 0.190 0 1 
civil servant 0.062 0.241 0 1 0.037 0.190 0 1 
saved continuously between 2002 and 2007 0.402 0.490 0 1 0.379 0.485 0 1 
paid off loans continuously between 2002 0.053 0.223 0 1 0.044 0.206 0 1 
worried about health 0.632 0.482 0 1 0.673 0.469 0 1 
inheritance between 2002 and 2007 0.138 0.344 0 1 0.136 0.343 0 1 
IHS-transformed net-wealth 2002 8.609 6.209 -13.785 15.873 8.111 6.031 -13.953 15.873 
… continued 
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… continued (distribution of control variables for OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth) 
change in individual earnings            
     change up to 5% 0.327 0.469 0 1 0.400 0.490 0 1 
     earnings decreased  up to 10% 0.052 0.222 0 1 0.032 0.177 0 1 
     earnings decreased  up to 25% 0.074 0.262 0 1 0.058 0.234 0 1 
     earnings decreased  up to 50% 0.056 0.229 0 1 0.049 0.215 0 1 
     earnings decreased  more than 50% 0.160 0.366 0 1 0.152 0.359 0 1 
     earnings increased  up to 10% 0.046 0.210 0 1 0.031 0.172 0 1 
     earnings increased  up to 25% 0.088 0.283 0 1 0.058 0.234 0 1 
     earnings increased  up to 50% 0.064 0.245 0 1 0.041 0.199 0 1 
     earnings increased  more than 50% 0.134 0.340 0 1 0.179 0.383 0 1 
change in household income            
     change up to 5% 0.171 0.377 0 1 0.166 0.372 0 1 
     household income decreased up to 10% 0.082 0.275 0 1 0.074 0.263 0 1 
     household income decreased up to 25% 0.150 0.358 0 1 0.148 0.355 0 1 
     household income decreased up to 50% 0.139 0.346 0 1 0.139 0.346 0 1 
     household income decreased more than 0.069 0.254 0 1 0.088 0.284 0 1 
     household income increased up to 10% 0.070 0.255 0 1 0.067 0.250 0 1 
     household income increased up to 25% 0.136 0.342 0 1 0.127 0.333 0 1 
     household income increased up to 50% 0.100 0.300 0 1 0.097 0.296 0 1 
     household income increased more than 0.083 0.276 0 1 0.093 0.290 0 1 
birth  0.076 0.265 0 1 0.083 0.276 0 1 
retired 0.127 0.333 0 1 0.114 0.318 0 1 
health worsened  0.240 0.427 0 1 0.240 0.427 0 1 
father highly educated 0.116 0.321 0 1 0.121 0.326 0 1 
mother  highly educated 0.059 0.236 0 1 0.058 0.234 0 1 
grew up in rural area 0.597 0.491 0 1 0.603 0.489 0 1 
… continued 219 
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… continued (distribution of control variables for OLS regression on the change in IHS-transformed net-wealth) 
observations 6,419    7,077    
model (6)(*         
religion 0.280 0.449 0 1 0.292 0.455 0 1 
     catholic 0.324 0.468 0 1 0.378 0.485 0 1 
     evangelical 0.022 0.148 0 1 0.025 0.157 0 1 
     other Christian religious organisation 0.030 0.171 0 1 0.023 0.149 0 1 
     Islamic religious organisation 0.002 0.042 0 1 0.001 0.038 0 1 
     other religious organisation 0.343 0.475 0 1 0.280 0.449 0 1 
     non-denominational 2.855 2.338 0 10 1.950 1.937 0 10 
risk 7.126 1.647 0 10 7.115 1.689 0 10 
life satisfaction 0.280 0.449 0 1 0.292 0.455 0 1 
observations 6,374    6,981    
(* As the distribution of the previous control variables does not differ to a great extent between the models, they are not listed again.     
Source: SOEP 2007.  
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Table A 15: Calculation of the propensity scores 
  
Control variables MEN WOMEN 
   
age in 2002 
-0.0729*** -0.0721*** 
(0.0261) (0.0187) 
log (permanent household 
income) 
-0.302 -1.111*** 
(0.189) (0.160) 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
0.0307 0.0655*** 
(0.0376) (0.0235) 
educational attainment 2002 
0.0418 0.0102 
(0.0780) (0.0669) 
log ( length of marriage) 
0.109 0.338* 
(0.184) (0.191) 
log (age at marriage) 
0.982* 1.180** 
(0.541) (0.510) 
region (omitted: rural) 
  
  
town 
0.00585 0.132 
(0.155) (0.138) 
city 
0.105 -0.0313 
(0.170) (0.167) 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
-0.0540 -0.183 
(0.169) (0.175) 
migration background (yes) 
-0.303 -0.636*** 
(0.216) (0.205) 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
  
  
satisfactory 
-0.247* 0.00215 
(0.135) (0.120) 
not so good / bad 
-0.180 -0.0262 
(0.192) (0.180) 
mental health 
-0.0145** -0.0157*** 
(0.00648) (0.00551) 
number of children 
-0.403*** 0.203** 
(0.108) (0.0878) 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
-0.0949 -0.00877 
(0.183) (0.164) 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
0.440** -0.159 
(0.187) (0.176) 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
-0.199 0.327* 
(0.164) (0.181) 
years of working experience 
2002 
0.0238 0.00548 
(0.0212) (0.0139) 
years unemployment 
0.0446 0.0295 
(0.0413) (0.0315) 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
-0.295 0.0703 
(0.651) (0.326) 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
  
  
evangelical 
-0.0288 0.267* 
(0.160) (0.144) 
other Christian religious 
organisation(* 
 -0.158 
 (0.454) 
other religious organisation 
0.0810 0.769*** 
(0.341) (0.280) 
non-denominational 
0.205 0.367** 
(0.167) (0.182) 
life satisfaction 2002 
-0.138*** -0.0760** 
(0.0403) (0.0349) 
… continued 
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… continued (calculation of the propensity scores) 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
0.114 -0.0305 
(0.173) (0.162) 
father highly educated (yes) 
0.0936 0.0970 
(0.217) (0.192) 
mother highly educated (yes) 
0.00352 0.446* 
(0.285) (0.237) 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
-0.241* -0.115 
(0.124) (0.116) 
partner age 2002 
  
  
partner education 2002 
  
  
partner physical health 2002 
  
  
constant 
2.292 8.220*** 
(2.529) (2.128) 
pseudo R2 21.29 23.97 
observations 3,530 3,543 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.    
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Table A 16: Balancing tests for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for men 
  Mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched 40.743   51.802  -100.7       -7.11  0.000 
Matched 40.736   40.788    -0.5  99.5  -0.04  0.971 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched 10.317   10.405   -18.7       -1.72  0.086 
Matched  10.34   10.371    -6.6  64.6  -0.44  0.659 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched 9.7129   7.8767    53.8        3.64  0.000 
Matched 9.7477   9.8384    -2.7  95.1  -0.27  0.785 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched 1.3919    1.498   -11.4       -0.93  0.353 
Matched 1.4028    1.487    -9.0  20.6  -0.56  0.577 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched 2.3241    3.002   -84.6       -7.25  0.000 
Matched 2.3119   2.3092     0.3  99.6   0.02  0.984 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched 3.2892   3.2549    16.7        1.61  0.108 
Matched 3.2913   3.2983    -3.4  79.5  -0.20  0.841 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched .39189  0.48409   -18.6       -1.57  0.116 
Matched .38889  0.37247     3.3  82.2   0.20  0.841 
city 
Unmatched .33784   0.2581    17.4        1.55  0.122 
Matched .34722  0.35665    -2.1  88.2  -0.12  0.907 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched 37838  .26389    24.6       2.21  .027 
Matched .36111  0.37832    -3.7  85.0  -0.21  0.832 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched .10811  0.15885   -14.9       -1.18  0.236 
Matched .11111      0.1     3.3  78.1   0.22  0.830 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched .27027  0.37674   -22.8       -1.87  0.061 
Matched .27778  0.26404     2.9  87.1   0.18  0.854 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched .16216  0.15451     2.1        0.18  0.857 
Matched .15278  0.15407    -0.4  83.1  -0.02  0.983 
mental health 
Unmatched 45.832   51.465   -55.3       -5.13  0.000 
Matched 46.514   45.886     6.2  88.9   0.37  0.714 
number of children 
Unmatched .77027  0.73785     3.3        0.27  0.787 
Matched .79167   0.9004   -11.1  35.3  -0.73  0.465 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched .16216  0.12326    11.1        1.00  0.315 
Matched .16667  0.15729     2.7  75.9   0.15  0.880 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched .52703  0.35966    34.1        2.96  0.003 
Matched .52778  0.57912   -10.4  69.3  -0.62  0.539 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched .17568  0.39844   -50.7       -3.89  0.000 
Matched .18056  0.17951     0.2  99.5   0.02  0.987 
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for men) 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched 18.481   27.296   -87.8       -6.51  0.000 
Matched 18.625   18.372     2.5  97.1   0.17  0.862 
years unemployment 
Unmatched    0.75  0.56351    12.8          1.06  0.287 
Matched  0.6375  0.5532     5.8   54.8    0.38  0.708 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.94359  0.90448    30.0          2.28  0.023 
Matched 0.95123  0.95099     0.2   99.4    0.01  0.990 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched 0.21622  0.33304   -26.3         -2.11  0.035 
Matched 0.22222  0.22768    -1.2   95.3   -0.08  0.938 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched 0.04054  0.04398    -1.7         -0.14  0.886 
Matched 0.04167  0.04028     0.7   59.6    0.04  0.967 
non-denominational 
Unmatched 0.48649  0.29861    39.1          3.49  0.000 
Matched 0.48611  0.52242    -7.5   80.7   -0.43  0.666 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched  6.0811  7.0911   -56.3         -5.40  0.000 
Matched  6.1806  6.1877    -0.4   99.3   -0.02  0.981 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched 0.12162  0.16956   -13.6         -1.09  0.276 
Matched   0.125  0.11205     3.7   73.0    0.24  0.812 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.09459  0.07813     5.8          0.52  0.602 
Matched 0.09722  0.12525    -9.9  -70.2   -0.53  0.596 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.05405  0.03038    11.7          1.16  0.244 
Matched 0.05556  0.06414    -4.3   63.7   -0.22  0.830 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched     0.5  0.64352   -29.2         -2.55  0.011 
Matched     0.5  0.48001     4.1   86.1    0.24  0.812 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 17: Balancing test for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for 
women 
  Mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched   37.95  49.231    -101.7          -8.48   0.000 
Matched    37.8   38.37      -5.1    94.9   -0.45   0.652 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched  10.185   10.41     -50.4          -5.07   0.000 
Matched  10.218  10.219      -0.3    99.4   -0.02   0.981 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched  7.9218  5.9756      51.3           4.36   0.000 
Matched  7.8966  7.9443      -1.3    97.5   -0.11   0.914 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched    1.31  1.2451       7.0           0.68   0.498 
Matched  1.2842  1.3018      -1.9    72.9   -0.13   0.894 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched  2.3981  3.0026     -77.1          -7.40   0.000 
Matched  2.3812  2.3895      -1.1    98.6   -0.07   0.941 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched  3.1601    3.15       5.3           0.54   0.586 
Matched  3.1573  3.1741      -8.8   -66.4   -0.60   0.549 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched    0.52  0.47575       8.8           0.87   0.383 
Matched 0.50526  0.52991      -4.9    44.3   -0.34   0.736 
city 
Unmatched     0.2  0.26111     -14.5          -1.37   0.169 
Matched     0.2  0.21219      -2.9    80.0   -0.21   0.836 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.39  0.27563      24.4           2.52   0.012 
Matched 0.37895  0.40497      -5.5    77.2   -0.37   0.715 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched    0.11  0.16817     -16.8          -1.54   0.124 
Matched 0.11579  0.12526      -2.7    83.7   -0.20   0.842 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched    0.36  0.3677      -1.6          -0.16   0.875 
Matched 0.34737  0.33891       1.8    -9.8    0.12   0.903 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched    0.13  0.16091      -8.8          -0.83   0.406 
Matched 0.11579  0.10773       2.3    73.9    0.18   0.861 
mental health 
Unmatched  43.587  49.524     -50.7          -5.95   0.000 
Matched  44.927  44.261       5.7    88.8    0.39   0.694 
number of children 
Unmatched    1.32  0.7296      58.6           5.76   0.000 
Matched  1.3053  1.2413       6.3    89.2    0.43   0.666 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.27  0.12373      37.3           4.33   0.000 
Matched 0.28421  0.28071       0.9    97.6    0.05   0.958 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched     0.6  0.35928      49.5           4.94   0.000 
Matched 0.57895  0.56593       2.7    94.6    0.18   0.857 
        
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for women) 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.28  0.58902     -65.5          -6.20   0.000 
Matched 0.27368  0.28985      -3.4    94.8   -0.25   0.806 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched  12.466  17.979     -54.4          -4.64   0.000 
Matched   12.34  13.136      -7.9    85.6   -0.65   0.515 
years unemployment 
Unmatched   1.019  0.69297      19.2           1.90   0.057 
Matched 0.96316   1.154     -11.3    41.5   -0.68   0.497 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.69629  0.62551      22.9           2.12   0.034 
Matched 0.69572  0.71153      -5.1    77.7   -0.38   0.705 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched    0.36  0.37293      -2.7          -0.26   0.792 
Matched 0.36842  0.33466       7.0  -161.1    0.49   0.628 
other Christian religious 
organisation 
Unmatched    0.01  0.02759     -13.0          -1.07   0.286 
Matched 0.01053  0.01053       0.0   100.0    0.00   1.000 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched    0.06  0.04182       8.3           0.89   0.374 
Matched 0.06316  0.07895      -7.2    13.1   -0.42   0.674 
non-denominational 
Unmatched    0.39  0.2463      31.1           3.27   0.001 
Matched 0.37895  0.39797      -4.1    86.8   -8.48   0.789 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched    6.09   7.088     -53.6          -0.45   0.000 
Matched  6.3053  6.3661      -3.3    93.9   -5.07   0.824 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.12  0.16149     -11.9          -0.02   0.265 
Matched 0.10526  0.0986       1.9    83.9    4.36   0.880 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched     0.1  0.08132       6.5          -0.11   0.502 
Matched 0.09474  0.12108      -9.2   -41.0    0.68   0.561 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched    0.08  0.03427      19.7          -0.13   0.015 
Matched 0.08421  0.0716       5.4    72.4   -7.40   0.747 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched    0.59  0.64798     -11.9          -0.07   0.232 
Matched     0.6  0.56847       6.5    45.6    0.54   0.661 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
  
227 
 
Table A 18: Balancing tests for 5 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for men 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched 40.743    51.802   -100.7         -7.11  0.000 
Matched 40.736    40.819     -0.8   99.2   -0.06  0.953 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched 10.317    10.405    -18.7         -1.72  0.086 
Matched  10.34     10.36     -4.1   77.9   -0.27  0.784 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched 9.7129    7.8767     53.8          3.64  0.000 
Matched 9.7477    9.7448      0.1   99.8    0.01  0.993 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched 1.3919     1.498    -11.4         -0.93  0.353 
Matched 1.4028    1.4861     -8.9   21.4   -0.54  0.591 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched 2.3241     3.002    -84.6         -7.25  0.000 
Matched 2.3119    2.3015      1.3   98.5    0.08  0.938 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched 3.2892    3.2549     16.7          1.61  0.108 
Matched 3.2913    3.3045     -6.4   61.5   -0.37  0.709 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched .39189   0.48409    -18.6         -1.57  0.116 
Matched .38889   0.39444     -1.1   94.0   -0.07  0.946 
city 
Unmatched .33784    0.2581     17.4          1.55  0.122 
Matched .34722   0.34444      0.6   96.5    0.03  0.972 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched .37838   0.26389     24.6          2.21  0.027 
Matched .36111   0.39722     -7.8   68.5   -0.44  0.658 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched .10811   0.15885    -14.9         -1.18  0.236 
Matched .11111   0.09444      4.9   67.2    0.33  0.744 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched .27027   0.37674    -22.8         -1.87  0.061 
Matched .27778     0.275      0.6   97.4    0.04  0.971 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched .16216   0.15451      2.1          0.18  0.857 
Matched .15278   0.15278      0.0  100.0    0.00  1.000 
mental health 
Unmatched 45.832    51.465    -55.3         -5.13  0.000 
Matched 46.514    46.285      2.2   95.9    0.14  0.893 
number of children 
Unmatched .77027   0.73785      3.3          0.27  0.787 
Matched .79167   0.92222    -13.4  302.7   -0.87  0.386 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched .16216   0.12326     11.1          1.00  0.315 
Matched .16667   0.15556      3.2   71.4    0.18  0.857 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched .52703   0.35966     34.1          2.96  0.003 
Matched .52778       0.6    -14.7   56.8   -0.87  0.386 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched .17568   0.39844    -50.7         -3.89  0.000 
Matched .18056   0.17778      0.6   98.8    0.04  0.966 
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 5 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for men) 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched 18.481    27.296    -87.8         -6.51  0.000 
Matched 18.625    18.235      3.9   95.6    0.27  0.786 
years unemployment 
Unmatched   0.75   0.56351     12.8          1.06  0.287 
Matched 0.6375    0.6025      2.4   81.2    0.16  0.871 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched .94359   0.90448     30.0          2.28  0.023 
Matched .95123   0.94754      2.8   90.6    0.19  0.849 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched .21622   0.33304    -26.3         -2.11  0.035 
Matched .22222   0.20278      4.4   83.4    0.28  0.777 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched .04054   0.04398     -1.7         -0.14  0.886 
Matched .04167   0.03611      2.8  -61.5    0.17  0.864 
non-denominational 
Unmatched .48649   0.29861     39.1          3.49  0.000 
Matched .48611   0.53611    -10.4   73.4   -0.60  0.552 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched 6.0811    7.0911    -56.3         -5.40  0.000 
Matched 6.1806    6.1778      0.2   99.7    0.01  0.993 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched .12162   0.16956    -13.6         -1.09  0.276 
Matched  0.125   0.09722      7.9   42.1    0.53  0.599 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched .09459   0.07813      5.8          0.52  0.602 
Matched .09722     0.125     -9.9  -68.7   -0.53  0.599 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched .05405   0.03038     11.7          1.16  0.244 
Matched .05556   0.06944     -6.9   41.3   -0.34  0.733 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched    0.5   0.64352    -29.2         -2.55  0.011 
Matched    0.5   0.46389      7.3   74.8    0.43  0.667 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 19: Balancing test for 5 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for women 
 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched   37.95    49.231    -101.7          -8.48   0.000 
Matched    37.8    38.251      -4.1    96.0   -0.36   0.719 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched  10.185     10.41     -50.4          -5.07   0.000 
Matched  10.218    10.218      -0.0   100.0   -0.00   1.000 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched  7.9218    5.9756      51.3           4.36   0.000 
Matched  7.8966    8.0319      -3.6    93.0   -0.31   0.756 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched    1.31    1.2451       7.0           0.68   0.498 
Matched  1.2842    1.2653       2.0    70.8    0.14   0.886 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched  2.3981    3.0026     -77.1          -7.40   0.000 
Matched  2.3812     2.382      -0.1    99.9   -0.01   0.994 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched  3.1601      3.15       5.3           0.54   0.586 
Matched  3.1573    3.1742      -8.9   -67.8   -0.60   0.547 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched    0.52   0.47575       8.8           0.87   0.383 
Matched 0.50526   0.52421      -3.8    57.2   -0.26   0.795 
city 
Unmatched     0.2   0.26111     -14.5          -1.37   0.169 
Matched     0.2   0.21684      -4.0    72.4   -0.28   0.776 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.39   0.27563      24.4           2.52   0.012 
Matched 0.37895   0.39368      -3.1    87.1   -0.21   0.836 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched    0.11   0.16817     -16.8          -1.54   0.124 
Matched 0.11579   0.13053      -4.3    74.7   -0.31   0.759 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched    0.36    0.3677      -1.6          -0.16   0.875 
Matched 0.34737   0.33895       1.7    -9.3    0.12   0.903 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched    0.13   0.16091      -8.8          -0.83   0.406 
Matched 0.11579   0.09895       4.8    45.5    0.37   0.709 
mental health 
Unmatched  43.587    49.524     -50.7          -5.95   0.000 
Matched  44.927    44.394       4.6    91.0    0.32   0.752 
number of children 
Unmatched    1.32    0.7296      58.6           5.76   0.000 
Matched  1.3053    1.2379       6.7    88.6    0.46   0.647 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.27   0.12373      37.3           4.33   0.000 
Matched 0.28421   0.27158       3.2    91.4    0.19   0.847 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched     0.6   0.35928      49.5           4.94   0.000 
Matched 0.57895   0.55789       4.3    91.3    0.29   0.771 
        
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 5 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for women) 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.28   0.58902     -65.5          -6.20   0.000 
Matched 0.27368   0.29474      -4.5    93.2   -0.32   0.749 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched  12.466    17.979     -54.4          -4.64   0.000 
Matched   12.34    12.989      -6.4    88.2   -0.54   0.588 
years unemployment 
Unmatched   1.019   0.69297      19.2           1.90   0.057 
Matched 0.96316    1.1539     -11.3    41.5   -0.69   0.491 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.69629   0.62551      22.9           2.12   0.034 
Matched 0.69572   0.69767      -0.6    97.3   -0.05   0.963 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched    0.36   0.37293      -2.7          -0.26   0.792 
Matched 0.36842   0.33474       7.0  -160.5    0.48   0.629 
other Christian religious 
organisation 
Unmatched    0.01   0.02759     -13.0          -1.07   0.286 
Matched 0.01053   0.01263      -1.6    88.0   -0.13   0.893 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched    0.06   0.04182       8.3           0.89   0.374 
Matched 0.06316      0.08      -7.6     7.3   -0.45   0.655 
non-denominational 
Unmatched    0.39    0.2463      31.1           3.27   0.001 
Matched 0.37895   0.39579      -3.6    88.3   -0.24   0.813 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched    6.09     7.088     -53.6          -6.01   0.000 
Matched  6.3053    6.4232      -6.3    88.2   -0.43   0.669 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.12   0.16149     -11.9          -1.11   0.265 
Matched 0.10526   0.10105       1.2    89.9    0.09   0.924 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched     0.1   0.08132       6.5           0.67   0.502 
Matched 0.09474   0.10947      -5.1    21.1   -0.33   0.739 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched    0.08   0.03427      19.7           2.44   0.015 
Matched 0.08421   0.06737       7.3    63.2    0.44   0.663 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched    0.59   0.64798     -11.9          -1.20   0.232 
Matched     0.6   0.57053       6.1    49.2    0.41   0.682 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 20: Balancing tests for 1 nearest neighbour within a 0.05 caliper for men 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched  40.743     51.802    -100.7          -7.11   0.000 
Matched  40.736     40.264       4.3    95.7    0.36   0.717 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched  10.317     10.405     -18.7          -1.72   0.086 
Matched   10.34      10.36      -4.3    77.2   -0.29   0.773 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched  9.7129     7.8767      53.8           3.64   0.000 
Matched  9.7477     10.002      -7.5    86.2   -0.84   0.401 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched  1.3919      1.498     -11.4          -0.93   0.353 
Matched  1.4028     1.4861      -8.9    21.4   -0.54   0.592 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched  2.3241      3.002     -84.6          -7.25   0.000 
Matched  2.3119     2.3452      -4.2    95.1   -0.25   0.801 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched  3.2892     3.2549      16.7           1.61   0.108 
Matched  3.2913      3.279       6.0    64.3    0.35   0.730 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched 0.39189    0.48409     -18.6          -1.57   0.116 
Matched 0.38889    0.33333      11.2    39.7    0.69   0.491 
city 
Unmatched 0.33784     0.2581      17.4           1.55   0.122 
Matched 0.34722      0.375      -6.1    65.2   -0.34   0.731 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched 0.37838    0.26389      24.6           2.21   0.027 
Matched 0.36111    0.40278      -9.0    63.6   -0.51   0.610 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched 0.10811    0.15885     -14.9          -1.18   0.236 
Matched 0.11111    0.15278     -12.2    17.9   -0.73   0.464 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched 0.27027    0.37674     -22.8          -1.87   0.061 
Matched 0.27778    0.26389       3.0    87.0    0.19   0.853 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched 0.16216    0.15451       2.1           0.18   0.857 
Matched 0.15278    0.08333      19.0  -808.0    1.29   0.199 
mental health 
Unmatched  45.832     51.465     -55.3          -5.13   0.000 
Matched  46.514     45.954       5.5    90.1    0.34   0.736 
number of children 
Unmatched 0.77027    0.73785       3.3           0.27   0.787 
Matched 0.79167     1.0139     -22.7  -585.4   -1.57   0.119 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.16216    0.12326      11.1           1.00   0.315 
Matched 0.16667    0.16667       0.0   100.0    0.00   1.000 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.52703    0.35966      34.1           2.96   0.003 
Matched 0.52778    0.68056     -31.1     8.7   -1.88   0.062 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.17568    0.39844     -50.7          -3.89   0.000 
Matched 0.18056    0.20833      -6.3    87.5   -0.42   0.676 
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 1 nearest neighbour within a 0.05 caliper for men) 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched  18.481     27.296     -87.8          -6.51   0.000 
Matched  18.625     17.714       9.1    89.7    0.69   0.490 
years unemployment 
Unmatched    0.75    0.56351      12.8           1.06   0.287 
Matched  0.6375    0.46389      12.0     6.9    1.02   0.310 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.94359    0.90448      30.0           2.28   0.023 
Matched 0.95123    0.95042       0.6    97.9    0.05   0.961 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched 0.21622    0.33304     -26.3          -2.11   0.035 
Matched 0.22222    0.18056       9.4    64.3    0.62   0.536 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched 0.04054    0.04398      -1.7          -0.14   0.886 
Matched 0.04167    0.08333     -20.6 - 1110.9   -1.03   0.305 
non-denominational 
Unmatched 0.48649    0.29861      39.1           3.49   0.000 
Matched 0.48611    0.52778      -8.7    77.8   -0.50   0.620 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched  6.0811     7.0911     -56.3          -5.40   0.000 
Matched  6.1806     6.2083      -1.5    97.2   -0.09   0.929 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched 0.12162    0.16956     -13.6          -1.09   0.276 
Matched   0.125    0.09722       7.9    42.1    0.53   0.599 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.09459    0.07813       5.8           0.52   0.602 
Matched 0.09722    0.08333       4.9    15.7    0.29   0.773 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.05405    0.03038      11.7           1.16   0.244 
Matched 0.05556    0.04167       6.9    41.3    0.39   0.701 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched     0.5    0.64352     -29.2          -2.55   0.011 
Matched     0.5    0.45833       8.5    71.0    0.50   0.620 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 21: Balancing test for 1 nearest neighbour within a 0.05 caliper for women 
 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched   37.95   49.231   -101.7           -8.48   0.000 
Matched    37.8   39.042    -11.2    89.0    -0.97   0.335 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched  10.185    10.41    -50.4           -5.07   0.000 
Matched  10.218   10.211      1.5    97.0     0.10   0.917 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched  7.9218   5.9756     51.3            4.36   0.000 
Matched  7.8966   7.4839     10.9    78.8     0.87   0.387 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched    1.31   1.2451      7.0            0.68   0.498 
Matched  1.2842   1.2105      7.9   -13.6     0.58   0.561 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched  2.3981   3.0026    -77.1           -7.40   0.000 
Matched  2.3812   2.4231     -5.3    93.1    -0.39   0.699 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched  3.1601     3.15      5.3            0.54   0.586 
Matched  3.1573   3.1929    -18.7  -254.0    -1.29   0.199 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched    0.52  0.47575      8.8            0.87   0.383 
Matched 0.50526  0.43158     14.7   -66.5     1.02   0.311 
city 
Unmatched     0.2  0.26111    -14.5           -1.37   0.169 
Matched     0.2  0.27368    -17.5   -20.6    -1.19   0.234 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.39  0.27563     24.4            2.52   0.012 
Matched 0.37895  0.35789      4.5    81.6     0.30   0.765 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched    0.11  0.16817    -16.8           -1.54   0.124 
Matched 0.11579  0.08421      9.1    45.7     0.72   0.471 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched    0.36   0.3677     -1.6           -0.16   0.875 
Matched 0.34737  0.33684      2.2   -36.7     0.15   0.879 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched    0.13  0.16091     -8.8           -0.83   0.406 
Matched 0.11579  0.06316     14.9   -70.3     1.27   0.206 
mental health 
Unmatched  43.587   49.524    -50.7           -5.95   0.000 
Matched  44.927   43.982      8.1    84.1     0.58   0.565 
number of children 
Unmatched    1.32   0.7296     58.6            5.76   0.000 
Matched  1.3053   1.3053      0.0   100.0    -0.00   1.000 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.27  0.12373     37.3            4.33   0.000 
Matched 0.28421  0.27368      2.7    92.8     0.16   0.872 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched     0.6  0.35928     49.5            4.94   0.000 
Matched 0.57895  0.57895      0.0   100.0     0.00   1.000 
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… continued (balancing test for 1 nearest neighbour within a 0.05 caliper for women) 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.28  0.58902    -65.5           -6.20   0.000 
Matched 0.27368  0.25263      4.5    93.2     0.33   0.743 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched  12.466   17.979    -54.4           -4.64   0.000 
Matched   12.34   12.175      1.6    97.0     0.14   0.888 
years unemployment 
Unmatched   1.019  0.69297     19.2            1.90   0.057 
Matched 0.96316   1.1821    -12.9    32.8    -0.81   0.421 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.69629  0.62551     22.9            2.12   0.034 
Matched 0.69572  0.66979      8.4    63.4     0.60   0.552 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched    0.36  0.37293     -2.7           -0.26   0.792 
Matched 0.36842  0.36842      0.0   100.0     0.00   1.000 
other Christian religious 
organisation 
Unmatched    0.01  0.02759    -13.0           -1.07   0.286 
Matched 0.01053        0      7.8    40.2     1.00   0.319 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched    0.06  0.04182      8.3            0.89   0.374 
Matched 0.06316  0.09474    -14.3   -73.7    -0.80   0.422 
non-denominational 
Unmatched    0.39   0.2463     31.1            3.27   0.001 
Matched 0.37895  0.41053     -6.8    78.0    -0.44   0.658 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched    6.09    7.088    -53.6           -6.01   0.000 
Matched  6.3053   6.6632    -19.2    64.1    -1.40   0.164 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.12  0.16149    -11.9           -1.11   0.265 
Matched 0.10526  0.10526      0.0   100.0    -0.00   1.000 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched     0.1  0.08132      6.5            0.67   0.502 
Matched 0.09474  0.16842    -25.6  -294.5    -1.50   0.134 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched    0.08  0.03427     19.7            2.44   0.015 
Matched 0.08421  0.09474     -4.5    77.0    -0.25   0.801 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched    0.59  0.64798    -11.9           -1.20   0.232 
Matched     0.6  0.53684     13.0    -8.9     0.88   0.382 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 22: Balancing test for kernel matching (bandwidth 0.01) for men 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched  40.743    51.802   -100.7         -7.11 0.000 
Matched  40.736    41.173     -4.0  96.0   -0.32 0.752 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched  10.317    10.405    -18.7         -1.72 0.086 
Matched   10.34     10.35     -2.0  89.1   -0.14 0.892 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched  9.7129    7.8767     53.8          3.64 0.000 
Matched  9.7477    9.7848     -1.1  98.0   -0.11 0.914 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched  1.3919     1.498    -11.4         -0.93 0.353 
Matched  1.4028    1.3963      0.7  93.9    0.04 0.965 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched  2.3241     3.002    -84.6         -7.25 0.000 
Matched  2.3119    2.3752     -7.9  90.7   -0.47 0.638 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched  3.2892    3.2549     16.7          1.61 0.108 
Matched  3.2913    3.2895      0.8  95.0    0.05 0.961 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched 0.39189   0.48409    -18.6         -1.57 0.116 
Matched 0.38889   0.37778      2.2  87.9    0.14 0.892 
city 
Unmatched 0.33784    0.2581     17.4          1.55 0.122 
Matched 0.34722   0.31241      7.6  56.3    0.44 0.661 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched 0.37838   0.26389     24.6          2.21 0.027 
Matched 0.36111   0.39504     -7.3  70.4   -0.42 0.678 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched 0.10811   0.15885    -14.9         -1.18 0.236 
Matched 0.11111   0.11115     -0.0  99.9   -0.00 0.999 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched 0.27027   0.37674    -22.8         -1.87 0.061 
Matched 0.27778   0.24761      6.5  71.7    0.41 0.684 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched 0.16216   0.15451      2.1          0.18 0.857 
Matched 0.15278   0.14614      1.8  13.2    0.11 0.912 
mental health 
Unmatched  45.832    51.465    -55.3         -5.13 0.000 
Matched  46.514    45.828      6.7  87.8    0.40 0.690 
number of children 
Unmatched 0.77027   0.73785      3.3          0.27 0.787 
Matched 0.79167   0.89241    -10.3  10.7   -0.68 0.495 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.16216   0.12326     11.1          1.00 0.315 
Matched 0.16667   0.15156      4.3  61.2    0.25 0.807 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.52703   0.35966     34.1          2.96 0.003 
Matched 0.52778   0.57603     -9.8  71.2   -0.58 0.565 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.17568   0.39844    -50.7         -3.89 0.000 
Matched 0.18056   0.20974     -6.6  86.9   -0.44 0.662 
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for men) 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched 18.481 27.296  -87.8        -6.51  0.000 
Matched 18.625 19.028   -4.0  95.4  -0.29  0.776 
years unemployment 
Unmatched   0.75 0.56351   12.8         1.06  0.287 
Matched 0.6375 0.60234    2.4  81.1   0.15  0.878 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.94359 0.90448   30.0         2.28  0.023 
Matched 0.95123 0.95318   -1.5  95.0  -0.10  0.917 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched 0.21622 0.33304  -26.3        -2.11  0.035 
Matched 0.22222 0.19989    5.0  80.9   0.33  0.746 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched .04054 0.04398   -1.7        -0.14  0.886 
Matched 0.04167 0.04807   -3.2 -86.2  -0.18  0.854 
non-denominational 
Unmatched 0.48649 0.29861   39.1         3.49  0.000 
Matched 0.48611 0.5287   -8.9  77.3  -0.51  0.613 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched 6.0811 7.0911  -56.3        -5.40  0.000 
Matched 6.1806 6.0992    4.5  91.9   0.26  0.796 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched 0.12162 0.16956  -13.6        -1.09  0.276 
Matched  0.125 0.1056    5.5  59.5   0.36  0.719 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.09459 0.07813    5.8         0.52  0.602 
Matched 0.09722 0.09424    1.1  81.9   0.06  0.952 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.05405 0.03038   11.7         1.16  0.244 
Matched 0.05556 0.04666    4.4  62.4   0.24  0.811 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched    0.5 0.64352  -29.2        -2.55  0.011 
Matched    0.5 0.47451    5.2  82.2   0.30  0.762 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 23: Balancing test for kernel matching (bandwidth 0.01) for women 
 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched   37.95 49.231 -101.7         -8.48  0.000 
Matched  37.798 38.715   -8.3   91.9   -0.73  0.468 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched  10.185  10.41  -50.4         -5.07  0.000 
Matched  10.224 10.215    2.0   96.0    0.15  0.881 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched  7.9218 5.9756   51.3          4.36  0.000 
Matched  7.8912 7.5599    8.7   83.0    0.71  0.479 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched    1.31 1.2451    7.0          0.68  0.498 
Matched  1.2766 1.2866   -1.1   84.6   -0.08  0.939 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched  2.3981 3.0026  -77.1         -7.40  0.000 
Matched  2.3778 2.4556   -9.9   87.1   -0.69  0.488 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched  3.1601   3.15    5.3          0.54  0.586 
Matched  3.1576 3.1607   -1.6   68.8   -0.11  0.909 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched    0.52 0.47575    8.8          0.87  0.383 
Matched     0.5 0.47371    5.2   40.6    0.36  0.720 
city 
Unmatched     0.2 0.26111  -14.5         -1.37  0.169 
Matched 0.20213 0.23743   -8.4   42.2   -0.58  0.561 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.39 0.27563   24.4          2.52  0.012 
Matched 0.37234 0.41919  -10.0   59.0   -0.65  0.514 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched    0.11 0.16817  -16.8         -1.54  0.124 
Matched 0.11702 0.11048    1.9   88.8    0.14  0.888 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched    0.36 0.3677   -1.6         -0.16  0.875 
Matched 0.35106 0.34126    2.0  -27.3    0.14  0.888 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched    0.13 0.16091   -8.8         -0.83  0.406 
Matched 0.11702 0.1283   -3.2   63.5   -0.23  0.815 
mental health 
Unmatched  43.587 49.524  -50.7         -5.95  0.000 
Matched  44.831 43.721    9.5   81.3    0.65  0.519 
number of children 
Unmatched    1.32 0.7296   58.6          5.76  0.000 
Matched  1.2979 1.2568    4.1   93.1    0.27  0.786 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.27 0.12373   37.3          4.33  0.000 
Matched 0.28723 0.25292    8.8   76.5    0.53  0.599 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched     0.6 0.35928   49.5          4.94  0.000 
Matched 0.57447 0.57944   -1.0   97.9   -0.07  0.945 
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… continued (balancing test for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for women) 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched   0.28 .58902 -65.5        -6.20   0.000 
Matched 0.2766 .27239   0.9   98.6   0.06   0.949 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched 12.466 17.979 -54.4        -4.64   0.000 
Matched  12.34 12.824  -4.8   91.2  -0.40   0.693 
years unemployment 
Unmatched  1.019 0.69297  19.2         1.90   0.057 
Matched 0.96383 1.3035 -20.0   -4.2  -1.18   0.238 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.69629 0.62551  22.9         2.12   0.034 
Matched 0.69647 0.6865   3.2   85.9   0.23   0.816 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched   0.36 0.37293  -2.7        -0.26   0.792 
Matched 0.37234 0.30824  13.3  395.7   0.92   0.356 
other Christian religious 
organisation 
Unmatched   0.01 0.02759 -13.0        -1.07   0.286 
Matched 0.01064 0.01065  -0.0   99.9  -0.00   0.999 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched    0.0 0.0418    8.3         0.89   0.374 
Matched 0.06383 .09418 -13.8  -67.0  -0.77   0.443 
non-denominational 
Unmatched   0.39 0.2463  31.1         3.27   0.001 
Matched 0.37234 0.42111 -10.6   66.1  -0.68   0.497 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched   6.09  7.088 -53.6        -6.01   0.000 
Matched 6.3511  6.367  -0.9   98.4  -0.06   0.952 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched   0.12 0.16149 -11.9        -1.11   0.265 
Matched 0.10638 0.10068   1.6   86.3   0.13   0.899 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched    0.1 0.08132   6.5         0.67   0.502 
Matched 0.09574 0.11995  -8.4  -29.6  -0.53   0.595 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched   0.08 0.03427  19.7         2.44   0.015 
Matched 0.08511 0.08276   1.0   94.9   0.06   0.954 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched   0.59 0.64798 -11.9        -1.20   0.232 
Matched 0.60638 0.54878  11.9    0.6   0.80   0.427 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 24: Balancing test for local linear matching (bandwidth 0.01) for men 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched 40.743   51.802   -100.7          -7.11   0.000 
Matched 40.594    40.99     -3.6    96.4   -0.28   0.783 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched 10.317   10.405    -18.7          -1.72   0.086 
Matched 10.353   10.359     -1.3    93.1   -0.08   0.933 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched 9.7129   7.8767     53.8           3.64   0.000 
Matched  9.758   9.7802     -0.7    98.8   -0.06   0.950 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched 1.3919    1.498    -11.4          -0.93   0.353 
Matched 1.4058   1.3622      4.7    58.9    0.28   0.782 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched 2.3241    3.002    -84.6          -7.25   0.000 
Matched 2.3161   2.3735     -7.2    91.5   -0.42   0.678 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched 3.2892   3.2549     16.7           1.61   0.108 
Matched 3.2848   3.2815      1.6    90.2    0.10   0.924 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched 0.39189  0.48409    -18.6          -1.57   0.116 
Matched 0.4058  0.35806      9.6    48.2    0.57   0.569 
city 
Unmatched 0.33784   0.2581     17.4           1.55   0.122 
Matched 0.34783  0.29827     10.8    37.9    0.62   0.539 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched 0.37838  0.26389     24.6           2.21   0.027 
Matched 0.36232   0.4208    -12.6    48.9   -0.70   0.487 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched 0.10811  0.15885    -14.9          -1.18   0.236 
Matched 0.10145  0.10209     -0.2    98.7   -0.01   0.990 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched 0.27027  0.37674    -22.8          -1.87   0.061 
Matched 0.27536  0.25524      4.3    81.1    0.26   0.792 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched 0.16216  0.15451      2.1           0.18   0.857 
Matched 0.15942  0.16849     -2.5   -18.6   -0.14   0.887 
mental health 
Unmatched 45.832   51.465    -55.3          -5.13   0.000 
Matched 46.738   46.793     -0.5    99.0   -0.03   0.975 
number of children 
Unmatched 0.77027  0.73785      3.3           0.27   0.787 
Matched 0.82609  0.93468    -11.1  -234.9   -0.72   0.470 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.16216  0.12326     11.1           1.00   0.315 
Matched 0.15942  0.15372      1.6    85.4    0.09   0.928 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.52703  0.35966     34.1           2.96   0.003 
Matched 0.52174  0.60634    -17.2    49.5   -0.99   0.322 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched 0.17568  0.39844    -50.7          -3.89   0.000 
Matched 0.18841  0.22881     -9.2    81.9   -0.58   0.564 
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for men) 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched 18.481   27.296    -87.8          -6.51   0.000 
Matched 18.325   18.928     -6.0    93.2   -0.42   0.677 
years unemployment 
Unmatched   0.75  0.56351     12.8           1.06   0.287 
Matched 0.61594  0.62212     -0.4    96.7   -0.03   0.980 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.94359  0.90448     30.0           2.28   0.023 
Matched 0.95082  0.95629     -4.2    86.0   -0.29   0.776 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched 0.21622  0.33304    -26.3          -2.11   0.035 
Matched 0.23188  0.20144      6.9    73.9    0.43   0.668 
other religious organisation 
Unmatched 0.04054  0.04398     -1.7          -0.14   0.886 
Matched 0.04348  0.03935      2.0   -20.0    0.12   0.904 
non-denominational 
Unmatched 0.48649  0.29861     39.1           3.49   0.000 
Matched 0.47826  0.52949    -10.7    72.7   -0.60   0.552 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched 6.0811   7.0911    -56.3          -5.40   0.000 
Matched 6.2754   6.1213      8.6    84.7    0.48   0.634 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched 0.12162  0.16956    -13.6          -1.09   0.276 
Matched 0.13043  0.10775      6.4    52.7    0.41   0.685 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.09459  0.07813      5.8           0.52   0.602 
Matched 0.08696  0.09699     -3.6    39.1   -0.20   0.840 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched 0.05405  0.03038     11.7           1.16   0.244 
Matched 0.05797  0.05076      3.6    69.5    0.18   0.854 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched    0.5  0.64352    -29.2          -2.55   0.011 
Matched 0.50725  0.50044      1.4    95.3    0.08   0.937 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
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Table A 25: Balancing test for local linear matching (bandwidth 0.01) for women 
 
  mean % reduction bias t-test 
Control variables sample treated control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
age in 2002 
Unmatched   37.95   49.231    -101.7          -8.48   0.000 
Matched   38.41   38.713      -2.7    97.3   -0.22   0.825 
log (permanent household 
income) 
Unmatched  10.185    10.41     -50.4          -5.07   0.000 
Matched  10.268   10.284      -3.7    92.7   -0.27   0.786 
log (permanent individual 
earnings) 
Unmatched  7.9218   5.9756      51.3           4.36   0.000 
Matched  7.8949   7.7902       2.8    94.6    0.21   0.833 
educational attainment 2002 
Unmatched    1.31   1.2451       7.0           0.68   0.498 
Matched  1.3012   1.3148      -1.5    79.0   -0.10   0.924 
log ( length of marriage) 
Unmatched  2.3981   3.0026     -77.1          -7.40   0.000 
Matched  2.4285   2.4331      -0.6    99.2   -0.04   0.969 
log (age at marriage) 
Unmatched  3.1601     3.15       5.3           0.54   0.586 
Matched  3.1607   3.1653      -2.4    54.7   -0.15   0.880 
region (omitted: rural) 
       
       
town 
Unmatched    0.52  0.47575       8.8           0.87   0.383 
Matched 0.49398  0.46246       6.3    28.8    0.40   0.689 
city 
Unmatched     0.2  0.26111     -14.5          -1.37   0.169 
Matched 0.22892   0.2339      -1.2    91.8   -0.07   0.940 
East-Germany before 1989 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.39  0.27563      24.4           2.52   0.012 
Matched 0.36145  0.39637      -7.4    69.5   -0.46   0.648 
migration background (yes) 
Unmatched    0.11  0.16817     -16.8          -1.54   0.124 
Matched 0.13253  0.12681       1.7    90.2    0.11   0.914 
physical health (omitted: good 
/ very good) 
       
       
satisfactory 
Unmatched    0.36   0.3677      -1.6          -0.16   0.875 
Matched  0.3494  0.33984       2.0   -24.1    0.13   0.899 
not so good / bad 
Unmatched    0.13  0.16091      -8.8          -0.83   0.406 
Matched 0.10843  0.11447      -1.7    80.5   -0.12   0.903 
mental health 
Unmatched  43.587   49.524     -50.7          -5.95   0.000 
Matched  46.056   45.477       4.9    90.2    0.33   0.740 
number of children 
Unmatched    1.32   0.7296      58.6           5.76   0.000 
Matched  1.2289   1.2349      -0.6    99.0   -0.04   0.970 
child(ren) aged 0-4 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.27  0.12373      37.3           4.33   0.000 
Matched 0.27711  0.26677       2.6    92.9    0.15   0.883 
child(ren) aged 5-17 (yes) 
Unmatched     0.6  0.35928      49.5           4.94   0.000 
Matched 0.57831  0.57395       0.9    98.2    0.06   0.955 
        
… continued 
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… continued (balancing test for 10 nearest neighbours within a 0.05 caliper for women) 
child(ren) older than 17 (yes) 
Unmatched    0.28  0.58902     -65.5          -6.20   0.000 
Matched  0.3012  0.30505      -0.8    98.8   -0.05   0.958 
years of working experience 
2002 
Unmatched  12.466   17.979     -54.4          -4.64   0.000 
Matched  12.966   13.291      -3.2    94.1   -0.25   0.807 
years unemployment 
Unmatched   1.019  0.69297      19.2           1.90   0.057 
Matched 0.93976   1.0223      -4.9    74.7   -0.28   0.781 
share of years worked during 
marriage 
Unmatched 0.69629  0.62551      22.9           2.12   0.034 
Matched 0.70635  0.71224      -1.9    91.7   -0.13   0.896 
religion (omitted: catholic) 
       
       
evangelical 
Unmatched    0.36  0.37293      -2.7          -0.26   0.792 
Matched 0.37349  0.34611       5.7  -111.8    0.36   0.718 
other Christian religious 
organisation 
Unmatched    0.01  0.02759     -13.0          -1.07   0.286 
Matched 0.01205  0.01216      -0.1    99.3   -0.01   0.995 
Ot2her religious organisation 
Unmatched    0.06  0.04182       8.3           0.89   0.374 
Matched 0.07229  0.07157       0.3    96.0    0.02   0.986 
non-denominational 
Unmatched    0.39   0.2463      31.1           3.27   0.001 
Matched 0.36145  0.38172      -4.4    85.9   -0.27   0.790 
life satisfaction 2002 
Unmatched    6.09    7.088     -53.6          -6.01   0.000 
Matched  6.5301   6.5251       0.3    99.5    0.02   0.985 
inheritance during marriage 
(yes) 
Unmatched    0.12  0.16149     -11.9          -1.11   0.265 
Matched 0.12048  0.10364       4.8    59.4    0.34   0.735 
father highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched     0.1  0.08132       6.5           0.67   0.502 
Matched 0.10843  0.10439       1.4    78.4    0.08   0.934 
mother highly educated (yes) 
Unmatched    0.08  0.03427      19.7           2.44   0.015 
Matched 0.06024  0.06286      -1.1    94.3   -0.07   0.945 
grew up in rural area (yes) 
Unmatched    0.59  0.64798     -11.9          -1.20   0.232 
Matched 0.60241  0.57551       5.5    53.6    0.35   0.729 
 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations.  
 
 
